International legal context

Adherence to all treaties

Disarmament Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)	Not Party
2001 Firearms Protocol	Not Party
Optional Protocol to the CAT	Not Party

International Humanitarian Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1949 Geneva Conventions	State Party
Additional Protocol I of 1977	Not Party
Additional Protocol II of 1977	Not Party

International Criminal Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	Not Party

International Human Rights Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	Not Party
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR	Not Party
1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	State Party
1948 Genocide Convention	State Party
1984 Convention against Torture	Not Party

Membership to International Organisations

Organisation	Status	Comment
United Nations	Member State	(represented by Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun; the UN has not recognised the junta’s credentials).
International Court of Justice	Did not accept compulsory jurisdiction	Jurisdiction for the genocide case comes from the Genocide Convention.
ASEAN	Member State	Since 2021, Myanmar has been excluded from political-level participation in ASEAN Summits, while remaining a full member.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Member State	Safeguards agreement in place

Domestic Legal Context

Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base

Myanmar remains heavily dependent on imported military equipment, despite maintaining a limited State-directed domestic defence industry centred on the Directorate of Defence Industries (DDI). DDI manufactures small arms and ammunition and some heavy weapons using imported machinery, raw materials, and components. Since the February 2021 coup, the military has relied on a combination of direct transfers of complete weapons systems and imports of dual-use goods, manufacturing equipment, and industrial inputs that sustain domestic weapons production. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has documented these procurement networks in reports issued in 2022, 2023, and 2024, tracing both the sources of military supplies and the financial and commercial networks facilitating their transfer.

In The Billion Dollar Death Trade, published in May 2023, the Special Rapporteur concluded that: ‘The Myanmar military has imported at least US$1 billion in arms, dual-use goods, equipment, and raw materials to manufacture weapons since it initiated a military coup in February 2021.’ The report identified China, India, Russia, Singapore, and Thailand as the principal jurisdictions involved in these transfers. Between the February 2021 coup and December 2022, entities based in Russia accounted for approximately US$406 million in military-related transfers, followed by China (US$267 million), Singapore (US$254 million), India (US$51 million), and Thailand (US$28 million) 

China’s support for Myanmar’s armed forces predates the 2021 coup. It has long been one of the Tatmadaw’s principal arms suppliers, providing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery systems, naval vessels, and air-defence equipment both before and after the coup, as SIPRI has documented. Indeed, SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database records the breadth and continuity of Chinese military support to Myanmar over more than three decades and identifies China as one of Myanmar’s principal long-term arms suppliers since the late 1980s, sustaining the modernization of the Tatmadaw across all three services. Between 1990 and 2025, China supplied major capabilities across all three services, including approximately 80 combat-capable fixed-wing aircraft (F-7M, A-5C, JF-17 and FTC-2000G), around 700 tanks and armoured vehicles, 22 major naval platforms (including patrol craft, missile boats, corvettes, frigates and a Type-035G submarine), 19 transport aircraft, 12 CH-3 unmanned aerial vehicles, and seven KS-1A surface-to-air missile batteries with approximately 350 missiles, alongside extensive inventories of anti-ship and air-to-air missiles supported by radar and fire-control systems.

The UN Special Rapporteur further documented that Chinese entities supplied machinery, manufacturing equipment, raw materials and dual-use components used by Myanmar’s DDI to manufacture weapons and ammunition domestically, and estimated that China accounted for approximately US$267 million in military-related transfers between February 2021 and December 2022. More broadly, Chinese companies have supplied surveillance and communications technologies, including Huawei’s ‘Safe City’ surveillance systems, jamming and interception technologies, and other digital infrastructure that has strengthened the military’s capacity for internal repression.

The Special Rapporteur’s subsequent report, Banking on the Death Trade (June 2024), found that military procurement continued despite increasing international scrutiny. Reviewing transactions between 1 April 2022 and 31 March 2024, the report identified more than US$630 million in military procurement involving 16 banks operating across seven jurisdictions. It concluded that Singapore substantially reduced its role following enhanced enforcement measures But procurement networks adapted so as transfers linked to Singapore-registered entities declined by more than 80 per cent, procurement increasingly shifted through Thailand, where exports of weapons, dual-use goods, and manufacturing materials expanded dramatically. The report estimated that entities registered in Thailand exported more than US$120 million in military-related goods in 2023, making Thailand the junta’s largest procurement hub by value that year.

The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) has little reporting on Myanmar’s acquisition of major conventional arms or small arms transfers. Available data are fragmented, coming mainly from partner State submissions rather than Myanmar itself.

As noted, Myanmar possesses a limited but significant defence-industrial base centred on the DDI, commonly known as KaPaSa. Open-source defence analyses estimate that KaPaSa operates approximately 20–25 state-owned production facilities manufacturing MA-series small arms, small-arms ammunition, mortars, artillery ammunition, rockets, aerial bombs, and other conventional munitions. Although this enables substantial domestic production of small arms and ammunition, Myanmar remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for major conventional weapons systems, including combat aircraft, helicopters, armoured vehicles, air-defence systems, and naval platforms, and associated munitions.

Investigations by the UN Special Rapporteur have demonstrated that KaPaSa’s production capacity depends heavily on imported machine tools, precision manufacturing equipment, raw materials, and dual-use components. Despite successive rounds of targeted sanctions, supply chains through China, India, Russia, Singapore, and Thailand have enabled continued domestic weapons production by the Myanmar military. Following intensified attacks by resistance forces against military-industrial facilities, open-source reporting in 2025 indicated that elements of KaPaSa’s production infrastructure had been relocated closer to Naypyidaw in an apparent effort to improve their protection and maintain production continuity.

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

National framework

Myanmar’s firearms regulation is formally grounded in the colonial-era Arms Act of 1878 (India Act XI of 1878), which remains the core legal statute governing manufacture, possession, import, export, and transfer of arms and ammunition in Myanmar. The Act establishes a licensing-based system under state control and has continued to provide the legal foundation for firearms governance in Myanmar across successive regimes, including military and quasi-civilian administrations. This legal architecture was supplemented by a 1977 Ne Win-era regulatory framework governing civilian firearms possession, which is repeatedly referenced in later administrative and policy documents as the pre-existing system for firearm licensing prior to recent reforms.

Following the February 2021 military coup, the State Administration Council (SAC) has retained this inherited legal structure while adapting it to the intensifying armed conflicts across the country. The junta has relied on administrative orders and licensing adjustments that expand discretionary control over civilian access to weapons. State policy allows licensed firearm holders to be mobilised when ordered by authorities to perform ‘security, law enforcement, and stability’ functions, effectively converting civilian gun ownership into a form of auxiliary State security capacity. This approach reflects a broader structural shift in which the State distributes coercive capacity to loyal civilian networks rather than maintaining a monopoly over armed force. Firearm categories include revolvers and pistols, shotguns, and hunting rifles for civilian ownership, while fully automatic weapons are excluded.

On 11 May 2023, Myanmar’s military regime enacted a new Weapons Law criminalising the purchase, possession, production, import, export, and transfer of weapons deemed linked to ‘treason’, including participation in armed resistance against the junta. The law introduces severe penalties ranging from long-term imprisonment to the death penalty in certain cases. The law also criminalizes the theft, destruction, sale, or transfer of State-owned weapons and ammunition. Analysts cited in RFA reporting assess the Weapons Law as a coercive counterinsurgency instrument designed to deter and criminalize support for the armed resistance.

More broadly, human rights organisations assess Myanmar’s post-coup legal and security measures as primarily wartime internal security tools rather than comprehensive arms control regulation aligned with international standards such as the ATT. These assessments highlight that the framework focuses on domestic repression, weapons control, and insurgency management rather than regulating international arms transfers, end-use monitoring, or diversion-risk mitigation.

Amnesty International highlights that Myanmar’s military maintains extensive economic interests through conglomerates such as Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which are linked to arms-adjacent revenue streams. These structures increase the risk of diversion and lack of oversight in defence-related supply chains.

Transparency and Reporting

Myanmar’s transparency record on conventional arms transfers is highly limited. It is not a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and therefore has no binding domestic obligation to submit annual reports on authorized or actual international arms transfers, end-use, or diversion risk assessments.

Myanmar also does not provide publicly available submissions to the UNROCA. Available data are largely derived from exporter-side reporting, commercial datasets, or third-party monitoring. There are also no reports under UN Programme of Action on Small Arms.

In the absence of transparent State reporting mechanisms, independent verification of Myanmar’s arms acquisitions – particularly since the 2021 coup – has relied on external monitoring sources.

Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces

Strategic position and defence posture

Myanmar borders Bangladesh, China, India, Lao PDR, and Thailand, and its 1,260-nautical-mile coastline provides strategic access to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Since the 2021 coup, the Tatmadaw’s principal security priority has shifted from external territorial defence towards regime survival against multiple internal armed adversaries, including the National Unity Government’s People’s Defence Force (PDF), the Three Brotherhood Alliance – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army – , and more than twenty other ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).

Widespread resistance to Myanmar’s junta and the military’s attacks on civilians since 2021 places it among the top five countries with the most intense political violence in the world, according to ACLED Conflict Index. Estimates published by ACLED and discussed by Chatham House in 2025 indicate that ethnic armed organizations and self-defence forces controlled approximately 42 per cent of Myanmar’s territory by late 2024, while the military exercised complete control over only about 21 per cent, with much of the remainder contested. These estimates illustrate the fragmentation of territorial authority following the 2021 coup. 

By mid-2026, the BBC reported the military had partially regained the strategic initiative after the territorial setbacks of 2023–24. Although it continued to exercise full control over less than half of Myanmar, it had recaptured key transport corridors and strategic townships while launching renewed offensives in Kachin, Chin and Karen States. Resistance commanders interviewed by the BBC attributed this reversal primarily to the enforcement of compulsory military service from 2024, which substantially increased the Tatmadaw’s manpower, together with expanded use of air power, drones and artillery. They also highlighted growing shortages of weapons, ammunition and electronic countermeasures among resistance forces, while noting that China-brokered ceasefires with some ethnic armed organisations and restrictions on arms supplies had further improved the military’s operational position. 

Facing mounting battlefield losses and recruitment shortages, the State Administration Council activated the People’s Military Service Law – originally enacted in 2010 – on 10 February 2024, introducing compulsory military service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 (with higher age limits for certain professionals), generally for up to two years, with longer periods permitted during a state of emergency.

Comprehensive estimates of Myanmar’s military expenditure remain difficult because the junta publishes only limited budget information and significant military financing occurs outside the formal budget through military-owned enterprises and procurement networks. World Bank defence expenditure indicators nevertheless indicate that recorded military expenditure remained above US$2.4 billion annually after the 2021 coup and rose sharply to around US$5 billion in 2024 (3.8% of GDP). These figures likely understate the resources available to the Tatmadaw because they exclude substantial off-budget financing some of which have been documented by the UN Special Rapporteur.

The official defence budget also understates the military’s overall resource base. The UN Special Rapporteur has documented the Tatmadaw’s financing of procurement through military-controlled conglomerates, State-owned enterprises, and foreign networks that operate outside normal budgetary transparency. Since the coup, these networks have enabled the junta to import more than US$1 billion in arms, dual-use goods, manufacturing equipment and related materiel despite international sanctions and growing diplomatic isolation. This demonstrates that Myanmar’s effective military spending extends beyond officially reported budget allocations.

Composition of the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw)

The Tatmadaw comprises the Army, Navy and Air Force, operating under the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Commander-in-Chief. Since 31 July 2025, following the dissolution of the State Administration Council (SAC), Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has served as President of Myanmar while retaining his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services, thereby preserving the military’s effective control over the state. Supporting security forces include the Myanmar Police Force, Border Guard Forces (BGFs), many of which were formed through the transformation of former ethnic armed groups under Tatmadaw command, along with the Myanmar Coast Guard, and pro-junta militia formations, notably the Pyu Saw Htee and other People’s Militia Forces. These latter forces have assumed an increasingly prominent role in counterinsurgency since the 2021 coup.

Although the Tatmadaw has traditionally been estimated at around 300,000 personnel, independent assessments suggest that the Tatmadaw has experienced a significant erosion of manpower since the 2021 coup as a result of sustained battlefield losses, casualties, defections, desertions and recruitment difficulties. In response, the military authorities activated the dormant People’s Military Service Law in February 2024, introducing compulsory military service to replenish depleted ranks. The BBC reported young people attempting to flee ahead of conscription order in 2024.

Army – Tatmadaw Kyi

The Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw Kyi) is organized into Regional Military Commands (RMCs), each overseeing Military Operations Commands, Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) and Tactical Operations Commands (TOCs). A total of 517 infantry/light infantry battalions are recorded, alongside around 100 artillery battalions, 24 armoured/tank battalions organized under five Armoured Operations Commands, and nine missile battalions. LIDs function as the Army’s principal mobile counter-insurgency and strike formations.

Traditionally deployed as three-battalion Tactical Operations Commands (TOCs), LIDs have provided the army with a mobile reserve capable of responding rapidly to insurgencies. However, sustained combat losses since October 2023 have significantly reduced their effectiveness, with many formations operating below historical strength.

Recent and current operations

Myanmar has been engaged in at least six distinct non-international armed conflicts (NIACs): against the Arakan Army in Rakhine state; the Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) – the armed wing of the Chin National Organization, formed in 2021 as a civilian response to the coup – in Chin state; the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin state; the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Kayin state; the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the Kokang region of northern Shan state; and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in northern Shan state.

All six conflicts are governed by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary IHL; Myanmar is not a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) aligned with the National Unity Government are frequently subsumed within these Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) command structures rather than constituting separate conflicts in their own right. PDF units in Kayin state, for instance, typically serve under a KNLA commander with a PDF deputy and joint brigade-level coordination, while the Kachin PDF operates directly under KIA command.

A more detailed assessment of the organisation, evolution and territorial dynamics of these armed conflicts is provided in War Watch report. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Myanmar Conflict Map also provides an interactive dashboard visualising conflict incidents, territorial patterns and conflict trends across Myanmar’s six principal warscapes since 2020, illustrating the geographic expansion and changing operational intensity of the conflict.

The Tatmadaw has conducted counter-insurgency operations against non-State armed groups since the 1960s. During the current armed conflicts, however, it has sustained significant territorial, personnel and materiel losses, particularly in Chin, Rakhine, Kachin, Shan and Kayin states.

Tatmadaw operations continue to rely on infantry formations supported by artillery and air power. Increasing manpower shortages and constraints on sustained ground manoeuvre have led to greater reliance on long-range fires, airstrikes, and unmanned aerial systems. Ground forces have increasingly integrated drones with artillery, infantry and air operations. Coordination between land, naval and air assets has also become more apparent in Rakhine State, particularly around Kyaukphyu Township, where the Arakan Army has made significant advances since late 2024, with severe consequences for the Rohingya population, addressed in the Compliance with IHL section below.

Air Force – Tatmadaw Lay

Ground Security Assets

The principal challenge facing the Myanmar Air Force remains sustaining its high operational tempo. Continuous combat operations require around-the-clock maintenance together with uninterrupted supplies of aviation fuel and spare parts. Despite the increasing operational burden, there is little verifiable information indicating significant recruitment shortfalls, and morale is generally assessed to remain higher than within the Myanmar Army.

The growing threat posed by insurgent stand-off attacks against airbases has increased the importance of ground security. Since 2024, several airbases have been targeted with Chinese-manufactured 107 mm rockets and UAVs, highlighting the need for enhanced base protection. Although there has been no reliable confirmation that these attacks destroyed aircraft on the ground, Janes assesses that attacks against airbases and aviation fuel infrastructure are likely to become increasingly important as insurgent forces operate closer to major urban centres.

Recent and current operations

The Myanmar Air Force (MAF) has been employed increasingly intensively throughout the ongoing civil conflict and has become a critical component of Tatmadaw operations. Whereas the service traditionally played a secondary role in counterinsurgency operations, since 2022, it has provided direct combat and logistical support to ground forces conducting both offensive and defensive operations across the country. MAF aircraft have conducted close air support (CAS) and bombing missions against PDFs in central Myanmar and against EAOs operating primarily in the country’s border regions. Air operations have targeted groups including the Arakan Army in Rakhine state, Chin resistance organisations in Chin state, the MNDAA and TNLA in Shan state, the KIA in Kachin state, and the KNLA in Kayin (formerly called Karen) state.

Most deployments have consisted of CAS and strike missions. Aircraft employed include light attack aircraft and armed jet trainers, higher-performance fighters such as the FTC-2000G and JF-17 Thunder, while MiG-29 fighters have also occasionally been used in the CAS role. According to Janes, air strikes have targeted militant positions across the country and have also repeatedly struck civilian locations, including schools, hospitals, markets, monasteries, community gatherings and displacement camps.

The tempo of air operations increased significantly from 2022 and again following the escalation of the conflict in late 2023, as the air force sought to slow advances by insurgent forces in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan states. Despite sustained operational activity, the MAF’s overall capabilities remain broadly unchanged. Combat losses have generally been limited but have prompted the acquisition of replacement aircraft from China and Russia to sustain operational capacity.

Navy – Tatmadaw Yei

The Myanmar Navy (Tatmadaw Yei) comprises approximately 22,000 personnel and operates under five regional commands: Ayeyarwady, Tanintharyi, Panmawady, Mawrawady and Danyawaddy. Most major assets are based at Yangon, with additional naval facilities located at Sittwe, Myeik, Mawlamyine, Hainggyi Island and other coastal locations.

Traditionally focused on riverine patrol, coastal defence and counter-insurgency support, the Myanmar Navy has expanded significantly since the 2010s through the acquisition of frigates, submarines, amphibious vessels and offshore patrol vessels. These acquisitions reflect an effort to transition from a primarily brown-water force into a navy capable of limited blue-water operations, particularly to secure Myanmar’s maritime territory and offshore resources. However, since the 2021 coup and subsequent escalation of internal conflict, naval operations have increasingly focused on supporting ground forces through coastal and riverine operations, particularly against the Arakan Army in Rakhine state and along the Ayeyarwady and Chindwin rivers.

Recent and Current Operations

Following a decade of modernization aimed at transforming the Myanmar Navy (Tatmadaw Yei) from a riverine and coastal force into one capable of limited blue-water operations, the ongoing civil war has shifted operational priorities back towards supporting land operations. While the acquisition of frigates, submarines and amphibious vessels has expanded the fleet’s ability to operate beyond Myanmar’s coastal waters, current operations remain concentrated in coastal and riverine areas.

Traditionally, the navy’s primary role has been to patrol Myanmar’s rivers and coastline in support of army counter-insurgency operations, providing reconnaissance, fire support, troop transport and logistical support. Since the nationwide insurgency escalated in late 2023, the tempo of naval operations has increased markedly, particularly in support of operations against the Arakan Army in Rakhine state and Ayeyarwady region. The navy has also supported operations along the Chindwin and Ayeyarwady rivers, including resupply missions to forces operating in Kachin State.

Despite continued investment in new surface vessels and submarines, the ongoing conflict is stretching the navy’s resources and limiting employment of its developing blue-water capabilities. Nevertheless, its large fleet of riverine and coastal patrol vessels, fast attack craft, and amphibious assets continue to provide significant support to military operations along the coast and inland waterways.

Compliance with IHL by the Armed Forces

Myanmar’s armed conflict has been characterised by widespread and escalating violations of IHL and international human rights law every year since the February 2021 coup. The overwhelming majority of documented violations are attributed to the Tatmadaw, reflecting its sustained reliance on air power, artillery, and heavy weapons against areas under the influence of resistance forces and EAOs; credible allegations of serious violations such as unlawful killings, forced displacement, and attacks on Rohingya civilians, have also been documented among non-State armed groups (NSAGs), principally the Arakan Army. The applicable legal framework is that governing non-international armed conflict: Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and customary IHL, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, and the prohibition of collective punishment. Myanmar is not a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977.

Protection of Civilians and Civilian Objects

Trends in civilian harm, 2021–2026

The trajectory of civilian harm has risen steadily since the coup, driven overwhelmingly by the expansion of Tatmadaw air power. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) points that figures are an underestimation of the reality due to documentation challenges, such as personal security and military-imposed restrictions on communication. However, they clearly identify ‘widespread and systematic human rights violations, their perpetrators, protection concerns of the civilian population, and their urgent humanitarian needs’.

OHCHR recorded 301 airstrikes nationwide between February 2021 and March 2022; by its next full reporting cycle (April 2022–July 2023) this had more than doubled to 687 strikes, verified as killing at least 281 people, with a 324 per cent increase in strikes on the central regions (from 78 to 331) and Sagaing Region alone accounting for 258 of those 331. Independent mass-casualty tracking by ISP-Myanmar shows the same escalation across military operations more broadly: civilians killed in mass-casualty events rose from 113 in 2021 to 245 in 2022 and 379 in 2023.

The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) verified annual civilian death toll followed the same pattern — 1,639 in 2023, 1,824 in 2024 — before registering 1,514 verified deaths in 2025, a figure OHCHR stresses is a significant undercount, since more than 4,400 further reported deaths remained unverified at year’s end and open-source aggregation recorded over 3,220 civilian deaths for 2025 alone. AAPP’s cumulative total since the coup stood at a minimum of 7,646 civilians killed (1,616 women, 982 children) as of late 2025.

Consistent with previous years, airstrikes and artillery shelling specifically have driven this escalation. Although likely representing a fraction of the actual cases, verified deaths from airstrikes nearly doubled from 341 in 2023 to 641 in 2024 and to 982 in 2025, including 368 women and 232 children, a figure that alone surpassed the combined total of children killed across 2021–24. The geographic footprint of aerial attacks has also widened: Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway remained the most heavily struck regions each year, but 2025 saw the emergence of another significant front in Ayeyarwady Region (73 airstrikes, 18 verified deaths, with no previously recorded airstrikes there), attributed to the Arakan Army’s expansion of operations beyond Rakhine State.

Key incidents involving air power, 2023–26

The selection of incidents below illustrate that mass-casualty airstrikes on civilian gatherings, internally displaced person (IDP) camps, and villages are a sustained feature of the conflict rather than isolated or recent events. Human Rights Watch has repeatedly reported the military has increasingly relied on airstrikes and artillery during military operations including attacks that were indiscriminate or deliberately targeted against civilians and civilian infrastructure.

9 October 2023 — Mung Lai Hkyet village, near Laiza, Kachin State: A night-time airstrike struck Mung Lai Hkyet village, located close to the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Organisation and hosting IDPs. At least 28 civilians, including 11 children, were killed and dozens injured. The Myanmar military denied responsibility, claiming the explosion resulted from munitions stored by the Kachin Independence Army. Following analysis of satellite imagery, photographs, witness testimony and munition fragments, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International concluded that the damage was consistent with an air-delivered bomb and found no evidence supporting the military’s explanation.

7 January 2024 — Kanan village church, Khampat Township, Sagaing Region: A Myanmar Air Force airstrike struck a church, where civilians had gathered after nearby fighting, killing seventeen civilians, including nine children, and injuring at least twenty others. The attack destroyed the church and surrounding buildings. The military did not publicly acknowledge responsibility. UN and human rights organizations argued that the strike violated the principles of distinction and proportionality in attack under international humanitarian law.

8 January 2025 — Kyauk Ni Maw village, Ramree Township, Rakhine State: as the Arakan Army made territorial advances, Tatmadaw aircraft bombed a market in this predominantly Muslim village. OHCHR‘s fuller-year verification puts the toll at 41 civilians killed (12 women, seven children), 50+ injured and over 500 homes destroyed. The military acknowledged the strike, citing observed ‘fire flashes’; the Arakan Army denied its forces were present in the targeted area.

8 May 2025 — Kanna Yeiktha monastery, Bhamo Township, Kachin State: an airstrike on displaced civilians sheltering at the monastery, amid an ongoing KIA offensive to capture Bhamo (begun 4 December 2024), killed 15 civilians and injured around 30; the KIA said it attempted to evacuate the site once fighting began.

12 May 2025 — Oe Htein Kwin village, Depayin Township, Sagaing Region: A Myanmar Air Force aircraft dropped munitions on a school during class hours, killing 24 civilians (16 girls, 6 boys, and 2 teachers) and injuring dozens of authors. Witnesses stated that an aircraft had circled the village before releasing two bombs. According to Amnesty International, there were no reports of active fighting or military objectives in the vicinity at the time of the strike. Military-affiliated news outlets denied the air strike, however, insinuating – without corroboration – that the explosion had resulted from the school’s use as a factory to make landmines. OHCHR identified the incident as the deadliest single attack affecting children in 2025, while Myanmar Witness assessed that the damage was consistent with unguided air-delivered munitions used by the Myanmar Air Force. While the motivations for the attack remain unclear, sources indicated that the military regularly targeted public administration sites, including schools, with the effect of instilling fear. OHCHR reported an established pattern of military attacks against schools, with over 640 instances since 2021.

6 October 2025 — Bon To village, Chaung-U Township, Sagaing Region: Two military paramotors dropped large-calibre mortar rounds on civilians gathered in front of a school during a candlelit event. Participants were celebrating the end of Buddhist Lent while also calling for the release of political prisoners, opposing compulsory military service and rejecting the military-planned elections. The attack killed at least 23 civilians, including two women and four children, and injured more than 60 others. According to OHCHR, after rescuers arrived, another munition landed, without resulting in casualties but heightening fears. Artillery shelling directed towards a nearby clinic further disrupted efforts to transport the wounded. A public statement in military-affiliated media claimed that the attacks were part of a “counter-terrorism operation” in which armed groups used civilians as shields, without providing corroborating information.

10 December 2025 — Mrauk-U General Hospital, Rakhine State: on Human Rights Day, aircraft dropped two munitions on the 300-bed hospital, killing at least 33 civilians (among whom 17 women and a three-month-old baby), injuring dozens of other civilians, and destroying the facility. Assessed by OHCHR as the deadliest attack on a health facility in Myanmar since the coup, out of a total of 1,873 reported incidents as of 31 January 2026. The military claimed the hospital was being used as an armed-group base, a claim that could not be independently verified.

New aerial weapons: paramotors, gyrocopters and armed drones

The military’s growing use of armed drones, paramotors, and gyrocopters to carry out unlawful attacks is creating new threats for civilians. Since December 2024, the military has increasingly deployed paramotors (motorised paraglider with the ability to carry and deliver munitions) and, from July 2025, gyrocopters (short-range, crewed rotary-wing aircraft capable of carrying up to three passengers, rockets and mortar rounds), in part substituting for helicopters.

OHCHR‘s 2025 analysis identified 309 paramotor incidents causing 163 civilian deaths and 64 gyrocopter attacks causing a further 34 deaths – an unusually high incident-to-death ratio reflecting how these low-cost, low-altitude platforms let operators release munitions by hand with minimal warning (see above October 2025 Bon To case). In line with nationwide conflict trends, Sagaing and the central regions were the most affected, although attacks were also recorded in Ayeyarwady and Rakhine.

Armed drones are not unlawful per se but remain subject to the same distinction, proportionality and precautions requirements. Their use by the Arakan Army against Rohingya civilians fleeing Maungdaw in August 2024 is addressed in the Rohingya section below. The Myanmar military has also expanded its use of UAVs for operations. Reports have documented drone strikes accompanying ground operations, including attacks in Sagaing Region in 2024. However, compared with the increasingly documented use of paramotors and gyrocopters, available public reporting provides fewer independently verified details on the scale and pattern of Tatmadaw armed drone employment.

Attacks on educational facilities

Myanmar Witness documented 174 incidents of damage to schools between February 2021 and July 2024, attributing 90 of 113 incidents in its primary dataset to the military, with Sagaing Region accounting for the largest share (36 cases, 33 per cent). The trend is consistent with data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) on school infrastructure. Additional sources, including the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) and United Nations Human Rights Council analysis, also indicate a rise since the coup. Human Rights Watch documented an airstrike on a school in Daw Se Ei village, Karenni State, on 5 February 2024, killing four students and injuring 27.

OHCHR open-source analysis recorded 111 attacks affecting educational facilities in 2025, reflecting the continued vulnerability of schools and educational infrastructure during the conflict. In September 2025, Myanmar military aircraft dropped two 500-lb bombs on two private boarding schools in Thayat Tabin village, Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State, killing 20 students aged 15–21 and injuring 22 others, according to OHCHR and IIMM. The above mentioned 12 May 2025 Oe Htein Kwin school strike in Sagaing Region was among the deadliest attacks against children documented since the February 2021 coup.

Attacks on medical facilities

OHCHR’s overview of 2024 developments recorded that, since the coup, 135 health workers had been killed and 347 health facilities damaged or destroyed; on a broader incident-count basis, 1,873 attacks on health-care facilities had been reported since the coup as at 31 January 2026, of which 117 occurred during the August 2025–January 2026 reporting period alone. The World Health Organization separately verified at least 70 attacks on health facilities in 2025 and 53 in 2026. The 10 December 2025 Mrauk-U hospital bombing (see above) was assessed as the deadliest attack on a health facility in Myanmar since the coup. Human Rights Watch reported 21 April 2023 air and ground assault in Magway Region burned a Japan-funded hospital, illustrating that such attacks span the full post-coup period.

Religious and cultural sites

Religious sites and other cultural property have repeatedly been affected during the conflict. Radio Free Asia reported that nearly 200 religious buildings had been destroyed or damaged since the February 2021 coup by September 2023, including churches, monasteries and mosques in Chin State and Sagaing Region. In its 2025 annual update, OHCHR reported that open sources recorded 231 attacks against religious sites during 2025, although the report did not provide a breakdown of locations or attack methods.

Use of landmines and cluster munitions

Myanmar is not a party to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, or the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Nevertheless, the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions remains governed by applicable customary international humanitarian law, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack.

According to the Landmine Monitor 2025, anti-personnel mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces increased significantly following the February 2021 coup and remained extensive through 2024–2025. Mines were reportedly deployed around military bases and outposts, as well as near civilian infrastructure such as telecommunications towers, extractive sites and energy pipelines. The Monitor also documented reports of mines being laid around villages, abandoned military positions, checkpoints and areas used by civilians for farming, travel and access to resources, contributing to continued civilian casualties. It further documented allegations that the Myanmar Armed Forces forced civilians to act as guides in mine-affected areas and to undertake mine-clearance activities, exposing them to landmines and causing deaths and injuries. The Monitor also documented anti-personnel mine use or suspected use by PDFs, EAOs, and military-aligned militias, although responsibility for individual incidents is often difficult to verify because of the multiplicity of armed actors. 

By October 2025, suspected mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination had been reported in 211 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, up from 190 townships in 2023 and 100 in 2020, illustrating the rapid expansion of contamination following the coup. Myanmar has been described as “littered with landmines”. The United Nations report use of anti-personnel mines on the rise with Myanmar seeing record levels of casualties through 2024–25, with contamination impeding civilian movement, humanitarian access and the safe return of displaced populations.

Myanmar recorded the world’s highest number of mine/ERW casualties for the second consecutive year in 2024. Landmine Monitor 2025 recorded 2,029 casualties, approximately double the 2023 total, of whom 86% were civilians, while 1,352 casualties (66%) were caused by anti-personnel mines. UNICEF reported 745 civilian mine/ERW casualties, including 155 children, during 2025, underscoring the continuing humanitarian impact. Survivors continue to face limited access to emergency medical care, rehabilitation, prosthetics and psychosocial support owing to ongoing conflict, attacks on health facilities and the absence of a national mine action authority or systematic humanitarian clearance.

Myanmar also remains one of the few countries where there is credible evidence of continued cluster munition use. Although the Government has consistently denied employing cluster munitions, the Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 reports evidence indicating that the Myanmar Armed Forces have used domestically produced air-dropped cluster munitions in several parts of the country since 2022, with reported incidents continuing in Sagaing Region and Kayin State in 2025 following earlier documented attacks in Rakhine and Chin in 2024 and in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, Shan and Sagaing between 2022 and 2023.

The March 2024 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar concluded that photographic and video evidence suggested the military’s continued use of cluster munitions, including during Operation 1027, and assessed that their use in populated civilian areas likely constituted a war crime. Human Rights Watch has likewise identified Myanmar as one of only four countries worldwide where government forces continue to use cluster munitions.

Forced Displacement, Destruction of Property and Humanitarian Access

Forced displacement

Myanmar’s displacement has been driven overwhelmingly by attacks on civilian areas, destruction of homes, fear of renewed airstrikes and restrictions on assistance. Displacement has risen steadily: an estimated 3.6 million people were internally displaced by early 2025 according to UNHCR, rising to approximately 3.8 million as of 6 July 2026 – a figure regarded as an undercount, since many displaced people do not access formal assistance channels. Displacement remains concentrated in Sagaing and Rakhine, which together account for close to half of the total, with further significant concentrations in Magway, Kayin, Tanintharyi, Bogo and Kachin.

Destruction of civilian property (‘four cuts’ tactics)

The Tatmadaw has repeatedly employed its long-standing ‘four cuts’ counterinsurgency strategy, aimed at severing armed opposition groups from access to food, finances, intelligence, and recruits. According to OHCHR, the strategy has included indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery shelling, the systematic burning of villages to displace civilian populations, and denial of humanitarian access. Human Rights Watch likewise reported that the military intensified its scorched earth tactics following the 2021 coup, burning more than 100,000 homes between May 2021 and August 2024, predominantly in Sagaing Region. Although destruction of civilian property has also been reported during fighting involving some EAOs, reporting indicates the scale has been far smaller than that attributed to the Myanmar military.

Humanitarian access

Humanitarian organisations have consistently reported severe administrative, security and logistical constraints on access to populations outside government control. According to OHCHR, more than 12 million people are reported suffering from acute food insecurity, while a minimum of 22 million are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. OCHA, FAO and WFP identified Myanmar as a global hunger hotspot.

Protection of Persons in the Power of Parties to the Conflict

Common Article 3 prohibits murder, torture, cruel treatment, mutilation and outrages upon personal dignity against anyone in the power of a party to the conflict; customary IHL further prohibits arbitrary deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and collective punishment. These protections have been violated on a widespread and sustained scale throughout the post-coup period.

Killings, torture and ill-treatment

Extrajudicial killings of civilians during military operations, as well as killings following capture or detention, have been repeatedly documented throughout the conflict by OHCHR, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) and other UN mechanisms, implicating primarily the Myanmar Armed Forces and, in some cases, non-State armed groups. In October 2024, OHCHR reported that military operations in Budalin Township, Sagaing Region, involved at least 13 airstrikes, the burning of up to 1,000 houses and the killing of at least 25 civilians across several villages in a single day. In Si Par village, troops reportedly committed further grave abuses, including the killing and mutilation of civilians, sexual violence and the burning of homes. Similarly, in May 2024, in Byaing Phyu village, Sittwe Township, Rakhine state, Myanmar military forces reportedly conducted a raid against civilians suspected of supporting the Arakan Army. OHCHR documented allegations that at least 48 people were killed, villagers were detained for prolonged periods, subjected to torture and ill-treatment, and that homes were burned. Men perceived to have links with the Arakan Army were reportedly subjected to particularly severe abuse. Military-controlled courts subsequently convicted over 300 people arrested during the raid for alleged association with the Arakan Army. In March 2025, Myanmar military troops conducted a sweep operation in Myay Sun Taw village, Magway region, killing 11 civilians, many of them elderly residents who had been unable to flee.

Non-State armed groups have also committed grave violations: Human Rights Watch documented that Arakan Army fighters killed at least 170 Rohingya civilians fleeing fighting near Hoyyar Siri village, Buthidaung Township, on 2 May 2024, the deadliest single documented massacre attributed to a non-State armed group during the current conflict. This was also documented by OHCHR.

Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance

Tens of thousands of people have been arbitrarily detained since the 2021 coup, including political opponents, journalists, lawyers, healthcare workers, humanitarian personnel and individuals perceived to support resistance groups. According to OHCHR, as of 31 January 2026, 30,508 people had been verified as arrested on political grounds since the coup, including 6,177 women and 633 children; 22,799 remained in detention, including 4,261 women and 250 children. OHCHR has continued to document widespread torture and ill-treatment in detention, including beatings, stress positions, electric shocks, sexual violence and denial of medical care. Deaths in custody of the military remained a key concern with at least 2,237 individuals verified as dead since the coup. At least 173 people had been sentenced to death since the coup, including 44 in absentia. Although the military announced several prisoner amnesties in 2025, monitoring groups and OHCHR reported that releases remained limited and that many released detainees faced renewed arrest or charges.

Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence

The scale of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (CRSV) in Myanmar remains difficult to determine due to insecurity, stigma, fear of reprisals and limited reporting mechanisms. The IIMM has documented evidence of rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, sexualised torture, sexual mutilation, sexual assault at checkpoints and forced nudity and sexual violence in detention, affecting women and girls from ethnic minority communities in particular, while men and boys have also been targeted, especially in detention. However, the Mechanism reported facing severe challenges in collecting evidence from primary sources. Survivors of sexual and gender-based violence often lack adequate support services and frequently suffer from severe psychological trauma, and/or cultural and social stigma. Victims’ fear of further harm and distrust in authorities and others often results in delayed reporting and/or under-reporting. Despite these difficulties, the Mechanism has advanced its investigations in identifying persons within military units and affiliated militias, as well as PDFs and other non-State armed groups, who are implicated in sexual and gender-based crimes. The UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict has continued to identify Myanmar as a situation of concern, noting that sexual violence has been used as a means of ‘tactic of war’, intimidation, punishment and repression.

Recruitment, conscription and the protection of children

Myanmar is a State Party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and ratified the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC) on 27 September 2019. Despite these obligations, UN monitoring has continued to verify the recruitment and use of children by multiple parties to the conflict. The UN Secretary-General’s 2025 Children and Armed Conflict report verified the recruitment and use of 482 children (467 boys and 15 girls) during 2024. Of these, 400 cases were attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces, including related forces and affiliated militias, while the remainder were attributed to the Kachin Independence Army, PDFs/local defence groups, Arakan Army and other EAOs. Most children recruited by the Myanmar Armed Forces were used in combat.

The IIMM has continued to examine information indicating that children below the age of 15 have been enlisted, conscripted or used as participants in hostilities by various armed actors, in violation of international standards protecting children affected by armed conflict.

Following activation of the People’s Military Service Law in February 2024, the Myanmar military introduced compulsory conscription, the law applies to men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27, although women were not initially called up. Monitoring organizations estimated that 95,000 people had been recruited through 19 intake batches by the end of 2025. Implementation relied heavily on local administrators and security officials and prompted many youth to flee abroad or go into hiding to avoid recruitment.

Children continued to be disproportionately affected by the conflict. In 2024, the United Nations verified 2,138 grave violations against 1,762 children, while receiving reports of a further approximately 1,200 alleged violations pending verification. Verified violations included the killing and maiming of 1,261 children, 133 attacks on schools and hospitals (100 schools and 33 hospitals), the military use of 65 education and health facilities (59 schools and six hospitals), the abduction of 85 children, most for recruitment and use, and two cases of rape. The majority of verified violations were attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces, including related forces and affiliated militias, although ethnic armed organisations and other armed groups were also responsible. Most child casualties resulted from explosive ordnance, while most attacks on schools and hospitals resulted from airstrikes. OHCHR reported that 2025 became the deadliest year for children since the coup, with airstrikes alone killing at least 232 children.

The December 2025–January 2026 Election Period

The military organized a three-phase general election between 28 December 2025 and 25 January 2026, despite ongoing armed conflict, widespread displacement and the continued detention or exclusion of major political opponents. OHCHR concluded that the conditions for a free, inclusive and representative election did not exist. The electoral process relied substantially on the incomplete 2024 military census, which covered only 145 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, while voting was not conducted in large areas outside military control and Rohingya remained excluded from citizenship and voting rights.

OHCHR verified 702 civilian deaths between August 2025 and January 2026 (224 women and 153 children). Of these, 505 deaths (175 women and 112 children) resulted from air-delivered attacks. Civilian fatalities peaked during August–September 2025 (265 deaths) and December 2025–January 2026 (228 deaths), coinciding respectively with intensified military offensives following the election announcement and with the election period itself.

Rohingya Population – continuing violations

The Rohingya Muslim minority remains particularly vulnerable amid the conflict in Rakhine State. The current situation follows decades of persecution, including the Tatmadaw’s 2016–17 ‘clearance operations’, which displaced more than 740,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission found reasonable grounds to believe that members of the Myanmar Armed Forces had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts warranting investigation for genocide.

Since fighting between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the Arakan Army resumed in late 2023, Rohingya civilians have again been subjected to serious violations by both parties. OHCHR reported that the protection situation deteriorated significantly during 2024 as the Arakan Army assumed control over most of northern Rakhine state. Rohingya communities became trapped between the two forces, with the Arakan Army operating from or near Rohingya villages while the military responded with artillery and airstrikes. OHCHR documented indiscriminate attacks, forced displacement, forced recruitment of Rohingya by the Myanmar military from February 2024, severe restrictions on movement and humanitarian access, and widespread destruction in Buthidaung and Maungdaw.

In 2025, OHCHR reported that Rohingya living in military-controlled areas in and around IDP camps in Sittwe were subjected to widespread violations, with arbitrary arrests, forced labour, and ill-treatment reported throughout the year as well as forced recruitment and extorsion. Over 5,000 Rohingya had reportedly been conscripted in the first six months of 2025, with this practice continuing throughout the year. Further, the military’s continuing campaign of airstrikes on Arakan Army-controlled areas continued to claim civilian lives, including those of Rohingya. 

Both parties have been implicated in grave abuses against Rohingya civilians. On 2 May 2024, Arakan Army fighters reportedly killed at least 170 Rohingya men, women and children fleeing fighting near Hoyyar Siri (Htan Shauk Khan) village, Buthidaung Township. OHCHR documented witness accounts describing how more than 1,000 Rohingya fleeing the fighting were stopped by AA elements, separated into groups in paddy fields and fired upon. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar reported that approximately 200 Rohingya civilians were killed on 5 August 2024 while attempting to cross the Naf River into Bangladesh. According to Rohingya eyewitnesses, armed drones involved in the attack originated from the direction of Arakan Army positions, while the Arakan Army denied responsibility and blamed the Myanmar military.

International monitoring and accountability mechanisms

Domestic accountability remains effectively absent. Myanmar’s judicial system operates under military influence, and there is no independent civilian mechanism capable of investigating or prosecuting alleged violations committed by the Myanmar Armed Forces or other armed actors.

UN monitoring and documentation mechanisms

The United Nations has maintained several mechanisms to document and report on the human rights situation in Myanmar. OHCHR continues to monitor, verify and report on violations of international human rights law and IHL, including unlawful attacks against civilians, arbitrary detention, torture, conflict-related sexual violence and restrictions on humanitarian access. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, an independent expert appointed by the Human Rights Council Resolution 19/21 (2012) and subsequent mandate’s renewals, conducts monitoring, receives information from victims and civil society, and reports publicly on patterns of violations while making recommendations for protection and accountability. Neither mechanism has a judicial mandate or conducts criminal prosecutions.

Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM)

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM), established by the Human Rights Council Resolution 34/22 (2017), was the precursor mechanism that investigated alleged violations against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities. Its final reports in 2018–2019 identified reasonable grounds to conclude that Myanmar security forces committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and acts warranting investigation for genocide. The FFM’s mandate ended in 2019 and was succeeded by the IIMM.

The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), established by Human Rights Council Resolution 39/2 (2018), is the principal UN mechanism dedicated to supporting criminal accountability. The Mechanism’s mandate is to collect, preserve and analyse evidence of serious international crimes committed in Myanmar and to share relevant evidence and analysis, subject to confidentiality and protection safeguards, with competent investigative, prosecutorial and judicial authorities. Since becoming operational in 2019, it has issued seven annual reports to the Human Rights Council documenting evidence of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by multiple parties, including the Myanmar Armed Forces and, increasingly, non-State armed groups.

In 2025, the IIMM reported expanded cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and national jurisdictions exercising universal jurisdiction, including Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Mechanism supported ongoing proceedings relating to crimes against the Rohingya in Argentina, before the ICC, and in the The Gambia v. Myanmar proceedings before the ICJ concerning alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. It also engaged with UK authorities regarding investigations into crimes committed against the Rohingya and other groups in Myanmar, including crimes committed following the February 2021 coup. The IIMM further monitored universal jurisdiction complaints filed in other national jurisdictions, including the Philippines and Türkiye, and continued engagement with additional jurisdictions to support future accountability efforts.

International judicial proceedings

Alleged crimes committed against the Rohingya remain the subject of several international accountability processes. In November 2019, The Gambia instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging violations by Myanmar of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In January 2020, the Court ordered provisional measures requiring Myanmar to prevent acts prohibited under the Convention and preserve evidence. In July 2022, the Court rejected Myanmar’s preliminary objections, allowing the case to proceed to the merits phase. By 2026, eleven States had been authorized to intervene in the proceedings. Public hearings on the merits concluded on 29 January 2026.

Separately, the International Criminal Court (ICC) continues its investigation into crimes associated with the forced deportation and persecution of the Rohingya into Bangladesh. On 27 November 2024, the Prosecutor of the ICC submitted an application for an arrest warrant against Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes against humanity, including deportation and persecution of the Rohingya, allegedly committed with the involvement of the Myanmar security forces and other actors.

National courts have also pursued accountability through universal jurisdiction. On 13 February 2026, an Argentine federal court reportedly issued arrest warrants against Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, 22 other military officials and two civilian figures, including Aung San Suu Kyi, for alleged genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya between 2012 and 2018. The proceedings also included requests to examine alleged crimes committed by the Arakan Army after the 2021 coup.

Aviation fuel and the MOGE sanctions-evasion chain

The Special Rapporteur has repeatedly identified the absence of a coordinated international embargo on aviation fuel and on the military’s principal revenue sources as a critical gap enabling continued airstrikes on civilian areas – a gap directly relevant to IHL compliance given the documented use of airstrikes against civilians addressed above. The EU became the first jurisdiction to sanction Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) — the junta’s single largest source of foreign-currency revenue — in February 2022; the United States imposed only a partial measure (a financial-services prohibition under OFAC Directive 1, effective December 2023) rather than a full designation, and Switzerland did not sanction MOGE until 2025. The UK, Canada and Australia have not sanctioned MOGE.

As Singapore-based banks curtailed military-linked transactions from 2023, Thai banks and the state-owned PTT Group filled the resulting gap: Thai companies sold an estimated US$80 million of aviation fuel usable by the junta in 2023 alone, and gas revenue flowing from PTT through Thai banks to MOGE (via the Myanmar Economic Bank) remains the junta’s largest single revenue stream. Amnesty International separately documented in 2024 that a Chinese-owned oil tanker and Vietnamese and Singapore-based trading companies continued supplying jet fuel to the military using the same evasive routing previously exposed in 2023, even as the UN Special Rapporteur reported that military airstrikes against civilian targets had increased five-fold in the first half of 2024 alone. Amnesty International confirmed delivery of at least nine separate shipments of aviation fuel to Myanmar by four vessels between mid-2024 and the end of 2025.

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

Law enforcement is primarily carried out by the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), which operates under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). The MoHA is one of three ministries constitutionally reserved to serving military officers and has remained under military control since the February 2021 coup. The MPF has therefore operated within a security structure directly subordinated to the military authorities following the establishment of the State Administration Council (SAC).

The MPF includes conventional police units, criminal investigation units, riot-control elements and specialised branches. Its exact current strength is unclear, as no independent post-coup assessment of personnel losses, defections or recruitment has been published. Pre-coup estimates generally placed MPF personnel at approximately 70,000–100,000 officers. The Border Guard Police (BGP) constitutes a specialized paramilitary police force operating primarily in border areas, particularly in Rakhine State.

Military-controlled or military-affiliated security forces have also performed policing functions, particularly after the 2021 coup. These include military units conducting arrests, crowd-control operations and counter-insurgency activities, as well as affiliated militias operating alongside state security forces.

Legal Framework

Myanmar does not have a comprehensive statutory framework regulating police use of force. Police powers remain governed by a combination of colonial-era criminal procedure provisions, domestic legislation and security measures introduced or amended by military authorities following the 2021 coup.

The 1898 Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter V) provides police powers concerning arrest and the use of force. Section 46(2) permits officers executing an arrest to use “all means necessary” to effect the arrest, while Section 50 requires that arrested persons not be subjected to more restraint than necessary to prevent escape. These provisions do not establish a comprehensive framework requiring legality, necessity, proportionality and precaution consistent with international standards. Chapter IX, Section 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits a senior officer to disperse an unlawful assembly ‘by force’ if it does not disperse on command.

The 2008 Constitution provides limited protections relevant to policing. Article 21(a) guarantees liberty and justice, while Article 353 provides that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except in accordance with existing law. However, the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or establish safeguards equivalent to international human rights standards.

The Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law (2011, amended 2014) provides a notification-based framework for assemblies. However, since the 2021 coup, emergency and security legislation has been used extensively to restrict assembly rights and criminalize peaceful opposition activity. The military authorities also amended the law to significantly expand police and security powers while dismantling human rights protections.

Amendments to the Penal Code introduced new offences, including Section 505A, criminalising criticism of the military and support for the Civil Disobedience Movement. Revisions to the Code of Criminal Procedure made these offences non-bailable and subject to warrantless arrest. The military also suspended key provisions of the 2017 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, removing safeguards against arbitrary detention, warrantless searches and surveillance, and reinstated the requirement under the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law to report overnight guests, facilitating surveillance and arrests. Amendments to the Electronic Transactions Law further restricted freedom of expression by criminalising the online dissemination of information critical of the junta. Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of Jurists concluded that these measures institutionalised arbitrary detention, surveillance, and the suppression of peaceful dissent while providing a legal façade for widespread human rights violations following the coup.

The military authorities also amended legal provisions governing police administration. The 2022 Myanmar Police Force Law placed the appointment, promotion and disciplinary structure of the police under military-controlled authorities, further reducing institutional independence from the armed forces.

The 2022 Myanmar Police Force Law significantly expanded the powers of the Myanmar Police Force while reducing legal safeguards and accountability. The Law grants broad discretionary powers to arrest, search, inspect, disperse and intervene. These powers are coupled with expanded warrantless arrest and search authorities, increased executive and military control over the police, and procedural barriers to holding police officers accountable for abuses. Radio Free Asia reported that the Law placed the police under the full control of the military.

Withing such context, there is no independent external police oversight body with power to sanction misconduct, and Myanmar’s non-party status under the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture means no UN treaty body has jurisdiction to review individual complaints against Myanmar police conduct.

Police Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights

Police actions under military control

Available evidence indicates that Myanmar’s law enforcement framework and practice remain fundamentally inconsistent with international standards governing the use of force, arrest powers and police accountability. Reports by the OHCHR, IIMM, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar and other independent investigations have documented consistent patterns of arbitrary arrest, excessive and unlawful use of force, torture, enforced disappearance, and conflict-related sexual violence, along with the absence of effective domestic oversight and accountability. These findings demonstrate persistent violations of the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and accountability reflected in the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990).

Since the military coup, police and military forces have operated jointly to suppress peaceful protest, political opposition and perceived support for resistance movements. In this context, security forces have committed widespread violations of the rights to life, liberty, security of person, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. During the nationwide anti-coup demonstrations, the MPF was at the forefront of law enforcement operations. Security forces rapidly escalated from crowd-control measures to the use of lethal force against largely peaceful protesters, including live ammunition, sniper fire, military-grade weapons and indiscriminate shootings into crowds. Successive UN reports concluded that the force used was widespread, systematic and grossly disproportionate to any legitimate law enforcement objective.

Amnesty International verified that Myanmar police used live ammunition and Myanmar-made BA-93/BA-94 sub-machine guns against peaceful protesters in Nay Pyi Taw on 9 February 2021, contradicting official claims that only non-lethal weapons were deployed. Verified footage showed repeated gunfire, including automatic bursts, after a 19-year-old woman was shot in the head, evidencing the reckless use of firearms against protesters. On 3 March 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that security forces killed at least 38 protesters nationwide during coordinated crackdowns, making it one of the deadliest days of violence since the coup. By the end of March 2021, hundreds of civilians had been killed and thousands arbitrarily detained. The Human Rights Council has repeatedly condemned the excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate use of lethal force by Myanmar security forces, including against peaceful demonstrators, children and medical personnel.

Police have remained heavily involved in mass arrests following the coup, targeting peaceful protesters, political opponents, journalists, lawyers, healthcare workers, civil servants participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), humanitarian workers and persons accused of supporting resistance groups. Arbitrary arrest and detention have become central features of military rule. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), by 31 January 2026, at least 30,357 people had been arrested since the coup, including 6,249 women and 631 children; 22,767 remained detained, while at least 2,235 people had died following arrest or while in custody.

Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during arrest, interrogation and detention have been repeatedly documented. Reported methods include severe beatings, stress positions, electric shocks, mock executions, sexual violence, threats against family members, prolonged shackling, sleep deprivation and denial of medical treatment. The IIMM has continued to collect evidence indicating that torture is routinely used during detention and interrogation by multiple security actors, including police personnel operating jointly with military intelligence units. OHCHR reported in 2025 that courts have systematically demonstrated disregard for basic fair trial guarantees, including ignoring widespread reports of torture.

Following activation of the People’s Military Service Law in February 2024, police officers, village administrators and military-affiliated militias played a central role in implementing compulsory conscription. To meet military-imposed recruitment quotas at village and township levels, they identified eligible recruits, detained individuals at local administration offices and sought to locate those attempting to evade military service. OHCHR further reported more than 270 alleged abductions, arbitrary arrests and possible enforced disappearances associated with conscription during the year, occurring in both urban and rural areas, including at checkpoints and during arrests.

The IIMM has reported that it possesses substantial evidence that a variety of crimes against humanity have been committed in relation to the suppression of post-coup dissent. According to the Mechanism, security forces – including police operating alongside military personnel – used unlawful lethal force against peaceful protesters and were responsible for widespread arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances, manifestly unfair prosecutions, and rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence in detention. The IIMM documented systematic torture and other forms of ill-treatment to extract confessions, inhumane detention conditions, denial of food, water and medical care, and efforts to conceal unlawful killings, including through falsified autopsy reports. It has found substantial evidence that crimes against humanity, including murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts, have been committed in connection with the suppression of opposition following the 2021 coup.

Monitoring, accountability and oversight

Myanmar is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Convention against Torture. Oversight therefore relies primarily on UN mechanisms, including the Human Rights Council, OHCHR, the Special Rapporteur and the IIMM. Domestic accountability remains ineffective. The Myanmar Police Force Law (2022) expanded police powers relating to arrest, search, inspection and public order enforcement while maintaining disciplinary mechanisms within the security hierarchy rather than establishing independent civilian oversight. Myanmar lacks an independent civilian police complaints mechanism capable of investigating allegations of unlawful killings, torture, excessive force or abuse of authority.

Risk of Diversion and Re-Export of Imported Weapons

Myanmar’s diversion and re-export risk is high. This assessment is driven by the continuation of a nationwide armed conflict, the fragmentation of State authority, extensive capture of military equipment through battlefield losses, the proliferation of armed actors operating outside effective regulatory control, the growth of improvised and locally manufactured weapons production, cross-border illicit trafficking networks, persistent sanctions-evasion practices, and the absence of a comprehensive national strategic trade control and end-use monitoring system.

International arms embargo and sanctions architecture

The European Union has maintained restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma in successive forms since 1996, including an arms embargo prohibiting the export of arms, related equipment and technology usable for internal repression; measures were substantially expanded after the 2021 coup to include targeted sanctions against individuals and entities linked to the military, restrictions on dual-use goods for military and Border Guard Police end-users, and a prohibition on military training and cooperation with the Tatmadaw.

On 18 June 2021, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 75/287 (119 in favour, one against — Belarus, 36 abstentions including China, Russia and India), calling on UN Member States ‘to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar’. The resolution is politically significant but non-binding, and efforts to secure a mandatory UN Security Council arms embargo have not succeeded owing to divisions among permanent members.

The United States (Executive Order 14014, February 2021), United Kingdom and Canada have each imposed their own targeted sanctions regimes and, in Canada’s case, a formal arms embargo; by late 2023, Canada’s designations covered 95 individuals and 63 entities, and the UK’s covered 25 individuals and 29 entities in addition to the military’s two principal conglomerates (Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd and Myanmar Economic Corporation) and 111 of their subsidiaries.

Battlefield capture and diversion of State stockpiles

Since 2021, resistance forces and EAOs have reportedly captured very substantial quantities of Tatmadaw weapons, ammunition and equipment through the fall of military outposts, bases and, in several cases, entire Regional Military Command areas. These include the mass surrender of officers and equipment at Laukkai, Kokang, in January 2024, the surrender of an estimated 670 junta personnel at Myawaddy in April 2024, and the capture of the Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters at Lashio in August 2024. The TNLA announced a significant seizure of over 350 weapons and ammunition following the capture of the Light Infantry Battalion-115 of the Myanmar junta in Nawnghkio town, northern Shan State in July 2024. Among the captured ammunition are 349 firearms, including MA-1, MA-2, and MA-3 rifles, RPG launchers, 60 mm mortars, and various medium and small machine guns. Photographic evidence of these weapons has been released by the TNLA.

This represents a large and only partially quantified diversion of state-held stockpiles into the hands of a wide range of non-state actors with varying degrees of command and control and no international transparency obligations; the precise scale of diverted materiel remains difficult to establish given the absence of transparent reporting and the fragmentation of the armed actors involved.

On the resistance side, People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and allied armed groups have developed local manufacturing and adaptation capabilities to compensate for limited access to conventional weapons. These groups have relied on captured Tatmadaw equipment, weapons acquired through conflict networks, and locally produced firearms and improvised systems. Open-source investigations have also documented limited use of 3D-printing technology by some resistance actors for weapons components and unmanned systems, although the scale of such production remains difficult to assess independently.

Illicit economies, arms trafficking and diversion risks

Myanmar’s prolonged conflict has become deeply intertwined with a broader illicit economy that both sustains and is reinforced by conflict dynamics. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) identifies Myanmar as among the world’s most criminalized environments, with severe weaknesses in resilience against organised crime. GI-TOC’s March 2025 assessment, ‘Cashing In On Conflict: Illicit Economies and the Myanmar Civil War’, describes a deepening “crime–conflict nexus” involving armed actors, criminal networks and state-linked actors across interconnected illicit markets, including narcotics production and trafficking, illegal mining, natural-resource exploitation, cyber-enabled fraud and arms trafficking.

Arms trafficking has become an increasingly important component of this conflict economy. GI-TOC reports that illicit arms flows associated with Myanmar have expanded since the 2021 coup, driven by battlefield capture of military equipment by resistance forces and ethnic armed organisations, increased artisanal weapons production, and trafficking through vulnerable regional supply networks. These dynamics have increased the quantity of weapons outside state control and created heightened risks of diversion, onward transfer and circulation among armed actors with varying levels of command and accountability.

Border areas affected by armed conflict are particularly vulnerable to the convergence of illicit economies and arms circulation. GI-TOC has documented how some armed actors and militia structures operating in border regions, including Border Guard Forces and allied groups in areas such as Kokang and Karen State, participate in broader illicit economies that generate financial resources and reinforce armed power structures.

Myanmar also contributes to wider regional arms-trafficking risks. GI-TOC notes that illicit firearms flows linked to Myanmar have increased since the coup through battlefield capture, artisanal production and trafficking networks operating across vulnerable borders. It has documented cases illustrating the regional dimension of these flows, including Thai-origin weapons likely trafficked through Myanmar and subsequently identified among Kuki militias in India’s Manipur State.

The scale of Myanmar-origin weapons transferred abroad remains difficult to quantify. Available evidence more clearly demonstrates a high diversion risk arising from the combination of: (i) large quantities of military equipment captured from State forces; (ii) expanding domestic weapons production outside effective regulatory oversight; (iii) porous borders and established illicit trafficking networks; and (iv) the absence of effective national strategic trade controls or end-use monitoring mechanisms.

In sum, Myanmar presents a high diversion and re-export risk profile. These risks are amplified by the fragmentation of armed actors, porous borders, limited transparency over weapons holdings, and the continued circulation of weapons outside State control.