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Tajikistan

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Tajik armed forces committed apparent war crimes in Kyrgyzstan in April 2021 and September 2022 – including unlawful killings and large-scale burning and looting of villages – with no accountability to date, and have repeatedly backed internal-security crackdowns in Gorno-Badakhshan using troops without independent scrutiny of their conduct. Tajikistan’s anti-corruption agency found that Ministry of Defence bodies lost more than US$13 million to corruption in 2024. Tajikistan is an arms importer and is not a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It offers little transparency in its arms dealings and while there is detailed national legislation governing imports, no publicly available legislation specifically governs conventional arms procurement or import authorization for the Tajik Armed Forces.

International legal context

Organisation Status Comment
United Nations Member State
International Court of Justice Did not accept compulsory jurisdiction
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Participating State
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member State

Safeguards agreement in place
Collective Security Treaty Organization Member State
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member State

Domestic Legal Context

Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base

Tajikistan is overwhelmingly an arms importer without recorded exports. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Tajikistan’s recorded major-arms acquisitions since independence have come almost entirely from Russia, with China emerging as a secondary supplier from 2017 and one-off deliveries from Bulgaria (2013) and an (as-yet-undelivered) order from Iran (2021). Early transfers were modest and helicopter-centred: ten Mi-17 transport helicopters ordered from Russia in 1993 and delivered in 1994; a further two Mi-17s and two Mi-24V combat helicopters delivered in 2006; and, in 2007, four L-39C Albatros armed trainer aircraft together with a single S-125 Pechora-2M surface-to-air missile system and 50 V-601 missiles for it, both delivered in 2009. Bulgaria supplied 15 BM-21 Grad 122mm multiple rocket launchers in 2013, and Russia delivered 26 BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers ordered in 2015.

The largest modernization wave came in 2017–19. In 2017, Russia delivered three T-72B tanks, five BTR-70/BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, four BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, two Mi-24V combat helicopters, two Mi-8T transport helicopters and three D-30 122mm towed guns; it followed this in 2019 with nine BRDM-2 armoured reconnaissance vehicles and a P-12 air-search radar, and delivered ten Tiger AV armoured personnel carriers (APCs) the same year. China’s first major arms transfers to Tajikistan recorded by SIPRI date to the same period: ten VP-11 and ten Tiger AV APCs delivered in 2018, followed by ten VN-3 APCs delivered in 2019.

Since 2021, deliveries have shifted toward heavier fire support and air defence. Russia delivered four TOS-1 thermobaric multiple rocket launchers and four TZM-T armoured resupply vehicles, both ordered and delivered in 2022. An Iranian order for Ababil-T armed drones, placed in 2021, has not been recorded by SIPRI as delivered. Most recently, China supplied Tajikistan’s first SIPRI-recorded modern air-defence missile system – a single HQ-17A surface-to-air missile system and 100 HQ-17 missiles – both delivered in 2025, consistent with the wider pattern of deepening Sino-Tajik defence cooperation.

Russia has remained Tajikistan’s dominant supplier of major equipment and munitions since the 1992–97 civil war, when the Russian Ministry of Defence reasserted direct control over the Dushanbe-based 201st Motor Rifle Division rather than transferring it to Tajik command. In 2013, Russia transferred an estimated US$200 million of weapons and hardware to the Tajik military in connection with the extension of the 201st Military Base’s status of forces agreement, and Russia’s ambassador to Tajikistan said further large-scale supplies of Russian military hardware, weapons, and munitions were made at the end of 2021, as the Taliban took power in neighbouring Afghanistan (TASS). Spurred by recurrent border skirmishes with Kyrgyzstan and the 2021 Taliban takeover, Tajikistan has since pursued a broader re-equipment drive, acquiring TOS-1A thermobaric multiple-barrelled rocket launchers from Russia and numerous armoured vehicle types from China; both nations, together with the United States, also make frequent donations of equipment to Tajikistan.

China has become a significant secondary supplier of military equipment to Tajikistan, with the Type 56 assault rifle remaining the standard service weapon for most Tajik conscripts. India built a substantial defence relationship with Tajikistan over more than two decades, developing and operating the Farkhor (Ayni) air base near Dushanbe – India’s only overseas military facility – and providing training to Tajik personnel; India relinquished the base on expiry of the bilateral hosting agreement in late 2025, a withdrawal regional analysts link to growing Russian and Chinese influence over Tajikistan rather than any bilateral rupture.

In 2022, Iran and Tajikistan announced the inauguration of a joint production line near Dushanbe for Iran’s Ababil-2 reconnaissance drone and Ababil-2T loitering munition – reportedly Iran’s first publicly acknowledged military drone production facility abroad – but the facility’s operational status remains unverified: an RFE/RL investigation published in March 2026 did not confirm it had ever produced drones, no Tajik-made Ababil-2 airframes have been identified in operational use anywhere, and anonymous Tajik officials and independent analysts cited by RFE/RL questioned whether it had ever become operational, suggesting the inauguration may have been symbolic. France maintained a small air-transport detachment at Dushanbe airport from 2002 to 2014, supporting its operations in Afghanistan.

Tajikistan’s submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) have consistently been nil reports, recording no imports or exports. Outside visibility into Tajikistan’s actual transfers accordingly depends on reporting by its trading partners. Tajikistan has filed only one national report under the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) – in 2003.

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

National Framework

Tajikistan is not a State Party to the ATT. The principal legislation governing international transfers of strategic goods is Law No. 1168 of 31 December 2014 ‘On Export Control’, which repealed a 1997 Law ‘On State Control over the Export of Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Products’. The official consolidated text notes that the 2014 Law has been amended three times: by Law No. 1392 of 24 February 2017, Law No. 2040 of 3 January 2024, and Law No. 2265 of 17 June 2026. The 2024 amendment added a statutory definition of ‘foreign economic activity’ – a term the Law had already used operationally since 2014/2017 but had not formally defined – expressly enumerating export, re-export, import, re-import, transit, investment, and production-cooperation activity within it, and empowered the Government to establish a dedicated export-control commission. The 2026 amendment added a statutory definition of ‘military-purpose products’ and rewrote the Law’s dual-use licensing article to reference a new Law ‘On the Permission System’.

The Law empowers the Government to approve a national list of controlled goods, designate the competent export-control authority, and, since 2024, establish an export-control commission (Article 6), and separately to impose restrictions necessary for national security or Tajikistan’s international obligations (Article 13). Exports of controlled goods – a category including weapons, military equipment, ammunition, and WMD-related dual-use items – require a written end-use undertaking (Article 9) and State examination (Article 10). Dual-use export-control approvals are regulated separately (under Article 8), and records of export transactions must be kept for three years (Article 11).

Although imports and re-imports are now expressly included within the Law’s scope as part of ‘foreign economic activity’, no publicly available legislation establishing a dedicated statutory import-authorization procedure for conventional arms (for both State and civilian imports) was identified. Controlled goods are subject to customs control on crossing the border (Article 5), and the government has general power to regulate foreign economic activity and restrict transactions (Articles 6, 13). But implementing regulations for these powers, including the government decision approving the national List of Controlled Goods required by Article 6, were not identified, so the precise scope of import controls, including which categories of conventional arms, ammunition, and components are covered, could not be confirmed.

Law No. 939 of 19 March 2013 ‘On Weapons’ itself covers all three of Tajikistan’s statutory weapons categories – (combat/military), (service), and (civilian) (Article 3). Individuals are expressly barred from privately owning combat weapons, except award weapons (Article 4(2)); combat weapons may be held only by named State bodies (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), State Committee for National Security (GKNB), National Guard, Customs Service, and others), under a circulation procedure the Law delegates to the government (Article 4(3)). No publicly available legislation specifically governs the procurement or import authorization of conventional arms for the Armed Forces, and acquisitions instead appear to proceed through executive decisions and intergovernmental agreements. For civilian and service weapons specifically: manufacture, trade, collection, and exhibition require a licence, while acquisition, import, export, storage, and carrying by individuals require a permit from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Articles 10, 14, 18, 22); imported and exported weapons and ammunition must bear a conformity mark and undergo mandatory certification (Articles 22(3), 8); and civilian acquisition is restricted to citizens aged 21 or older (Article 18(1)). These details are based on an unofficial translation of the Russian original.

Transparency and Reporting

As a State not party to the ATT, Tajikistan does not submit annual reports under the treaty. Its UNROCA reporting is limited to nil returns, so outside visibility into Tajik transfers depends on reporting by supplier States rather than on Tajikistan’s own disclosures. Tajikistan has not submitted an updated publicly available PoA national report since its 2003 submission. Consequently, several institutional details contained in that report, such as INTERPOL membership and aspects of the legislative framework, have become outdated. That the most recent SALW national report on file is more than two decades out of date is itself a significant transparency finding.

Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces

Strategic position and defence posture

Tajikistan’s defence posture is dominated by two factors: its 1,374km-long border with Afghanistan that has become steadily more dangerous since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, and continued reliance on Russia for strategic deterrence, training, and rapid reinforcement through Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) arrangements and the stationing of Russia’s 201st Military Base. Historically Russia’s largest military deployment abroad, the base was widely estimated to host between 5,000 and 7,000 personnel before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with more recent assessments suggesting the contingent has since been reduced. Among the Central Asian states, Tajikistan adopted the most critical position towards the Taliban following its return to power in 2021, reflecting a historical alignment with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance during the Tajik civil war and continued hostility rooted in shared ethnic-Tajik identity with opposition networks in northern Afghanistan.

Border security has become acutely salient since late 2025. Tajik officials report that a sequence of cross-border incursions from Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province represent a new pattern of attacks, widely attributed by regional analysts to Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K). These include a 26 November 2025 drone attack on a Chinese-operated gold mine in Khatlon that killed three Chinese nationals, a 30 November 2025 armed attack on China Road and Bridge Corporation workers in Darvoz district that killed at least two, and a clash in Shamsuddin Shokhin district in late December 2025 that killed two Tajik officers and three intruders.

According to Janes, Tajikistan’s most persistent non-state threat is Jamaat Ansarullah (also called the Tajik Taliban, or the Movement of the Taliban in Tajikistan), an Islamist group aiming to overthrow the Tajik government. Banned by Tajikistan’s Supreme Court in May 2012, it has operated from bases in north-eastern Afghanistan since emerging as a Tajik-focused offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 2006. The UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported in February 2025 that the group maintains training camps in Afghanistan’s Khost province staffed by al-Qaida engineers and weapons instructors, together with a dedicated military centre in the Kalafgan district of Takhar province training Central Asian and Arab fighters, and a unit based in Kunduz’s Imam Sahib district – directly opposite the Tajik border – tasked with infiltrating border areas. Tajik nationals have separately been implicated in terrorism abroad, including the March 2024 attack on Crocus City Hall near Moscow.

The other major bilateral security risk – the long-undemarcated Kyrgyz–Tajik border that produced the April 2021 and September 2022 clashes discussed below – has since moved toward political resolution. The two governments announced on 4 December 2024 that they had completed the description of all remaining border sections; President Rahmon of Tajikistan and President Japarov of Kyrgyzstan signed a border delimitation treaty in Bishkek on 13 March 2025, closing off a process that began in 2002. Delimitation is understood to be complete; demarcation, the physical marking of the border on the ground and its communication to the communities living along it, is outstanding and its implementation will determine whether the settlement holds.

Tajikistan is a presidential republic in which President Emomali Rahmon – accorded the constitutional honorific title ‘Founder of Peace and National Unity, Leader of the Nation’ and thereby exempted from the ordinary two-consecutive-term limit under Article 66 – is head of state and supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces. All members of the government, including the defence leadership, are presidential appointees. Rahmon won a seventh term with 90.92% of the vote in the October 2020 presidential election, and his People’s Democratic Party won 49 of 63 seats in the March 2025 parliamentary election. Succession planning ahead of the next presidential election (due by 2027) is widely expected to favour his eldest son. The military has never displaced a civilian government in Tajikistan, and no indicators of an imminent threat to civilian rule are apparent. Institutional integrity within the defence sector is nonetheless a live concern: as reported by Janes, Tajikistan’s Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption found in 2024 that Ministry of Defence bodies had lost 122.7 million somoni (approximately US$13 million) to corruption.

Tajikistan’s small defence budget and historically poor allocation of resources have long constrained the armed forces from developing into a modern, interoperable force, and the military remains oriented overwhelmingly toward internal security, counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency rather than conventional combined-arms warfare; ethnic and factional loyalties within some units. This situation is a legacy of the 1992–97 civil war, when militia commanders retained standing alongside the formal chain of command, complicating centralized command and control.

The 2025 defence, law-enforcement, and judiciary budget was set at 4.7 billion somoni (approximately US$446 million), up from US$354 million in 2024, raising the security-sector share of GDP to roughly 2.8 per cent from 2.6 per cent the previous year. The breakdown by agencies and types of law enforcement was not provided in the State budget, nor was other information regarding the military budget, as such details are classified under the nation’s law ‘On State Secrets’. The 2026 State Budget reportedly further increased allocations for defence and law enforcement agencies to 5.96 billion somoni. Independent assessment corroborates the resulting capability gap: the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s 2025 Tajikistan profile concludes that ‘military capacities are insufficient to counter serious insurgent threats without Russian support, underscoring reliance on external military partnerships’, while cautioning that Tajikistan’s rising military spending amid regional tensions may not by itself enhance stability. Consistent with Janes’ assessment, and given few indigenous fixed-wing air assets and negligible reconnaissance capability of its own, Tajikistan depends on the Russian forces stationed in-country for close air support, airlift, and intelligence in any higher-intensity contingency.

Composition of the Armed Forces      

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan comprise the Army and the Air Force together with closely affiliated but institutionally separate security formations. Military service is governed by the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan ‘On Conscription and Military Service’ (2021, amended 2026), which provides for compulsory conscription of male citizens from age 18 and a voluntary service pathway for all citizens under State-regulated conditions.

Army – Ground Forces       

According to Janes, Tajik Ground Forces’ conventional warfare capabilities are in a poor state, oriented primarily toward counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, leaving them with very little ability to adapt to the demands of a conventional campaign. The funding of internal security bodies to maintain domestic stability has long taken priority over capital investment. Consequently, Russia, through its military presence in Tajikistan, is – and in the long term is expected to remain – the main guarantor of Tajik territorial integrity. Russia leases a number of facilities in the country, and the most recent extension of these lease arrangements will see Moscow maintain its presence until 2042, which Russia’s foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov, has said it will do ‘virtually for free’. In return, Russia is understood to have committed to invest up to US$200 million by 2025 to equip Tajikistan with modern weapons, part of a wider assistance package estimated at US$1.2 billion in total, the bulk of which is reportedly earmarked for the land forces.

The Army operates under the Ministry of Defence, headquartered in Dushanbe, with the President as commander-in-chief. The General Staff of the Armed Forces, also Dushanbe-based, exercises operational control over all services and joint formations. Combat elements are organized into motorized rifle, mountain infantry, air assault, artillery, and special-purpose brigades reporting directly to the General Staff, and are concentrated around Dushanbe and the country’s border regions rather than under formal territorial commands. This arrangement emphasizes centralized control, internal security, and border defence across mountainous terrain over conventional territorial defence. Manpower combines compulsory conscription (men aged 18 to 27 years, for a term of twenty-four months) with voluntary contract service; there is understood to be no formal reserve system to track conscripts once their service ends, and no refresher training is understood to be offered.

The land forces are struggling to establish a unified command-and-control structure with a single set of procedures and doctrines. Although the government says it is working towards integration, the Ground Forces remain in competition with other internal-security formations – most notably the Border Guards, a considerably larger and better-funded and better-trained force. With posture oriented toward CT and COIN, mobile force detachments are deployed near the Afghan border to reinforce the Border Troops, with others positioned near the Kyrgyz border for rapid reinforcement in the event of renewed escalation (see, on the border’s 2024–25 political resolution, the section below ‘Recent and current operations’).

A worsening security situation along the Afghan border has meant a continued focus on improving COIN tactics. In the late 2000s, the military benefited from growing defence ties with the United States, resulting in small-scale training and supply of Tajik personnel for CT and counternarcotics missions in support of US-led operations in Afghanistan, but this assistance has been scaled down since 2012. Nevertheless, infantry units hold regular joint exercises with paramilitary forces from other security agencies and participate in CSTO-sponsored regional exercises intended to improve the readiness of forces deployed near the Afghan border.

Unresolved problems continue to hamper the capabilities of the land forces according to Janes. Most Army units still lack adequate personal protective equipment such as body armour, operate few radios, and are supported by a few dozen armoured vehicles of questionable serviceability. Troops are described as poorly disciplined and ill-suited to modern warfare, and the force’s cohesiveness has also been questioned.

Per Janes, the majority of Tajikistan’s military bases are located near the border with Afghanistan, with a further four bases near the shared border with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Army formations are correspondingly concentrated in the south, close to Afghanistan’s restive Kunduz province, with a single motor rifle brigade stationed in the north, near both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan’s security guarantees rest, in essence, on the Russian 201st Military Base, headquartered in Dushanbe, comprising the 92nd and 149th Motor Rifle Regiments at Dushanbe, the 191st Motor Rifle Regiment at Kurganteppa (renamed Bokhtar in 2018), and the 214th Air Group at Ayni. Janes assesses the 201st Military Base as being by far the most capable force in the country.

Even with the delivery of Russian equipment, Tajikistan maintains a relatively small inventory of armoured vehicles. A number of industrial enterprises in the country’s northern regions, once part of the Soviet military-industrial complex, produced military-oriented goods before independence; since the Soviet collapse, however, Tajikistan’s ability to produce and maintain its own armour has steadily degraded, and the country is now understood to be solely reliant on Russia for these services.

Beyond the SIPRI-recorded transfers discussed under ‘Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base’ above, Janes records a longer-running Russian assistance programme, worth up to US$1.2 billion and structured across 2013–15, 2016–20, and 2020–25 phases, though delivery lagged well behind schedule. Equipment deliveries (three each of T-72B1 tanks, BMP-2 IFVs, D-30 howitzers, and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns, plus nine BTR-70M/BTR-80 APCs, worth approximately US$122 million) began only in December 2017, followed by ten upgraded BRDM-2M-1 reconnaissance vehicles in late 2019 and around 40 pieces of engineering equipment in early 2021.

According to Janes’ current inventory, the Ground Forces’ tanks and armoured vehicles comprise 44 T-72 main battle tanks (of which 14 are assessed in service), 4 T-62 tanks, and 3 T-72B1 tanks; 85 BMP-1s (of which 8 are assessed in service) and 15 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles; 26 BTR-70 and 15 BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, together with 6 Chinese-made WZ523 and 5 YW531H APCs. Towed and rocket artillery comprises 15 D-30 and 10 M-30 122mm howitzers, 27 BM-21 Grad 122mm multiple rocket launchers (of which 18 are assessed in service), and a single TOS-1A thermobaric multiple-barrelled rocket launcher delivered in 2022.

Reportedly, Tajikistan has also begun developing a limited domestic armoured-vehicle production capacity, mirroring a trend among its Central Asian neighbours. President Rahmon inaugurated the Sipar Gurukh plant in Tursunzod in 2023 – a production facility for the assembly and installation of military equipment, using vehicles belonging to the Canadian-Emirati company Streit Group. Tajikistan’s Minister of Industry and New Technologies, Sherali Kabir, has said the country now produces its own armoured vehicles using Canadian technology, with current production capacity of 120 vehicles per year. In August 2024, news agency reported that the Government had signed a further agreement with the Sipar Group Company – a US$15 million investment expanding assembly to 17 vehicle types – to produce armoured vehicles and special equipment for the Government, with capacity of up to 120 vehicles per year and the possibility of increased production. This has been confirmed by Janes.

According to Janes, in February 2020, Tajikistan publicly displayed a number of platforms and weapons acquired from China, including the Dongfeng EQ2050F Mengshi 4×4 unprotected light tactical vehicle, assigned to the 7th Air Assault Brigade; the Norinco CS/VN3 light tactical armoured vehicle, and the Tiger patrol vehicle, made by the Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicles Manufacturing Company. The latter were armed with a W85 12.7mm heavy machine gun. Following Belarus, Tajikistan became the second former Soviet republic to operate a mix of Russian- and Chinese-made land systems in significant numbers.

Ground-based air defence

Tactical ground-based air defence relies on man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) – the Igla-1, Strela-2, Strela-2M, and Strela-3 – attributed by Janes to the Armed Forces of Tajikistan. Gun-based air defence under the Army itself is limited to 3 ZU-23M1 anti-aircraft guns, delivered in 2017 as part of the wider Russian equipment handover described above. This capability sits alongside Tajikistan’s far greater dependence on Russia for wider air defence, pursued through a joint regional air-defence system discussed below.

Janes records infantry weapons as comprising the 5.45mm PSM and 9mm Makarov (PM) pistols; the 5.45mm AK-74 and AKS-74, and 7.62mm AKM, assault rifles; the 7.62mm SVD sniper rifle; the 7.62mm PK and 12.7mm NSV machine guns; and the RPG-7 rocket launcher. No quantity, delivery date, or in-service figures are given.

Janes’ separate, force-wide equipment database adds the SPG-9 73mm recoilless gun, and the M120 mortar. Their inclusion confirms only that Janes associates these weapon types with the Tajik armed forces, not that any particular quantity is currently held or in service.

Air Force

According to Janes, the Tajik Air Force is underfunded, underequipped, and understaffed, and is unable to effectively address any external threats the country faces. This gap has been sharpened by insurgency spillover following the conclusion of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan in 2014 and the subsequent rise of Islamist militancy in the cross-border regions, as well as by continuing border tensions with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan that have led to occasional low-level skirmishes between border units. Tajikistan lacks a meaningful air-defence capability, let alone an integrated air-defence network, and its small fleet of combat-capable helicopters would not be able to effectively support ground operations against insurgents. With only one cohesive air unit known to exist (which is under the command of the paramilitary force responsible for riot control and COIN operations), Janes assesses that no fixed combat roles are assigned to what cannot be described as an air force in the generally accepted sense.

The Air Force, such as it is, operates under the Ministry of Defence, with service headquarters in Dushanbe; operational control is exercised by the General Staff of the Armed Forces under the President, and the service is commanded by a senior officer at Major General level. Air Force units are centrally organized, with the primary operational base at Ayni (Gissar) Air Base, west of Dushanbe. The force consists mainly of rotary-wing and training aircraft, supporting airlift, border surveillance, and internal-security missions.

Tajikistan is part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Air Defence System and the Russian-led CSTO; in consequence, its national airspace is monitored and patrolled by the Russian Air Force. Although some surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have been transferred to Tajikistan, there is no coherent network of air-defence posts and stations. Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been deployed to Dushanbe to provide Russian and Tajik forces with improved situational awareness, especially along the Afghan-Tajik border, and an integrated, automated control system is expected to be established in the coming years in close cooperation with Moscow. Apart from a moderate endeavour to modernize Tajik ground-based air defence within the CIS Joint Air Defence System, Janes assesses that Russia sees no incentive to help Tajikistan develop a capable air arm of its own, appearing to take the view that its own air contingents at Ayni and at Kant in Kyrgyzstan are sufficient to ensure adequate security; Dushanbe’s dependency on Russia to maintain its territorial integrity and provide security guarantees is expected to solidify in the medium term.

Tajikistan has received only limited assistance from abroad and has had no funding of its own for fixed-wing combat aircraft. Russia announced US$200 million of military assistance in 2013, but first deliveries (Mi-8 transport and Mi-24 attack helicopters and armour described above) began only in late 2017. The S-300 air-defence system followed in late 2023. Tajikistan is said to be training officers toward an eventual independent air force squadron and needs a viable air element for its Afghan border, but sees little likelihood of meaningful progress absent further transfers from Russia.

Per Janes, there are three airbases in Tajikistan – Ayni Air Base, operated by the Russian Aerospace Forces, and two further bases that function primarily as civilian-style airports. The sole functional Tajik air unit is an attack/transport squadron operating Mi-8, Mi-24P, and Mi-24V helicopters from Ayni; the more capable force at that base is Russia’s own 214th Aviation Group, attached to the 201st Military Base, which represents the main fire-support capability actually available in-country, and Tajik airspace is additionally patrolled by Russian aircraft from Kant in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. Janes says that the Air Force itself has not taken part in any operations recently.

Combat Aircraft

Tajikistan’s Air Force does not operate any dedicated combat aircraft. Its fixed-wing fleet is limited to seven L-39 jet trainers, of which four are assessed in service, employed in attack, light-attack, and surveillance/reconnaissance roles. This is the closest to a combat-aircraft capability the Air Force possesses.

Combat helicopters and armed rotary-wing aircraft

Per Janes’ current inventory, the Air Force’s rotary-wing fleet comprises nine Mi-24 attack/air-assault helicopters, of which six are assessed in service; thirteen Mi-8 utility helicopters, of which five are assessed in service; and one Mi-172 transport helicopter, delivered in 2003. Of these, only the Mi-24 is a dedicated combat/attack type; the Mi-8 and Mi-172 are utility and transport variants.

Air-defence systems

Janes records the Air Force as operating four HQ-17AE short-range air-defence systems, delivered in 2025, and eight S-300PS medium-to-long-range air-defence launchers, all assessed as in service and dated to 2023.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

In 2022, Kyrgyz news agency Kloop reported that Tajikistan had submitted a formal bid for Iranian-made military drones and that Iran had opened a plant for Ababil-2 drones in Tajikistan. Tajikistan has not officially responded to reports of the plant; in official statements, it has denied exporting military equipment to third countries, following accusations that Iranian-made drones used by Russia in Ukraine were being assembled in Tajikistan.

Recent and current operations

Peacekeeping operations, CSTO and CIS frameworks

Tajik Ground Forces maintained a limited external operational footprint, principally through past participation in United Nations peacekeeping and peace-support activities and through regular involvement in CSTO-led multinational exercises focused on counterterrorism, border security, and stabilization tasks rather than expeditionary combat. Tajik personnel had previously contributed to UN peacekeeping missions, including operations in Darfur, South Sudan, and Abyei, although Tajikistan was not recorded as a current UN peacekeeping contributor at the time of assessment (only two personnel in UNISFA).

The country’s main external military engagement was conducted through CSTO and CIS frameworks, with Tajik forces regularly participating in exercises such as Indestructible Brotherhood and other multinational drills that rehearsed peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, crisis response, and stabilisation operations under coalition command structures.

Operational activity had otherwise remained concentrated within Central Asia, particularly in relation to instability along the Afghan border. Janes assesses the Tajik armed forces as being without experience in sustained high-intensity combat, instead operating predominantly in low- to medium-intensity coalition-supported environments, with training priorities emphasizing peacekeeping, counterterrorism, internal security support, and interoperability with partner forces.

The 2021–22 Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border conflict

A long-running, undemarcated border dispute with Kyrgyzstan escalated into open interstate fighting on two occasions: a four-day clash beginning 28 April 2021, triggered by a dispute over a water facility near Kök-Tash, followed by a ceasefire ; and a sharper escalation from 14 to 16 September 2022, when Kyrgyz officials said Tajik forces used tanks, APCs, and mortars inside Kyrgyz territory and shelled the town of Batken and its airport. The affected area was evacuated of about 136,000 people. Casualty figures and attributed violations for both episodes are addressed under the section below, ‘Compliance with IHL and Human Rights by the Armed Forces’.

The April 2021 fighting was rooted in a dispute over the strategically important Golovnoy water-distribution station, claimed by both nations along an undelineated stretch of the border (at the time, only 570–580 km of the roughly 980km-long Tajik-Kyrgyz border had been officially delineated). The fighting took place along the border between Tajikistan’s Sughd province and Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region. It is unclear whether any Land Forces personnel beyond the Border Troops directly participated, though Land Forces reportedly moved additional forces and assets to the border region as the situation escalated. Janes dates the ceasefire to 29 April 2021, with both States agreeing on 30 April to establish a joint working group.

The September 2022 escalation began on 14 September and lasted four days. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a protocol on 19 September 2022 reiterating their commitment to resolving the border-demarcation process peacefully. On 4 December 2024, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan announced completion of the delimitation of all remaining border sections, and the two presidents signed a final agreement on the border in Bishkek on 13 March 2025. Subsequent demarcation work began, with installation of border markers underway in 2026. Independent assessment continues to describe border tensions as capable of flaring into violent clashes despite the improved trajectory.

January 2022 CSTO operation in Kazakhstan

In January 2022, Tajikistan contributed forces to the CSTO’s collective peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan, launched in response to that month’s mass unrest. Some 200 Tajik soldiers, including special-forces personnel, were reportedly deployed, with around 100 guarding strategic facilities in Almaty such as the Almaty-1 Power and Heating Centre (which supplies roughly 20% of the city’s heating and 12% of its electricity) as well as oil depots and warehouses.

Border operations against Afghanistan-based armed groups

Beyond the December 2025 clash and November 2025 attacks on Chinese nationals described above, Tajikistan has periodically conducted operations against militants crossing from Afghanistan since well before the Taliban takeover. The 22 July 2021 combat-readiness exercise held in response to the Taliban’s initial offensive – mobilizing 100,000 active servicemen and 130,000 reservists, with a further 20,000 reservists sent to reinforce the Afghan border – was described as the biggest such exercise in the 30-year history of independent Tajikistan. Jamaat Ansarullah, a Tajik armed group aligned with al-Qaeda-linked networks and active in northern Afghanistan near the Tajik border, is cited by the UN sanctions-monitoring committee alongside IS-K as a continuing cross-border threat. CSTO reinforcement of the Tajik-Afghan border, including through the 201st Base, has intensified accordingly.

Compliance with IHL and Human Rights by the Armed Forces

The Kyrgyzstan border conflict

The principal allegations concerning the conduct of the Tajik Armed Forces relate to the armed clashes with Kyrgyzstan along the disputed border in April-May 2021 and September 2022 (see also “Recent and current operations”, above). During the September 2022 hostilities, both sides employed heavy weapons, including artillery, mortars, and armoured vehicles, resulting in significant civilian casualties and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure.

Casualty figures for the two clashes vary by source and have not been reconciled. For the April 2021 clash, Kyrgyz authorities reported 36 Kyrgyz citizens killed (including a five-year-old boy) and 183 injured while 50,000 fled the area; on the Tajik side, RFE/RL’s own Tajik Service correspondents reported at least 16 Tajik nationals killed and at least 90 injured as of 3 May 2021, while a Tajik government official put the confirmed toll at 19 dead three days later. For the September 2022 fighting, Kyrgyz authorities reported 59 of their citizens killed, while Tajik officials claimed at least 35 fatalities (although unnamed officials separately told RFE/RL’s Tajik service that at least 39 Tajik citizens had died).

A May 2023 investigation by Human Rights Watch, ‘When We Moved, They Shot’, documented the deaths of at least 37 civilians, including five children, and 36 further injuries during the September 2022 fighting on both sides, with official and media estimates suggesting a toll as high as 51 dead and 121 injured. Human Rights Watch found that both parties committed apparent violations of international humanitarian law: Kyrgyz forces shot at ambulances and private vehicles carrying fleeing families and dropped a laser-guided bomb on a town square, killing at least ten civilians; Tajik forces shot at cars carrying civilians, unlawfully killed at least eight civilians in separate incidents. These included, as Tajik forces advanced and took control of Kyrgyz villages on 16 September, at least six civilian men, three while apparently fleeing and two in what Human Rights Watch assessed as apparent extrajudicial executions, among them a 72-year-old retired man shot in his own garden in Borboduk – and were responsible for large-scale looting and burning of private property in Kyrgyz villages while under Tajik control; conduct the organization assessed as likely amounting to war crimes on both sides.

Tajik authorities separately alleged that Kyrgyz forces fired on an ambulance near Isfara, killing five members of one family, including two children. Neither the April 2021 nor the September 2022 civilian deaths have been the subject of an independent investigation or accountability process identified in this draft. No prosecutions, courts-martial, or independent investigations of Tajik conduct during either the 2021 or 2022 clashes were identified in this draft.

Human Rights Watch’s most recent World Report reiterates that ‘there has been no accountability for crimes committed by the Tajik armed forces during the 2022 border conflict with Kyrgyzstan’ and that neither government has publicised any prosecution of its own forces for conflict-related violations.

Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast: military support to internal security

Since 2012, the Tajik Armed Forces have been periodically deployed in support of internal security operations in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) alongside the MIA, GKNB, and other security forces, in response to recurrent unrest in the predominantly Pamiri region. This reflects the government’s reliance on military assets in support of domestic security operations.

The most significant deployment followed the fatal shooting of Pamiri community leader Gulbiddin Ziyobekov by security forces on 25 November 2021, which triggered mass protests, a prolonged internet shutdown (28 November 2021–21 March 2022), and the deployment of military reinforcements to GBAO. Following renewed demonstrations in Khorog on 14–16 May 2022, the government launched a nationwide ‘anti-terrorism operation’ on 18 May 2022, involving military personnel and equipment alongside the MIA, GKNB, and other security agencies. Human Rights Watch documented that at least 40 people were killed during security-force operations between November 2021 and June 2022. Human Rights Watch also documented widespread allegations of excessive use of force during the operation and called for an independent investigation into the killings. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues publicly characterized the government’s violent response as disproportionate, citing specifically ‘the excessive and unlawful use of force, and the involvement of the military’ alongside mass arrests, and warned it risked spiralling ‘out of control’. He noted that he and other UN Special Procedures mandate holders had sent Tajikistan a joint communication warning of the risk of escalation after the November 2021 unrest, which went unanswered before violence recurred in May 2022 ‘on a larger and more dangerous scale’.

Available reporting does not distinguish responsibility for individual incidents between the Armed Forces and the other security agencies participating in the operation; most documented allegations concern the overall use of lethal force during the operation itself. The subsequent pattern of arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, unfair trials, restrictions on fundamental freedoms, and deaths in custody is instead attributed principally to the MIA, GKNB, and other law-enforcement bodies, and is examined below.

Reportedly, no independent investigations, military disciplinary proceedings or criminal prosecutions concerning the conduct of members of the Armed Forces during the 2022 GBAO operation were identified. International human rights organizations have repeatedly called for independent investigations into the civilian deaths arising from the operation. Members of the Pamiri ethnic group continue to report high levels of harassment and pressure from the authorities.

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

Legal Framework

Law enforcement in Tajikistan is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose Police (Militsiya) constitute the principal civilian law-enforcement agency. The MIA is supported by the Internal Troops, a militarized force responsible for protecting public order, securing important State facilities, participating in counterterrorism operations, responding to emergencies and supporting other law-enforcement agencies. The Internal Troops are regulated by Law ‘On Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan’, enacted in 1993 and subsequently amended; no English translation or consolidated text could be accessed. Separate law-enforcement and national security functions, including border protection, intelligence and counter-intelligence, are exercised by the GKNB, governed by its own statute, the Law ‘On the Bodies of National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan’.

The Constitution guarantees the principal human rights applicable to policing. Article 5 recognizes the inviolability of human rights and freedoms, Article 18 guarantees the right to life and prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and Article 29 protects the right to peaceful assembly. The Constitution does not itself regulate police powers or the use of force.

The Law ‘On Police’ establishes the legal framework governing police powers and the use of force. Article 4 prohibits police officers from committing torture, violence or other forms of ill-treatment or degrading a person’s honour and dignity, and expressly provides that police officers shall not deliberately inflict physical or psychological harm. Where force cannot be avoided, Article 14(5) requires officers to seek, wherever possible, to minimize the moral, material and physical harm caused by the use of physical force, special means or firearms.

Article16 authorizes police officers to use firearms only as a measure of last resort, but lists a comparatively broad range of circumstances in which lethal force may be employed. These include protecting citizens and hostages; repelling armed or collective attacks against police officers or persons maintaining public order; defending homes, protected facilities, government buildings and other public or private property; apprehending persons offering armed resistance or suspected of particularly serious offences; preventing the seizure of police weapons, vehicles or equipment; and responding to attacks involving explosives or highly flammable materials that threaten public safety. The Policing Law Database concludes that several of these grounds are broader than international standards, particularly because they permit the use of firearms to protect property or infrastructure in circumstances that may not involve an imminent threat to life. The database accordingly assesses Tajikistan’s legislation as only partially compatible with international standards governing the use of force.

The Internal Troops are governed by a separate legislative framework. Chapter 5 of the Law on Internal Troops of the MIA authorizes personnel to use physical force, special means, firearms and military equipment in the performance of their duties and requires personnel authorized to use such means to receive specialised training and periodic certification; the conditions and procedures governing their use are established by legislation and subordinate regulations (Articles 19–26).

Weapons and equipment

The broader legal framework governing state weapons is established by the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan ‘On Weapons’ (No. 939 of 19 March 2013), which distinguishes civilian, service, and combat weapons (Articles 4–6) and expressly bars individuals from privately owning combat weapons, except award weapons (Article 4(2)). Combat weapons are reserved for the Armed Forces and other State militarized organizations designated by the Government, while service weapons are intended for authorized State officials performing official duties; the law does not itself specify which weapons are allocated to particular law-enforcement agencies, leaving such allocation to government regulations.

No publicly available government regulation or official inventory identifying the specific firearms, less-lethal weapons, ammunition, or specialised equipment authorized for use by the Police or the Internal Troops was identified. Although both the Law ‘On Police’ and the Law ‘On Internal Troops’ expressly authorize the use of physical force, special means, and firearms, the detailed lists of authorized equipment are established through implementing regulations that are not publicly accessible, and no official information was identified on the standard issue of sidearms, assault rifles, chemical irritants, conducted-energy devices, batons, armoured vehicles, or other specialized equipment. The precise composition of law-enforcement arsenals and the rules governing their issue, carriage, and deployment accordingly cannot be independently verified from publicly available primary sources.

In the absence of an official inventory, press reporting on specific operations offers some indirect, illustrative evidence of equipment in practice, though it falls short of a verified inventory and does not always cleanly distinguish Police, Internal Troops, and GKNB personnel from the Armed Forces. During the May 2022 CT operation in Khorog (GBAO), the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues reported security forces used rubber bullets, stun grenades, and tear gas against protesters on 16 May, killing one local Pamiri man. Human Rights Watch separately documented police use of rubber bullets and tear gas against protesters more broadly over the following days, alongside live ammunition and killings, and the Interior Ministry itself confirmed a gun battle in which a GKNB officer was killed. Contemporaneous reporting on the same operation described unverified images of armoured vehicles in Khorog and unconfirmed claims of snipers deployed along the Pamir Highway; a rumour that a military helicopter had been shot down was explicitly denied by the Defence Ministry. An earlier, comparable operation in Khorog in July 2012 saw confirmed use of helicopter gunships, per a named State Committee for National Security spokesman.

Oversight

There is no civilian independent police oversight body in Tajikistan. 

The Law ‘On Combating Terrorism’ 1999 (unofficial translation) contains a broad immunity provision applicable to counter-terrorism operations. Article 28 provides that officers participating in CT operations incur no liability for moral, material, or bodily harm caused to terrorists through the lawful use of physical force, special means or firearms – a broad immunity provision relevant to the conduct of ‘anti-terrorism operations’ such as the May 2022 GBAO crackdown discussed above.

Police Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights

Tajikistan’s law-enforcement agencies – the MIA, the GKNB, and the Internal Troops – have repeatedly been accused by UN bodies and international organizations of failing to comply with international standards on the use of force, the prohibition of torture, due-process guarantees, and accountability for abuses. Allegations have been particularly prominent in relation to the GBAO, counter-extremism operations, and the treatment of detainees.

Use of force connected to political unrest

The most serious recent allegations concern the May 2022 GBAO operation (see above). International organizations reported that security forces used firearms against protesters and bystanders during the operation, with insufficient publicly available information on the circumstances of individual deaths or whether the force used was necessary and proportionate. A joint statement by international NGOs, and Human Rights Watch separately, called on the Tajik authorities to ensure prompt, independent, and effective investigations into the security operation and to end arbitrary detention of protesters and members of civil society.

The authorities subsequently prosecuted dozens of Pamiri activists, journalists, and civil-society figures on terrorism, extremism, and ‘organizing a criminal community’ charges, in a process that expanded over time. Reportedly, at least 46 people were arrested in the May 2022 operation itself and hundreds more faced charges or had been brought to trial for participation in the protests; by September 2022 an initial 16 of 70 GBAO detainees had already received prison sentences of eight years or more following closed trials; many defendants told relatives they had been tortured or ill-treated in pre-trial detention.

By September 2023, Amnesty International’s cumulative count had grown to more than 200 Pamiris imprisoned after closed, unfair trials – many without access to a lawyer – including 11 sentences of life imprisonment. The crackdown extended to the Pamiri diaspora in Russia, with at least seven activists, including two Russian citizens of Pamiri origin, forcibly disappeared and rendered to Tajikistan between November 2021 and August 2022 according to Human Rights Watch.

A March 2025 presidential amnesty covering 897 prisoners excluded every arbitrarily detained Pamiri despite repeated international appeals, and Pamiris have separately reported being prohibited from speaking their language in public and from holding prayer meetings in their homes since the crackdown began.

Use of force and custodial abuse

In its 2018 Concluding Observations, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern at ‘allegations that torture and ill-treatment continue to be routinely practised by law enforcement officials’, including during investigations and pre-trial detention, and highlighted coercive interrogation methods, insufficient investigation of complaints, limited access to lawyers and independent medical examinations, and the lack of effective remedies for victims. The Committee’s most recent review, in April 2026, welcomed progress on penitentiary reform – including Criminal Code amendments raising torture penalties to 5–15 years’ imprisonment, removing the possibility of fines or amnesty for torture, and classifying it as a serious crime – while continuing to raise questions about staff training and the treatment of prisoners serving life sentences. The Committee also encouraged Tajikistan to ratify OPCAT and establish an independent, adequately resourced National Preventive Mechanism as a priority – not yet done at time of writing.

Domestically, prison conditions remain a serious concern: no genuine investigation or accountability has followed the November 2018 and May 2019 prison riots in Khujand and Vahdat, which killed at least fifty prisoners and five guards in unclear circumstances, or the July 2019 poisoning deaths of 14 prisoners during a transfer. The detention of Pamiri activists after the 2022 crackdown further illustrates the pattern: five Pamiri political prisoners – Kulmamad Pallaev, Bogsho Imatshoev, Aslan Gulobov, Muzaffar Davlatmirov, and Eronsho Mamadrahimov – reportedly died in custody during 2025, in some cases after being denied medical care, prompting Human Rights Watch to call for an independent investigation.

The November 2021 unrest in GBAO that triggered the 2022 crackdown was itself a police custodial-abuse case: the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues described the death in custody of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov as an alleged torture-killing by Tajik security forces. The UN Special Rapporteur returned to Tajikistan in October 2023 and, in a statement at its conclusion, renewed his call for ‘an impartial and transparent investigation according to international standards’ into the November 2021 GBAO violence; he presented his full visit report to the Human Rights Council in March 2024. No such investigation has been undertaken.

More recently, and directly bearing on the sentencing figures given above, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention issued Opinions 18/2024 and 19/2024 in July 2024, finding that the detention of five Pamiri human-rights defenders – Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Manuchehr Kholiqnazarov, Faromuz Irgashov, Khursand Mamadshoev, and Sorbon Yunoev – was arbitrary on multiple grounds, and calling for their immediate release; the Working Group found their imprisonment was linked to their advocacy for an investigation into police violence against the Pamiri population during the 2021–2022 protests. None of the five had been released as of a joint civil-society statement issued on 4 August 2025 by nine organizations, which confirmed that the presidential amnesty of March 2025 (897 prisoners released) excluded all of them despite repeated international appeals for their release.

International Standards and Treaty Body Findings

The forcible cross-border renditions of Pamiri diaspora activists described above sit within a broader, longer-documented pattern: the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, following an official visit to Tajikistan in July 2019, raised concern about the forcible return of Tajik nationals from abroad amounting to enforced disappearance, harassment of the lawyers representing victims’ families, and the continued lack of a truth, justice, and reparations process for thousands of people still unaccounted for from the 1992–97 civil war.

Accountability and oversight

Domestic accountability mechanisms for police misconduct remain limited. Tajikistan does not have an independent civilian police oversight body empowered to investigate complaints against law enforcement officials, and no regional human-rights court with jurisdiction over Tajik policing; complaints are handled through internal disciplinary mechanisms, prosecutorial bodies, or the ordinary courts, raising concerns about independence and effectiveness. No publicly available judgments from Tajik domestic courts were identified establishing accountability for police or security-force killings, torture, or excessive use of force.

Two distinct International Criminal Court matters bear on this picture, and should not be conflated. First, on 10 April 2025 the ICC Office of the Prosecutor received an Article 15 communication – submitted by two NGOs (the Ukrainian Fund of International Volunteers and Freedom for Eurasia) together with the banned opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) – alleging that President Emomali Rahmon and senior officials committed crimes against humanity, including persecution, unlawful imprisonment, torture, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial killing, spanning 2002–24 and covering, among other incidents, the May 2022 GBAO crackdown. Under Article 15, the Prosecutor may assess such information but is under no obligation to act on it; as of writing, no preliminary examination had occurred.

Risk of Diversion and Re-Export of Imported Weapons

No publicly documented case was identified of imported weapons being diverted from Tajik government custody to another State or to a non-State armed group, and no evidence was found of systematic diversion from military or police stockpiles to armed groups or terrorist organizations. Isolated seizures of illicit military-grade weapons occur periodically during Tajik security operations near the Afghan border, but nothing indicates they originated from Tajik State arsenals rather than cross-border trafficking or civil war-era private caches. A long-running government programme to draw civil war-era weapons out of private hands remains the clearest thread of evidence : launched by presidential decree in December 1994, it had collected roughly 33,000 weapons by March 2011, and its most notable episode followed a 19 September 2010 ambush in the Kamarob Gorge that killed at least 25 government soldiers, after which the Defence Ministry and GKNB blamed former opposition commander Mirzokhuja Ahmadov, at whose house a substantial private arms cache was found.

The principal risk identified by international organizations is structural rather than a record of confirmed diversion. Tajikistan’s 1,374km-long border with Afghanistan is a well-documented corridor for trafficking both narcotics and small arms. GI-TOC rates Tajikistan’s arms-trafficking criminal market at 4.00 of 10 for 2025. Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan and its seizure of large quantities of US-origin equipment from the collapsed Afghan security forces, Tajik forces have seized foreign-origin military weapons from armed infiltrators near the border: in September 2023, US-made M16/M4 rifles and night-vision equipment from three Jamaat Ansarullah fighters, and in December 2025, M-16 rifles, suppressor-equipped pistols, grenades, and explosives from the Shamsuddin Shokhin clash. Corruption compounds the risk: the US State Department documents reliable reports of police extortion and bribery hindering law enforcement generally, and GI-TOC separately describes the MIA’s own anti-organized-crime departments as ‘reportedly compromised’.

Legally, Russia and China – Tajikistan’s principal arms suppliers – are not ATT States Parties and so face no ATT export-assessment obligation, and GI-TOC assesses Tajikistan itself as having ‘notably resisted’ both the ATT and the UN Firearms Protocol. Domestically, since Tajikistan is not an exporting country the legal question is re-export: the 2014 ‘On Export Control’ law requires government authorization and end-use documentation, but establishes no ATT-equivalent transfer-risk assessment, and no information was found on how the requirement is monitored in practice. Transparency International’s global 2025 study confirms personnel-level theft and embezzlement as the most common arms-diversion mechanism worldwide, without naming Tajikistan specifically.

Institutionally, Tajikistan’s most recent PoA national report dates to 2003 and assigns SALW coordination to a general IHL commission (CIIHL) rather than a dedicated agency. No public information exists on stockpile audits or on investigations into lost or stolen weapons. Since 2004, the OSCE has run continuous physical-security and stockpile-management assistance with the Tajik government, with further cooperation planned in 2026–28, a two-decade commitment that signals the issue is not considered resolved. GI-TOC separately scores Tajikistan 9.00 of 10 for ‘State-embedded actors’ – criminal actors embedded within the State apparatus, including armed factions with roots in the civil war, with particular influence in Gorno-Badakhshan (see the above section, ‘Compliance with IHL and Human Rights’). This is the highest of its five criminal-actor categories.