International legal context

Adherence to all treaties

Disarmament Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)	Not Party
2001 Firearms Protocol	Not Party
Optional Protocol to the CAT	Not Party

International Humanitarian Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1949 Geneva Conventions	State Party
Additional Protocol I of 1977	State Party
Additional Protocol II of 1977	Not Party

International Criminal Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	Not Party

International Human Rights Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	State Party
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR	Not Party
1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	State Party
1948 Genocide Convention	State Party
1984 Convention against Torture	State Party
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	State Party
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	State Party
2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights	State Party

Membership to International Organisations

Organisation	Status	Comment
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Member State	Safeguards agreement in place but not an Additional Protocol. Syria has had undeclared nuclear reactors in the past.
League of Arab States	Member State

Domestic Legal Context

Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base

Syria has been primarily an importer of major conventional arms. According to the SIPRI’s Arms Transfer Database, its international arms transfers consist overwhelmingly of imports from foreign suppliers in the 1970s, while it has no significant record as an exporter of major conventional weapons. More recently, Türkiye has been supplying the new regime with weaponry.

Historically, Syria relied predominantly on Soviet and French suppliers. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database records major Cold War acquisitions, including T-55 tanks, short-range air-to-air missiles, and MiG-21MF fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s; and MILAN anti-tank missiles from France delivered in 1979, along with SA-342 Gazelle light helicopters. Information on Syria’s armed forces inventory – to the extent it is known and up to date – is provided below.

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

Syria is not a State Party to the ATT. Indeed, it was one of only three States (along with North Korea and Iran) to actively oppose the treaty’s adoption in 2013, both in the diplomatic conference and subsequently in the United Nations General Assembly.

There is no known legislation restricting arms imports by the armed forces although a decree on customs issued by President Ahmed al-Sharaa in May 2026 prohibits weapons trafficking and unauthorized military goods, rendering such activities serious criminal offences. Article 206 of the new law stipulates that customs courts apply ‘immediate enforcement’ procedures in cases involving weapons trafficking.

Oversight and transparency

As a State not party to the ATT, Syria has not submitted annual reports to the Secretariat. It has also very rarely submitted national reports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), although exports to Syria have been reported by Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia, and Slovakia.

Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces

Strategic position and defence posture

Syria’s strategic posture has changed significantly since the overthrow of the Assad regime. The new government is actively cultivating positive links with the West while trying to bring to an end Israeli attacks on and occupation of its territory. Other security challenges remain with non-State armed groups continuing to threaten stability, although their severity has diminished in the last six months. Persistent divisions among the different groups present in Syria led to regular clashes in 2025 and into 2026, particularly between factions affiliated with the new government and remnants of the former government.

The interim government under HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has sought to unify the fragmented armed opposition throughout the country, with varying degrees of success. In December 2024, following the removal of Pr

esident Assad, the new leadership announced a policy to bring all weapons under State control and integrate armed groups into a national army. Its success will depend on the willingness of diverse armed factions to cooperate and the capacity of the new government to enforce its directives.

Composition of the Armed Forces

Army

The Syrian Arab Army is seeking to rebuild its authority and integrity while integrating members of former opposition armed groups. In August 2026, the purge of three former warlords was described as illustrating Damascus’s tightening control over the army. The same month, Minister of Defence Major-General Murhaf Abu Qasra and Culture Minister Mohammad Yassin Saleh said the protection of the homeland and the development of public awareness are interconnected efforts. General Abu Qasra said the army’s role extends beyond defending borders to work to protect communities and support reconstruction efforts.

Air Force

The Syrian Air Force is another of the three principal branches of the Syrian Armed Forces. In 2026, it was reported to operate 414  military aircraft, including 225 combat aircraft and 153 helicopters. It was ranked by one authority as 48th of 162 air forces worldwide.

Navy

The Syrian Navy is ostensibly responsible for the defence of its territorial waters and maritime interests but has no recorded naval inventory apart from, according to one recent report, six coastal boats of an unidentified type.

Recent and current operations

Syria’s operational activity remains centred on resolution of ongoing non-international armed conflicts on its territory. The end of July 2026 saw continued security operations targeting the three main challenges said to be facing the new Syrian government: Islamic State cells, drug networks, and armed elements of the former regime.

Coalition Operations against the Islamic State

Syria joined the international coalition against Islamic State on its territory in November 2025, becoming party to the ongoing NIAC against Islamic State. In late July 2026, operations against Islamic State were carried out in two towns in northern Aleppo while another operation was launched against an Islamic State cell in Deir Ez Zor that had reportedly carried out attacks in the Al-Baghouz and Al-Shaafa areas of Al-Bukamal district.

Compliance with IHL and Human Rights by the Armed Forces

Non-international armed conflicts

Hostilities between the Syrian Armed Forces and the SDF in January 2026 involved mutual accusations of atrocities against persons in their respective power. Human Rights Watch noted that both parties had ‘exchanged allegations’ of ‘extrajudicial killings’. The organization reviewed three videos showing apparent extrajudicial executions and desecration of bodies.

Human rights concerns

In March 2025, tensions led to mass killings of civilians, particularly among the Alawi community, as well as attacks against civilian infrastructure. These were tolerated if not perpetrated by elements of the new regime. Between 28 and 30 April 2025, violent incidents between supporters of the new government and Druze militias in the predominantly Druze areas of the country involved the killing of many civilians and extensive destruction of buildings.¹W. Christou, ‘Deadly Syria clashes continue for second day outside Damascus’, 30 April 2025; O. Sanadiki and A. Sewell, ‘Israel strikes military tanks in southern Syria’, PBS, 14 July 2025.

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

Legal Framework

Law enforcement in Syria is conducted by a range of agencies and bodies, including the Syrian Internal Security Forces under the Ministry of Interior. Under Legislative Decree No. 67 of March 1965, the police were considered as part of these Internal Security Forces. It is not known if this decree remains in force. In 2008, the government issued Legislative Decree No. 69, which confers immunity against prosecution to security officials and police officers for crimes committed while on duty.

Use of Force and Firearms

Syria does not have a robust statutory framework governing the use of force and firearms by police and other law enforcement officials. Respect for the 1990 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms is not set out in national legislation. The police and other law enforcement agencies effectively operate without legal constraint. The European Union announced in May 2025 that it would maintain sanctions imposed on the Assad regime as well as sanctions based on security grounds, including arms and technology that might be used for internal repression. It will also introduce additional targeted restrictive measures against human rights violators and those fuelling instability in Syria.. The United Kingdom also has a prohibition on the export to Syria of internal repression goods and technology.

Oversight

There is no effective oversight of the police. In the past, military courts have dealt with all cases involving members of the armed forces or the police.

Police Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights

Use of Force

In March 2026, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reported on the violence that tore through Suwayda in July 2025, killing more than 1,700 people and forcing nearly 200,000 from their homes. The Commission documented widespread executions, torture, gender-based violence and the burning of homes among other human rights violations. In the first and deadliest wave, Government forces accompanied by tribal fighters committed widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law against Druze civilians on 14–16 July in western Suwayda and Suwayda city, including murder, torture, arbitrary detention, and pillage. Men identified as Druze were separated from women and children and executed. Others were shot in the streets or killed in their homes alongside family members.

In its 2024 Concluding Observations on Syria (prior to the fall of the Assad regime), the Human Rights Committee was concerned that numerous reports indicated the excessive use of force against demonstrators. It called on the authorities to ‘ensure that its legislation allows the use of potentially lethal force by law enforcement officials in the context of assemblies only as a last resort and only when necessary to protect life or prevent serious injury from an imminent threat’. It called for training of all law enforcement officials on the use of force based on the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement.

Arbitrary arrest, torture, and ill-treatment

In its 2024 Concluding Observations, the Human Rights Committee welcomed the adoption of the Prevention of Torture Act No. 16 of 2022, but was ‘deeply concerned about reports of widespread torture or ill-treatment, at times leading to death’. It was also concerned that certain legislative provisions could provide immunity for employees of the State Security Department for crimes committed while carrying out their duties.

Accountability and oversight

The authorities, the Human Rights Committee stated, ‘should ensure that prompt, thorough, effective, independent and impartial investigations are launched into all incidents involving the excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, that perpetrators are prosecuted and, if found guilty, punished and that victims are provided with effective remedies.’

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic was established on 22 August 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council through resolution S-17/1, with a mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in Syria.

Risk of Diversion and Re-Export of Imported Weapons

The Global Organized Crime Index scores arms trafficking in Syria at 2.00 out of 10, describing the environment as an ‘overlapping trafficking of drugs, weapons and counterfeit goods’, which ‘underscor[es] the multifaceted nature of Syria’s transnational criminal landscape’.

The Index further states that: ‘Arms trafficking has been deeply embedded in Syria, driven by demand from armed groups, civilians and external entities. Weapons regularly enter from countries such as Iran and Türkiye, often enabled by corrupt officials and criminal networks. Sales occur on social media and in local shops, with prices varying widely based on the type of weapon and where it stood in the supply chain. Both domestic and foreign actors benefit from this market, worsening regional insecurity. Arms trafficking also frequently intersect with other illicit trades, notably drug trafficking. Following the end of the Assad regime in December 2024, it is unclear how this entrenched criminal market will evolve.’

National Capacity to Prevent Diversion

There is little national capacity to restrict diversion of arms. Given the continuing instability in the country, the risk of diversion or unauthorized re-export of Syrian arms is extremely high, in particular to and from non-State armed groups.

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  W. Christou, ‘Deadly Syria clashes continue for second day outside Damascus’, 30 April 2025; O. Sanadiki and A. Sewell, ‘Israel strikes military tanks in southern Syria’, PBS, 14 July 2025. ↩︎