Haiti
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The Haitian armed forces present a very high risk of abuse. The use of armed drones operated by the US private military company Vectus Global, contracted by Haitian authorities, has resulted in significant civilian casualties, with Human Rights Watch documenting at least 1,243 people killed in 141 drone operations between March 2025 and January 2026, including at least 43 civilian adults and 17 children. Impunity for violations remains widespread according to the United Nations.
The Haitian National Police presents a very high risk of abuse. OHCHR has documented a pattern of unnecessary or disproportionate use of lethal force, summary executions of suspected gang members, and the arming of civilian self-defence groups that have themselves committed extrajudicial killings and attacks on civilians. Haiti’s domestic legal framework on police use of force is more permissive than international law allows and lacks adequate accountability mechanisms.
International legal context
Disarmament Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) | Not Party | |
| 2001 Firearms Protocol | State Party |
International Humanitarian Law Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1949 Geneva Conventions | State Party | |
| Additional Protocol I of 1977 | State Party | |
| Additional Protocol II of 1977 | State Party |
International Criminal Law Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | Signatory |
|
|
| Amendments to the Statute on the crime of aggression | N/A | ||
| Amendment to the Statute on blinding laser weapons | N/A | ||
| Amendment to the Statute on the intentional starvation of civilians in NIAC | N/A |
International Human Rights Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights | State Party | |
| Optional Protocol to the ICCPR | Not Party | |
| 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights | State Party | |
| 1950 European Convention on Human Rights | State Party | |
| 1969 American Convention on Human Rights | State Party | |
| 1948 Genocide Convention | State Party | |
| 1984 Convention against Torture | State Party |
| Organisation | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| United Nations | Member State | |
| International Court of Justice | Accepted compulsory jurisdiction | |
| Organization of American States | Member State | |
| International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) | Member State | Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol in place with the IAEA. |
Domestic Legal Context
The Constitution of the Republic of Haiti (as amended through 2012) stipulates that the State has the ‘absolute obligation’ to guarantee the rights to life, to health, and to respect of the human person for all citizens without distinction, in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1Art. 19, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti (as amended). It is further provided that: ‘The use of any unnecessary force or restraint in arresting a person or in maintaining him in detention, or the application of any psychological pressure or physical brutality, especially during interrogation, is forbidden.’
The Constitution declares that the security forces comprise two distinct bodies: the Armed Forces and the Police Force. The Police Force is tasked with public order and the protection of the life and property of citizens. Its organization and operation ‘are regulated by the law’.2Art. 269(1), 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti (as amended).
The 1994 Law that created the Haitian National Police (PNH) is the primary legislation regulating its conduct, but it does not regulate explicitly police use of force.3Loi relative à la Police nationale, Loi du 29 novembre 1994 Portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de la Police nationale. Instead, police use of force in Haiti is regulated by an internal regulation: General Order No. 003 of the National Police. According to this instrument, a police officer should use force only within the limits of what is strictly necessary to neutralise the resistance to the legal intervention of a police officer. Excessive or unnecessary force is strictly prohibited.
A police officer is authorized to use firearms only when it is reasonably necessary to:
- Protect themselves or others from an immediate threat or likely to cause serious injury or death
- Prevent the commission of a crime that would put bystanders in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or
- Arrest an individual already known to have committed a crime involving the infliction of death or bodily injury on others and in the knowledge that the offender’s escape could lead to serious injury or death to others.
This is more permissive than international law allows. Use of firearms can only be lawful where it is necessary to confront an imminent threat of death or serious injury or a grave and proximate threat to life.
In June 2026, two units specialized in tackling impunity for acts of illicit arms trafficking, corruption, as well as the violence by the gangs were established in Haiti. Marta Hurtado, spokesperson for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) declared in Geneva: ‘We welcome the creation of two specialized judicial units in Haiti, which marks a significant step forward in the fight against widespread impunity in the country.’
Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty
There is no domestic legislation in Haiti on arms importation, nor is there a national committee established that adjudges the legality of arms imports or exports.
United Nations Arms Embargo
The UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Haiti in 2022. It banned all supplies of arms and related materiel to individuals and entities. In 2023, it was modified to an arms embargo on transfers of small arms and light weapons to any non-government individuals and entities. In October 2024, this was expanded to include arms and related equipment of all types. Excluded from the scope of the embargo4UN Security Council Resolution 2752 (2024), operative para 2(a).is the supply of weapons to ‘a security unit that operates under the command of the Government of Haiti, intended to be used by or in coordination with those entities and intended solely to further the objectives of peace and stability in Haiti’. The embargo is in place until 17 October 2026.
Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces
Haiti has an army, navy, and air force in its armed forces (‘Fòs Ame d’Ayiti’, in Créole, or Fad’H). But only the army is a service in the armed forces that is currently functioning.
- Tanks and armoured vehicles and munitions
- Small arms and munitions
- Combat aircraft
- Warships and submarines
The Fad’H has a fleet of armoured personnel carriers and MRAPs, including seven Senator RAM MRAP armoured vehicles delivered in November 2025. The Haitian Army had around 400 active personnel in 2024;
More recently, there were said to be approximately 987 active service members – 819 men and 168 women. According to Haiti’s 2025–26 national budget, an additional 360 recruits were in training as of mid-2025. The government has announced its goal of expanding the force to 6,000 personnel as soon as possible.
The Fad’H has a range of small arms and light weapons, including submachine guns and mortars.
The Aviation Corps (‘Corps d’Aviation des Forces Armées d’Haiti’) has its garrison at the Military Aviation Base, which is located at the former base of the Chilean Air Force battalion of MINUSTAH, which ended its mission in 2017. The base is attached to Toussaint Louverture International Airport. It is not an operationally effective service.
Instead, the US private military and security company Vectus Global has been engaged by the authorities to provide and operate armed drones against the gangs. The drones have pushed back the gangs, but have also inflicted significant civilian casualties (see War WATCH) and put civilians at considerable danger. This engages the responsibility of Haiti for any violations of international law by companies they contract for public functions.
The Haitian Navy has only a small number of patrol boats, which are not used offensively.
Compliance with IHL by the Armed Forces
Haiti has been engaged in a non-international armed conflict since 2024 with the Viv Ansanm coalition of gangs that control more than two thirds of the capital, Port-au-Prince. International humanitarian law (IHL) is thus applicable to all conduct related to the NIAC by both the Haitian Army and Police as well as by members of Viv Ansanm.
Human Rights Watch stated in March 2026 that ‘explosive-laden quadcopter drones’ have been used ‘in densely populated urban areas, killing and in some cases injuring dozens of people, including children and other residents who were not members of criminal groups’. Human Rights Watch documented at least 1,243 people killed in 141 drone operations between March 2025 and January 2026, with, it appeared, at least 43 civilian adults and 17 children among the dead. There were a further 738 people injured, including at least 49 with no apparent gang affiliation. The organization wrote to the Haitian Prime Minister, the PNH, and Vectus Global with queries about the casualties, but none responded.
Compliance with IHL by UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti
For decades, the United Nations has intervened in Haiti in a bid to address persistent political, economic and security crises. To date, all attempts have failed. On 30 September 2025, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, through its Resolution 2793, authorized the doubling of foreign military and police forces to more than 5,000 and transformed the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission in place since 2023 into a new ‘Gang Suppression Force’ (GSF).
The GSF established its operational presence on 1 April 2026, when the first Chadian troops arrived in Port-au-Prince and began a mandatory training period ahead of deployment alongside Haitian security forces. As of mid-May 2026, approximately 800 personnel from Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Mongolia had deployed, well below the authorized ceiling of 5,500 troops. The GSF is commanded by Major General Erdenebat Batsuuri of Mongolia, who arrived in Haiti on 14 May 2026 to assume command, reporting to Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jack Christofides of South Africa. Full operational deployment was expected by October 2026.5‘UN-appointed anti-gang force commander arrives in Haiti to lead expanded mission’, Haitian Times, 15 May 2026; ‘First troops from UN-backed Gang Suppression Force arrive in Haiti’, Al Jazeera, 1 April 2026; J Charles, ‘What you need to know about the new Gang Suppression Force deploying in Haiti’, Miami Herald, 25 May 2026; ‘GSF welcomes Major General Erdenebat Batsuuri as Force Commander’, Gang Suppression Force (X post), 14 May 2026. The United Nations is providing logistical, administrative and political assistance to the GSF through the UN Support Office in Haiti (BINUH), which became operational on 1 April 2026.
Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies
The Haitian National Police (PNH) is Haiti’s national law enforcement agency, established in 1995, with approximately 15,000 officers on active duty in 2023.
It was reported to have about 15,000 officers on active duty in 2023. Its officers use a range of small arms and light weapons, possibly including even crossbows.
Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights by the Police
In a 2025 report on human rights in Haiti, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the number of persons killed and injured during these police operations had risen.
‘During the reporting period, at least 2,012 people were killed or injured during these operations, an increase of 60 per cent compared to the previous one (from 29 February to 1 July 2024, when 1,253 casualties were documented). While the majority of the victims (73 per cent) were reportedly affiliated with gangs and sustained injuries or death during exchanges of fire with the police, others (27 per cent) were hit when they were not involved in acts of violence, often struck by stray bullets while in the streets or at home.
‘Information suggests a possible unnecessary or disproportionate use of lethal force by the police. OHCHR has documented incidents in zones like Carrefour Drouillard and Carrefour Vincent, where police fired gunshots from their armoured vehicles into areas where people were walking or selling goods on the streets. Additionally, there has been a growing involvement of some police officers in reportedly summary execution of suspected gang members, their families, or individuals who, when intercepted, were unable to provide identification or offer a sufficient explanation for their presence in the area. or selling goods on the streets.’
More recent data confirm that the pattern continued into 2026. OHCHR documented 247 instances of actual or attempted summary executions of suspected gang members or individuals believed to support gangs between 1 March 2025 and 15 January 2026, resulting in 196 deaths and 51 injuries. During security operations in the first quarter of 2026 alone, BINUH documented 196 non-gang members killed, of whom eleven were children, and 192 others injured, including a further eight children. Between January and September 2025, police units allegedly conducted 174 summary executions according to the UN.
Haiti should legislate clearly on the use of force by the police and for the duty to investigate potentially unlawful police shootings.
There is also a concern with so-called self-defence groups, because they are being provided with weapons by the PNH is adopting, and some members of the groups are perpetrating violence against non-gang members at times. BINUH recorded at least 106 persons killed by self-defence groups between December 2025 and February 2026, and documenting a pattern not only of extrajudicial killings, but also arbitrary detention and attacks on civilians, as well as extortion.6ACLED, ‘Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti’s Security Landscape’, February 2026; ‘United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/325, 14 April 2026, para 21.
Risk of Diversion of Imported Weapons
There is a very significant risk of diversion within and illegal re-export of weapons from Haiti. This includes through the provision of weapons by the police to civilian self-defence groups.
- 1Art. 19, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti (as amended). ↩︎
- 2Art. 269(1), 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti (as amended). ↩︎
- 3Loi relative à la Police nationale, Loi du 29 novembre 1994 Portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de la Police nationale. ↩︎
- 4UN Security Council Resolution 2752 (2024), operative para 2(a). ↩︎
- 5‘UN-appointed anti-gang force commander arrives in Haiti to lead expanded mission’, Haitian Times, 15 May 2026; ‘First troops from UN-backed Gang Suppression Force arrive in Haiti’, Al Jazeera, 1 April 2026; J Charles, ‘What you need to know about the new Gang Suppression Force deploying in Haiti’, Miami Herald, 25 May 2026; ‘GSF welcomes Major General Erdenebat Batsuuri as Force Commander’, Gang Suppression Force (X post), 14 May 2026. ↩︎
- 6ACLED, ‘Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti’s Security Landscape’, February 2026; ‘United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2026/325, 14 April 2026, para 21. ↩︎