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Fiji

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The Republic of Fiji Military Forces have a small army with limited conventional capabilities though it has a strong international peacekeeping role. Fulfilment of its mandate under the Constitution to ensure internal security has, however, seen repeated allegations of human rights violations during domestic operations. Combined with a lack of robust civilian oversight, significant risks are associated with any weapons transfers to the armed forces.

International legal context

Organisation Status Comment
United Nations Member State
International Court of Justice Did not accept compulsory jurisdiction
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member State

Safeguards agreement in place
Pacific Islands Forum Member State

Suspended in 2009–14 following the 2006 coup and abrogation of the Constitution; reinstated as a full member in 2014.

Domestic Legal Context

Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base

Fiji is primarily an arms importer. It has no domestic arms industry and has never issued a manufacturing licence under its arms legislation, although the law permits one, subject to ministerial and Cabinet approval. Its arms transfers are not governed by the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) since Fiji has neither signed nor adhered to the treaty.

Fiji has submitted reports under the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) intermittently since 1992, including ‘nil’ returns for 1993–96, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2007, confirming no reportable transfers of major conventional arms in those years. Fiji has never reported an export of major conventional arms and no major import of conventional arms appears in its reporting.

Fiji’s most substantive submission, covering 2012–15, disclosed small arms and light weapons imports: 3,617 rifles and carbines (1,387 Croatian-made K2 rifles delivered 2012–14 and 2,230 Russian AKM-74 rifles delivered 2015), 50 Croatian revolvers/pistols (2012), 34 Croatian-supplied heavy machine guns (K3 and .50 calibre K6, 2012), and 4 sniper rifles of Indonesian origin routed via Croatia (2012). No Fiji submission has been identified since the 2015 report.

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database records a small number of major conventional arms deliveries to Fiji, consistent with the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF)’s limited platform inventory. The United States delivered three Adjutant-class minesweepers, in 1976 – Fiji’s first modern patrol vessels. Australia has since become the dominant supplier of major platforms: three ASI-315 patrol boats (‘Pacific Class’), delivered in 1995; three ‘Guardian Class’ patrol boats, recorded as delivered in 2024; and 24 Bushmaster armoured personnel carriers (APCs) delivered in two batches (10 in 2017 and 14 in 2024). France supplied Fiji’s short-lived Air Wing (1987–97) with two light helicopters: an armed AS-350/H-125 in 1990 and an AS-565 in 1992.

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

National framework

Fiji is not a State Party to the ATT and has not adopted dedicated strategic trade control legislation governing conventional arms transfers. Fiji is not a significant producer or exporter of conventional arms. Its defence capability is almost entirely dependent on imported equipment and government-to-government security assistance, principally from Australia and New Zealand.

Constitutional and institutional basis

Executive authority over defence rests with the Minister for Defence and Veterans Affairs and with Cabinet. This is set under Sections 81 and 91 of the Constitution of the Republic of Fiji of 2013, while the President serves as ceremonial Commander-in-Chief (Section 127). Section 131(2) assigns the RFMF ‘overall responsibility’ for the ‘security, defence and wellbeing of Fiji and all Fijians’. This broad constitutional mandate is currently under review as part of the government’s ongoing national security and defence review.

The Constitution contains no provisions governing arms transfer controls or implementation of international arms-transfer obligations. Authority over imports and exports therefore derives from ordinary legislation, principally the Arms and Ammunition Act 2003 as discussed below.

Legislative framework and scope

The Arms and Ammunition Act 2003 is Fiji’s principal arms-control legislation. The Customs (Prohibited Imports and Exports) Regulations 1986 classify firearms and ammunition as prohibited or restricted goods requiring import or export authorization, but operate primarily as a customs enforcement mechanism and defer to licences issued under the Arms and Ammunition Act.

The Act regulates the manufacture,Section 3, possession and licensing,Sections 4–9 dealing,Part IV, Sections 10–15 and the import, export, and transit of arms and ammunition.Part V, Sections 16–24 The definitions in Section 2 extend broadly to firearms, ammunition, and military ordnance, including grenades, mortars, rockets and artillery ammunition. However, the Act does not regulate military platforms such as armoured vehicles, combat aircraft, or naval vessels, nor does it regulate brokering, technical assistance, technology transfers or dual-use goods. No national military list has been identified.

Accordingly, Fiji’s legislative framework regulates firearms and ammunition principally as public order commodities rather than strategic military exports. Its scope broadly corresponds to ATT Articles 2(1)(h) and 3 (small arms, light weapons and ammunition), but does not establish a comprehensive control regime covering all categories of conventional arms listed in ATT Article 2(1).

Competent authorities

Licensing authority is concentrated within the executive. Under Sections 3(3), 16(4), and 19(3) of the Arms and Ammunition Act, the Minister, with Cabinet approval, may grant or refuse manufacturing, import, and export licences. The Minister may also prohibit imports from or exports to specified countries under Section 24, after consulting the Commissioner of Police. The legislation does not require consultation with foreign affairs, customs, or defence authorities before licensing decisions are taken.

The Commissioner of Police administers firearms licences,Section 6 firearms identification cards, Section 7 dealer licences, Section 10 and, where delegated by the Minister, personal import and export licences, Sections 16(6) and 19(5) while maintaining the national firearms register. The Commander of the RFMF has only one statutory role: under Section 3(4), Cabinet must consider the Commander’s views before approving a manufacturing licence or arsenal (though the Commander has no statutory role in import or export licensing).

The Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs oversees defence policy and negotiates bilateral defence cooperation agreements governing transfers of major military equipment outside the Arms and Ammunition Act. Customs authorities enforce declaration requirements under section 21 and exercise search and enforcement powers under Sections 32 to 41. Parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence reviews the Ministry’s annual reports and scrutinises treaties, although no record of committee scrutiny of a specific arms transfer decision has been identified.

Military procurement

Major-platform acquisition for the RFMF proceeds principally through executive defence cooperation arrangements rather than under the Arms and Ammunition Act. Domestic financial approval for procurements exceeding FJD 50,001 (approx. €20,000)is governed by the Procurement Regulations 2010, under which defence procurements may proceed through waiver procedures rather than competitive tender.

Licensing system

The Arms and Ammunition Act establishes an individual transaction licensing system comprising manufacturing licences,Section 3 firearms licences,Section 6 dealer licences,Section 10 import licences,Section 16 temporary import permits for travellers,Section 17 export licences,Section 19 and transit permits.Section 22 No general licences, open licences, or broker registration system exists.

Although Section 48 provides grounds for refusing, suspending or cancelling civilian firearms and dealer licences on public safety and public order grounds, no equivalent statutory assessment criteria govern ministerial decisions on import or export licences under Sections 16 and 19. In particular, the legislation contains no requirement to assess whether a proposed transfer could contribute to serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law, facilitate terrorism or organized crime, undermine peace and security, or be diverted to unauthorized end users. It also does not require consideration of UN Security Council arms embargoes or other international obligations.

Accordingly, Fiji’s licensing regime is discretionary and administrative rather than risk-based, and does not incorporate assessment criteria comparable to those required under Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.

End-use control and diversion prevention

No statutory requirement for end-user certificates, delivery verification certificates, non-re-export assurances, post-shipment verification, or end-use monitoring has been identified in the Arms and Ammunition Act. Sections 16 or 19 do not require the competent authority to assess diversion risk before authorizing an import or export licence.

Diversion controls focus principally on civilian firearms. The Act provides for firearm identification cards, Section 7 mandatory reporting of lost or destroyed firearms, Section 9 dealer record-keeping,Section 10(6) and (9) inspection powers,Section 11 secure storage obligations, Sections 13 and 37 and a central police firearms register. Members of the RFMF and Fiji Police Force are, however, exempt from the firearms licensing regime when acting in the course of their official duties, Section 5(1)(d) and no equivalent statutory inspection or audit regime governing military stockpiles has been identified.

Although Fiji cooperates regionally on illicit trafficking through customs and law enforcement networks, no formal diversion risk assessment or end-use verification mechanism comparable to Article 11 of the ATT has been identified.

Enforcement

The Arms and Ammunition Act establishes criminal penalties for unlawful manufacture, Section 3 import, Section 16 export, Section 19 and trafficking Section 23 of firearms and ammunition, with penalties ranging from monetary fines to life imprisonment for aggravated trafficking offences. Police and customs officers are granted extensive search, seizure, detention and forfeiture powers under Sections 32 to 41, while Section 45 extends the sentencing jurisdiction of magistrates for offences under the Act.

Oversight and transparency

Oversight of arms transfers remains limited. While Parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence provides general oversight of the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs under Standing Orders 109 and 110, no statutory mechanism was identified requiring parliamentary scrutiny or approval of individual arms transfers, military procurement decisions, or arms import and export licences. Licensing decisions remain an executive function under the Arms and Ammunition Act 2003.

The Arms and Ammunition Act contains no provisions comparable to Article 12 of the ATT, which requires records of authorized international arms transfers to be retained for a specified period. Likewise, neither the Act nor any other identified legislation requires publication of licensing decisions, licence denials, or annual transfer statistics.

As a State not party to the ATT, Fiji is not subject to the Treaty’s annual reporting obligations under Article 13. Reporting under other international transparency mechanisms has also been limited. Fiji submitted national reports under the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) in 2004 and 2006, and has participated in regional PoA meetings, but no subsequent national reports were identified. Similarly, Fiji’s reporting to UNROCA has been intermittent, consisting primarily of nil returns and a single substantive submission covering imports of small arms and light weapons between 2012 and 2015. Taken together, these reporting practices provide only limited transparency regarding Fiji’s arms transfer controls and licensing practice.

Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces

Strategic position and defence posture

Fiji is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral legislature; the Prime Minister leads the government while the President is ceremonial head of state. The next elections were scheduled for 2026 and were expected to proceed without major disruption, following the largely peaceful December 2022 election that brought Sitiveni Rabuka – the leader of the 1987 coups – to office. Fiji faces no active internal armed conflict and no armed opposition.

Civil-military relations remain shaped by coup history. Article 131 of the Constitution frames the RFMF’s role as carrying out the will of the people through government decisions, yet Fiji has experienced four coups, the most recent a bloodless takeover in December 2006 led by then Commander Frank Bainimarama, with democratic government restored in September 2014. An underlying risk of military intervention against a future civilian government persists given this history, though the conditions typically associated with such an event – significant social unrest or acute economic distress – are not present.

Fiji faces no major security risk from geopolitical rivalry and is not party to a territorial dispute carrying realistic risk of armed conflict. Janes nonetheless notes that the Naval Division lacks the capacity to assert Fiji’s claim over the Minerva Reefs against Tonga, nor to comprehensively patrol the EEZ and suppress illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Composition of the Armed Forces

The RFMF is a unified command with no operational air arm – its small Air Wing, formed in 1987, was disbanded in 1997. Service is voluntary; Fiji does not conscript. The RFMF’s legal basis is the Republic of Fiji Military Forces Act 1949 (Cap 81) – currently under government review – with a new Defence Act expected in 2026.

Command runs through a three-tier structure. Headquarters RFMF (Commander, Deputy Commander, and Chief of Staff) directs a set of directorates and command formations. The Commander of the Joint Task Force Command (JTFC) reports directly to the Commander RFMF on strategic and operational matters, giving joint and expeditionary tasking a more direct line to the top of the chain of command than routine land or maritime operations.

Army – Land Force Command

Land Forces Command is a regiment-sized force. The lack of air assets and amphibious capability leaves it defensive in orientation, and it has few major combat and transport vehicles for firepower and manoeuvre. It generates land combat power through permanent infantry and support units, supported by the Territorial Forces Brigade as a reserve component; units hold assigned areas of operation across the country and conduct security patrols in support of the Fiji Police Force. Land Forces Command and the Territorial Forces Brigade are also active in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, including the COVID-19 public health response.

Prior to the 2006 coup, the RFMF acquired equipment mainly from Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the coup triggered sanctions from most of these countries, forcing Fiji to diversify its procurement sources. In 2016, Fiji’s Minister of Defence confirmed the country had received approximately US$9 million worth of guns and ammunition from Russia, intended to support Fiji’s participation in UN missions.

Fiji acquired ten Bushmaster armoured vehicles from the Australian Army in 2017, of which seven were earmarked to support RFMF’s participation in the UN peacekeeping operation at the Golan Heights. In 2023, it was reported that Fiji would purchase 14 further Bushmasters, though no delivery timeline or contract value was disclosed. Fiji also operates six KH178 105mm towed howitzers (Hyundai WIA, South Korea, delivered in 2014), although they are ceremonial use rather than operational fire-support. China supplied construction equipment, uniforms and other non-lethal aid in 2018, followed by a donation of 47 specialized military vehicles across six basic types in 2020.

The United States has also been a recurring source of vehicle donations: in 2022, US$224,000 worth of equipment, which included 11 vehicles, was delivered to the RFMF, and in January 2025 the US donated two further vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment, which were delivered to the RFMF Engineers Camp in Nabuni. Land Forces Command fields no main battle tanks or tracked armoured fighting vehicles.

Fiji’s forces operate a mixed inventory of small arms drawn from Western, South Korean, and former Soviet-bloc suppliers. Sidearms include the .45 M1911A1 pistol and the Russian PM (Makarov) pistol. Rifles include the 5.56mm M16A1 and M4, the 7.62mm FN-FAL, the Daewoo K2 assault rifle, and the Russian AKS-74 assault rifle. Light machine gun support is provided by the Daewoo K3 and the Russian RPK-74, alongside the 7.62mm PKM and M60 general-purpose machine guns. Quantities are not disclosed in available Janes’ reporting.

Fiji’s light weapons inventory includes the 0.5″ M2HB and the South Korean K6 .50 calibre heavy machine guns (the latter for an anti-materiel/anti-aircraft role), RPG-7 rocket launchers, M79 and M203 40mm grenade launchers, and the 81mm L16 mortar. Quantities are not disclosed in available Janes’ reporting.

Air force

Fiji has no air force.

Navy – Naval Division

The maritime arm of the RFMF is grouped under Maritime Forces Command falling under the RFMF Chief of Staff Headquarters. Its remit covers securing Fiji’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), maritime law enforcement and fisheries surveillance in support of other agencies, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The Naval Division (ND) lacks the capacity to patrol Fiji’s maritime zones effectively, and possesses no air or amphibious assets. Its structure is built around a small fleet of patrol and support vessels, forming a compact, multirole force designed to switch between constabulary, humanitarian, and limited warfighting tasks.

Australia donated three Tenix (Transfield Shipbuilding) Pacific Class patrol boats in the 1990s but none now remains in service. These were replaced by the Guardian Class patrol boats under an Australian programme. Guardian Class vessels carry a crew of 23, a 30mm naval gun as primary armament, and port and starboard 12.7mm general-purpose machine guns. These are intended to enhance Fiji’s capability against transborder maritime crime such as irregular migration and narcotics smuggling. The two Guardian Class boats received so far are in service: RFNS Savenaca (delivered March 2020) and RFNS Puamau (March 2024). Of the original three Pacific-class boats, RFNS Kiro was lost in 2016 and RFNS Kikau was decommissioned in December 2023.

Recent and current operations

Fiji’s core mandate for its forces is safeguarding the country against external security threats and upholding internal stability, working alongside the Fiji Police Force to contain civil disorder and supporting disaster relief and rural development activities. Peacekeeping is a further central pillar of this role. Fiji contributes regularly to UN peacekeeping missions — RFMF contingents have deployed to Lebanon, the Golan Heights, South Sudan, and Iraq – and the RFMF maintains more than 330 uniformed personnel across roughly seven current peace operations. Today, its largest deployment of more than 160 UN Police is to the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The Fijian armed forces have also deployed in the Pacific to assist the UN’s Transitional Administration in East Timor and to tackle the bushfires in Australia in early 2020.

New Zealand and Australia are the RFMF’s principal defence partners, with Fijian personnel training and deploying alongside both nations’ forces to prepare for and support these international missions. Australia outcompeted China to fund the upgrade of Blackrock Camp into a regional hub for peacekeeping training and pre-deployment preparation for military and police forces, and in May 2025, a company-sized RFMF contingent deployed to Australia for a five-month rotation, taking part in Exercises Talisman Sabre 2025 and Coral Warrior 2025.

Compliance with IHL and Human Rights by the Armed Forces

The RFMF overseas activities consist primarily of peacekeeping, observer, and protection missions rather than combat operations. No alleged violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) by Fijian military contingents overseas have been identified. 

One substantiated case of misconduct has nevertheless been recorded. Following allegations made in September 2017 that a Fijian peacekeeper serving with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) engaged in transactional sex with two adults in Beirut, the UN’s investigation substantiated one allegation of sexual exploitation. The peacekeeper was detained for 28 days, dismissed from the mission, and repatriated to Fiji. No other substantiated allegations involving Fijian peacekeepers were identified in subsequent UN reporting. 

The principal compliance concerns involving the RFMF arise from its domestic internal security role. Amnesty International concluded that the military’s involvement in civilian policing, combined with repeated military intervention in politics, has fostered a culture of impunity within Fiji’s security forces. The Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect similarly identified military involvement in policing, weak civilian oversight, and broad legal immunities as structural factors increasing the risk of human rights violations. One article even describes violence within Fiji’s security sector as ‘endemic’, while the Global Human Rights Defence (GHRD) concluded that brutality by Fiji’s security forces reflects entrenched structural and institutional weaknesses and not merely isolated misconduct. 

The most serious recent allegation concerns the death of Jone Vakarisi, who died on 16 April 2026 after being detained by the RFMF during what the military described as a ‘national security investigation’. The RFMF initially attributed his death to a  ‘medical emergency’ arising from a pre-existing medical condition. Following a police investigation, however, the death was reclassified as murder, prompting the RFMF to issue a public correction of its earlier account. As of late July 2026, the investigation was nearing completion according to the government.

According to RNZ, Mr Vakarisi’s sister stated that he was heard begging for his life while inside RFMF headquarters before his death. One of the detainees, Kelepi Komaisavou, subsequently told The Fiji Times that detainees were stripped, beaten, forced to crawl across hot tarmac, and compelled to drink from a pothole while a soldier stood on his neck. The Fiji Police Force subsequently confirmed that the leaked death certificate circulating publicly was an official police document issued following the post-mortem examination. The document recorded the causes of death as asphyxia, aspiration of gastric contents, severe traumatic head injuries, and blunt-force trauma to the head and chest.

Fiji’s security forces has established a joint taskforce mid-April to crack down on drugs and organised crime. Amnesty International, quoted by RNZ, believes the joint police and military operations have likely increased the incidence of torture and murder. Human rights activists’ have called to dismantle the task force, a call which has been rejected.

Taken together, the available information suggests that current compliance concerns arise principally from the RFMF’s domestic security role.

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

Legal Framework

Institutional and Statutory Basis

The Fiji Police Force is governed by the Constitution, national law, and administrative regulations. Section 8 of the 2013 Constitution provides that ‘every person has the right to life, and a person must not be arbitrarily deprived of life’. Section 11 protects freedom from torture of any kind – physical, mental, or emotional – and cruel, inhuman, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment, and the right to security of the person, including freedom from violence ‘from any source, at home, school, work or in any other place’. Section 18 protects the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present petitions peaceably and unarmed, subject to limitation ‘in the interests of national security, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or the orderly conduct of elections’ or to protect the rights of others. The Constitution provides that the Fiji Police Force ‘established under a written law continues in existence’ and that ‘a written law may prescribe provisions relating to the Fiji Police Force’, with similar provisions for the Fiji Corrections Service. It does not itself address use of force by either body, leaving this to national legislation and administrative regulation.

Use of Force and Firearms

Section 10(2) of the 2009 Criminal Procedure Decree authorizes a police officer to use ‘all means necessary to effect the arrest’ where a person forcibly resists or attempts to evade arrest. On firearms specifically, Section 9(3) of the Public Order Act, as amended by the 2012 Public Order (Amendment) Decree, permits an officer, if in his or her opinion such action is necessary for the public safety, after giving due warning’, to use force ‘as he or she considers necessary, including the use of arms’, to disperse an assembly and apprehend those present, with immunity from criminal or civil liability for any resulting harm or loss. These provisions do not comply with international law and standards, which restrict firearms use to situations of imminent threat to life or serious injury and only where less-lethal force would be ineffective.

In custodial settings, the 2006 Prisons and Corrections Act governs use of force. Section 40(1) restricts force against a prisoner to self-defence or defence of another, preventing escape or attempted escape, or responding to actual or passive resistance to an officer in the lawful discharge of duty, and requires that no more force be used than necessary, with immediate reporting to the officer in charge. Section 41(1) restricts firearms use to preventing escape (where arms are the only means of doing so), preventing a combined outbreak or forced breach of a prison’s doors, gates, walls or fencing, or preventing violence placing an officer or other person in danger of bodily harm. Warnings must be given before firearms are used, and ‘the objective shall be to disable rather than kill, as far as practicable’. These provisions likewise do not comply with international law and standards.

The Fiji Police Force has historically comprised approximately 2,500–3,500 sworn officers, although no current authoritative figure has been identified in official sources. Routine police patrol officers are traditionally unarmed, with firearms generally issued only to authorized personnel and specialist units when operationally required. In 2006, the Fiji Police Force upgraded its armoury and acquired additional firearms, but these were reportedly intended to strengthen police capability rather than introduce routine armed patrols. Publicly available estimates are provided by the Small Arms Survey’s Global Firearms Holdings (2018), which estimates that Fiji’s law enforcement agencies possess about 2,000 firearms, compared with an earlier estimate of 571 police firearms in 2003; no more recent inventory has been found.

Oversight

There is no independent external police oversight body.

Police Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights

Use of force connected to political unrest

The clearest historical instance of arms actually being used in connection with civil unrest remains the political violence surrounding the May 2000 coup rather than routine policing of assemblies: an Associated Press cameraman was shot in the arm while filming an armed confrontation between government soldiers and supporters of coup leader George Speight, and a soldier and a police officer were killed in a rebel ambush in August 2000 during the mutiny’s aftermath.

Use of Force and Custodial Abuse

Fiji’s police have a long-standing pattern of allegations concerning excessive use of force, torture, and ill-treatment. Amnesty International has documented repeated cases of police abuse, including allegations of torture and ill-treatment in custody, use of violence to extract confessions, unexplained deaths in custody, and failures to ensure effective investigations and accountability. The Global Human Rights Defence review of security-force violence in Fiji identified police brutality, weak oversight mechanisms and institutional impunity as continuing concerns, describing violence by security forces as rooted in broader structural and institutional weaknesses rather than isolated misconduct. Similar concerns regarding weak civilian oversight, the involvement of military personnel in domestic security functions, and risks of human rights violations arising from broad legal powers and limited accountability mechanisms were identified by the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. One article has described violence within Fiji’s police and corrections services as an endemic problem linked to institutional culture, inadequate accountability, and the normalization of use of excessive force.

In April 2026, Sakiasi Ose Radravu died after being arrested during a police raid at his home in Kinoya, near Suva. His family alleged that he had been tortured, sexually assaulted, and severely beaten during the arrest and subsequent detention. The Fiji Police Force acknowledged that 12 officers were involved in the operation and stated that the officers’ conduct represented a ‘failure to adhere to processes and procedures’; disciplinary and investigative measures were subsequently initiated. Amnesty International, in an RNZ article, stated that the allegations surrounding Mr Radravu’s death were consistent with historical patterns of security-force violence in Fiji and called for the officers involved to be suspended pending an independent investigation.

Another case followed : Iveri Tuimasi, a 39-year-old farmer, died on 19 June 2026 after a 27 March drug raid on his property on Beqa Island. His widow alleged that police and an accompanying soldier beat him, leaving a boot-shaped bruise on his chest, a ruptured liver requiring surgery, and a head wound. They then coerced him into telling hospital staff he had fallen from a cliff while fleeing arrest. His death certificate cited sepsis arising from a liver abscess and cerebral oedema, with a noted history of ‘severe blunt force trauma’.

Earlier evidence indicates persistent accountability concerns within Fiji’s police services. The Guardian reported that figures from Fiji’s Director of Public Prosecutions showed that more than 400 charges of serious violence had been filed against police officers between 2015 and 2020, including allegations of sixteen rapes, two murders, nine cases of manslaughter, five abductions and more than 100 assaults. Other evidence that this pattern has been ongoing comes from Amnesty International’s 2016 report, Beating Justice: How Fiji’s Security Forces Get Away with Torture already cited, which documented cases of fatal and severe beatings, rape and other sexual violence, attacks by police dogs, and shootings carried out by uniformed officers, including at least five cases in which detainees were beaten to death. Among the cases it examined, eight police officers and one RFMF soldier were convicted in November 2016 of the 2014 rape, sexual assault, and death of robbery suspect Vilikesa Soko. In another one, three police officers and two military officers were charged in November 2012 of the beating and sexual assault of Iowane Benedito; a video emerged on YouTube in February 2013 showing Iowane Benedito being sexually assaulted and beaten and another individual having a dog set upon him. Despite the video, in 2016 they were reportedly still awaiting trial; the case drew international attention after then Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama publicly defended the officers involved and described ‘buturaki’ (beatings) as ‘deeply ingrained in parts of the Fijian psyche’.

More recent individual cases documented in the US Department of State’s human rights reporting illustrate how slowly accountability has moved even where charges are laid. As of December 2024, trials remained pending for the alleged 2019 police beatings of Pelasio Tamanikoula (beaten during a Labasa arrest and later hospitalised after suffering seizures from his injuries) and Manasa Rayasidamu (who alleged officers struck his ankles with a cement block and poured hot water on his back while in custody), and for the 2022 death of Mikaele Tikoivalenibula, beaten to death at Samabula Police Station. One officer, Isireli Raseisei, was subsequently convicted of manslaughter over Mr Tikoivalenibula’s death and sentenced to three years eleven months, but other cases dating back to 2017 remained unresolved. Separately, several police officers were charged in September 2024 with offences including abuse of office, assault causing grievous bodily harm and wrongful confinement – a more recent tranche of charges than, and additional to, the DPP’s 2015–20 figures above.

International Standards and Treaty Body Findings

The concerns outlined above have also been reflected in international human rights monitoring. During Fiji’s second Universal Periodic Review (2014), the Human Rights Council made numerous recommendations aimed at strengthening police accountability, ensuring prompt and impartial investigations into allegations of torture and ill-treatment, enhancing human rights training for law enforcement officials, and improving compliance with international human rights obligations. Fiji accepted many of these recommendations and stated that reforms introduced under the 2013 Constitution and related legislative changes were intended to modernise policing, improve transparency and strengthen accountability. Nevertheless, States continued to recommend further measures to improve investigations into allegations of torture and excessive use of force and to strengthen implementation of Fiji’s international human rights obligations.

Fiji acceded to the ICCPR in 2018. In 2021, the Human Rights Committee adopted a List of Issues Prior to Reporting (CCPR/C/FJI/QPR/1) . The Committee requested detailed information on measures to prevent torture and ill-treatment, address excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, ensure implementation of the Fiji Police Force’s use-of-force policy, investigate allegations of torture and deaths in custody, improve detention conditions, and provide statistics on complaints, prosecutions and convictions relating to torture and ill-treatment. It also questioned police powers under the Public Order Act 1969 permitting officers to use force considered ‘necessary’, and requested information on allegations of excessive force during public assemblies. As of July 2026, however, Fiji had not submitted its responses and the Committee had therefore not undertaken its first periodic review.

Fiji ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) in 2016. As of July 2026, however, Fiji had not submitted its initial report, which has been due since 2017. Consequently, the Committee against Torture had not yet undertaken its first review of Fiji’s implementation of the Convention and had issued no List of Issues or concluding observations concerning Fiji.

During Fiji’s fourth Universal Periodic Review (2025), stakeholder submissions reiterated concerns regarding police violence and accountability. One submission observed that the Public Order Act 1969 permits the use of force where ‘necessary’, language considered overly broad and open to interpretation, while another reported that the majority of complaints received since 2019 concerned police brutality, prison violence, violations of the rights of arrested and detained persons, and breaches of the constitutional 48-hour detention rule. Stakeholders also recommended strengthening independent oversight of police misconduct and amending domestic use-of-force legislation to bring it into line with international standards. States further recommended strengthening safeguards against torture and ill-treatment, ensuring prompt, impartial and effective investigations into allegations of police abuse, holding perpetrators accountable, and considering ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) to establish an independent preventive inspection mechanism for places of detention. These concerns are broadly consistent with the pattern of cases set out above.

Accountability and Oversight

Fiji does not have an independent external police oversight authority with statutory powers to conduct autonomous investigations, compel evidence, or independently determine whether police conduct amounts to criminal or disciplinary misconduct. Nor is Fiji subject to the jurisdiction of a regional human rights court or commission.

According to Fiji’s submission during the 2014 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), complaints alleging police assault are addressed through an internal accountability process involving an assessment by the DPP of whether available evidence supports prosecution, followed, where appropriate, by referral to the Commissioner of Police for investigation and possible criminal charges. This process has, in at least one high-profile case, produced criminal convictions: in November 2016, nine security-force members – eight police officers and one RFMF soldier – were convicted over the 2014 torture, rape, and death in custody of robbery suspect Vilikesa Soko. However, the mechanism does not constitute an independent civilian police complaints authority, as investigations remain largely within State institutions responsible for policing and prosecution, and, as the individual cases documented above illustrate, the path from complaint to conviction has typically taken years.

Risk of Diversion and Re-Export of Imported Weapons

Fiji’s civilian firearms environment presents a comparatively low diversion risk. According to the Small Arms Survey’s Global Firearms Holdings (2018), civilian possession is estimated at approximately 5,000 firearms (around 0.51 firearms per 100 persons), including approximately 1,538 registered and 3,462 unregistered firearms. Civilian possession remains subject to the restrictive licensing regime described above.

The principal diversion vulnerability lies within State-controlled weapons holdings, particularly military stockpiles. The Small Arms Survey’s Global Firearms Holdings (2018) estimates that Fiji’s armed forces possess approximately 16,700 military firearms, more than double the 2003 estimate of 7,875 firearms. Fiji’s most significant reported diversion incident occurred during the 2000 political crisis, when Uzi and Galil rifles were removed from an RFMF armoury. Seven armed individuals, reportedly assisted by members of the RFMF’s Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Unit, used these weapons during the seizure of Parliament and the 56-day hostage crisis involving the Prime Minister and members of government. The same diverted stock was subsequently used to arm approximately 100 additional supporters. Although a substantial number of firearms were later recovered, the total quantity diverted could not be conclusively determined due to inadequate historical armoury records, and no comprehensive public audit of military weapons holdings appears to have been undertaken since.

Subsequent incidents indicate continuing challenges in maintaining armoury security and inventory control. In April 2026, two attempted breaches were reported at military facilities within the same week: an apparent attempt to access an ammunition storage area at the 3FIR Camp armoury in Lautoka after a perimeter fence was cut, and the forced removal of a passcode-controlled door lock at an armoury facility on Cunningham Road in Suva, near which a live 81mm mortar round was discovered. Following inspections and stock-takes, the Defence Minister and RFMF Commander stated that no weapons or ammunition were missing from either incident. Separately, joint police-military intelligence operations have identified an organized criminal network in possession of ‘unauthorised weaponry’ not recorded in the RFMF inventory, although the quantity, type, and origin of those weapons have not been disclosed.

These incidents have not demonstrated a sustained loss of weapons from official stocks; however, when considered alongside the 2000 diversion episode and the absence of a legally mandated independent system for military stockpile oversight, auditing and verification, they indicate that Fiji’s principal diversion exposure is institutional rather than linked to routine civilian or commercial channels.

Regional organised-crime assessments do not identify Fiji as a major source, transit hub or destination for illicit firearms trafficking. Nevertheless, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has highlighted emerging concerns regarding firearms proliferation in Fiji linked to the growth of criminal gangs and their connections with regional and transnational networks, including the overlap between firearms trafficking and drug-trafficking activities. Available evidence therefore indicates a developing vulnerability rather than an established illicit firearms market.

Fiji’s principal firearms-related exposure remains the potential diversion of State-held weapons rather than systematic trafficking through commercial or criminal import channels. However, given the expansion of transnational criminal networks operating through Pacific maritime routes, diverted weapons could potentially enter wider regional illicit markets. Current assessments do not provide evidence of systematic re-export of Fiji-origin weapons, but regional limitations in firearms tracing, intelligence-sharing and enforcement capacity increase the difficulty of detecting such movements.