Thailand
Last updated:
Thailand presents a high risk in relation to armed forces due to domestic military operations that involve excessive use of force. Key incidents include the response to the 2010 Red Shirt protests and continuing counterinsurgency operations in the south of the country. Persistent accountability gaps, including limited prosecution of senior officials responsible for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, raise concerns about civilian oversight of the armed forces and enforcement of international standards. Thailand’s status as an Arms Trade Treaty signatory but not a State Party further limits transparency and external scrutiny of arms transfers and end-use controls.
The law enforcement sector is assessed as high risk due to documented concerns over excessive use of force, weak accountability mechanisms, and gaps in the legal framework governing police use of force. While oversight bodies exist, including internal police mechanisms and human rights institutions, enforcement and sanctioning of abuses appear inconsistent.
There is a moderate to high risk of diversion or illicit transfer of military equipment in Thailand. Contributing factors include the ongoing armed conflict in the southern provinces, reported loss or theft of weapons from military stockpiles, Thailand’s role as a regional transit environment for illicit trafficking, and limited transparency and controls.
International legal context
Disarmament Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) | Not Party |
|
|
| 2001 Firearms Protocol | Not Party | ||
| Optional Protocol to the CAT | Not Party |
International Humanitarian Law Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1949 Geneva Conventions | State Party | |
| Additional Protocol I of 1977 | Not Party | |
| Additional Protocol II of 1977 | Not Party |
International Criminal Law Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | Signatory |
|
International Human Rights Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights | State Party | |
| Optional Protocol to the ICCPR | Not Party | |
| 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights | State Party | |
| 1948 Genocide Convention | Not Party | |
| 1984 Convention against Torture | State Party |
| Organisation | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| United Nations | Member State | |
| International Court of Justice | Did not accept compulsory jurisdiction | |
| ASEAN | Member State | |
| International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) | Member State |
Domestic Legal Context
Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base
Thailand is primarily an arms importer, although it has a modest and growing domestic defence-industrial base. Its arms transfers are not governed by the ATT as Thailand has signed but not ratified the treaty.
Thailand’s United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) reports for 2022–2024 reflect a predominantly import-driven pattern with limited exports. In 2022, Thailand reported exporting 14 armoured combat vehicles to Bhutan, and importing 38 armoured combat vehicles, 8 combat aircraft, and 4 attack helicopters from the United States. In 2023, imports included 10 main battle tanks from China, 68 armoured combat vehicles from the United States, 24 large-calibre artillery systems from France, 2 warships from China, and 16 missile systems from Singapore, with no exports reported. In 2024, Thailand reported delivery of two combat aircraft from the United States under a contract for eight signed in 2021. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) data reported by trading partners show a similarly import-dominant pattern: in 2022, Thailand exported 52 small arms against 4,388 small arms and 20 light weapons imports; in 2023, 21 small arms and 4 light weapons exports against 26,123 small arms and 94 light weapons imports; and in 2024, 3 small arms exports against 5,146 small arms and 1 light weapons import.
SIPRI data for 2020–24 place Thailand as the 40th largest importer of major arms globally, with a 0.6 per cent share of global imports – down 49 per cent from 2015–19 (an average 1.2 per cent share). Thailand’s three main suppliers in 2020–24 were China (43%), the United States (14%), and South Korea (12%). Notable recent deliveries recorded by SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database include 120 HQ-22 MI surface-to-air missiles from China (2022), 50 Igla-S portable SAMs from Russia (2022), and 20 KGGB guided bombs from South Korea (2023).
In 2025, Thailand placed a major order package centred on 8 Gripen E/F fighters from Sweden, with associated UK radar, Italian electro-optical systems, and US engines, alongside 75 Barak-LRAD SAMs from Israel and two SR-5 rocket artillery systems from China. Pending deliveries also include 50 AGM-114 Hellfire-2 missiles (from the United States, ordered 2023).
Thailand’s domestic defence industry has also a documented export record. SIPRI records transfers of the First Win APC to Malaysia (20 units, 2017), Indonesia (5 units, 2019), and Bhutan (15 units, 2021); L-39Z Albatros trainer/combat aircraft to Canada (5) and the Netherlands (2) in 2024; and four M-55 LCUs to Oman (ordered 2024). Earlier exports include OV-10 aircraft to the Philippines (2004) and missile boats to Pakistan (2006).
Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty
National framework
Thailand’s arms transfer control framework predates the ATT and remains fragmented. Conventional arms are regulated principally under the Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, Fireworks, and the Equivalent of Firearms Act B.E. 2490 (1947), as amended, which establishes licensing requirements for the manufacture, import, export, transfer and possession of firearms and ammunition. Thailand subsequently enacted the Control on Weapons of Mass Destruction Related Items Act B.E. 2562 (2019) to regulate items associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and certain dual-use goods. However, implementation of that Act has initially focused on limited categories of dual-use items and does not establish a comprehensive strategic trade control regime governing conventional arms, military technology, brokering, transit, trans-shipment and re-export.
Unlike many ATT States Parties, Thailand does not currently operate a single integrated legislative framework regulating the full spectrum of strategic goods or a consolidated national control list covering conventional arms, military equipment and dual-use items. Instead, export controls remain dispersed across several statutes and administrative authorities.
A 2026 policy brief published by the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University identifies this fragmented legislative framework as a significant structural limitation in Thailand’s export-control system. The authors conclude that the existing legal framework is insufficient to address increasingly complex international procurement, brokering and transshipment networks, and recommend developing a comprehensive strategic trade control regime alongside ratification of the ATT. The brief further recommends expanding the scope of the 2019 Act to cover conventional arms, strategic goods, dual-use technologies, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering within a unified export-control framework.
Although Thailand submits reports to UNROCA and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), these mechanisms provide only partial transparency. Unlike the ATT, they do not require comprehensive transfer-by-transfer export assessments, legally mandated diversion risk analysis, end-use verification, or annual reporting on authorized and actual international arms transfers.
Consequently, while Thailand maintains domestic controls over firearms and certain strategic goods, significant gaps remain in its legal framework governing international arms transfers. Independent legal and policy analysis continues to recommend the adoption of comprehensive strategic trade control legislation, strengthened export licensing and end-use control mechanisms, and eventual ratification of the ATT to bring Thailand’s arms transfer control regime into closer alignment with international standards.
At the regional level, Thailand participates in ASEAN defence and security cooperation mechanisms. However, ASEAN has no legally binding regional arms transfer control regime comparable to the ATT.
Transparency and Reporting
As mentioned, Thailand participates in both UNROCA and the PoA, and has submitted reports under each instrument over multiple years since the 1990s. However, engagement with both has been intermittent rather than systematic.
Thailand reported consistently to the UNROCA between 1993 and 2004, before reporting only for 2009, 2011 and 2022, reflecting a prolonged decline in transparency consistent with wider regional trends identified by SIPRI. Thailand subsequently submitted reports for 2023 and 2024, according to the UNROCA database, indicating a resumption of annual reporting. While this represents a positive development, it remains too early to determine whether sustained annual reporting will continue.
Under the PoA, Thailand submitted national reports consistently during the instrument’s early phase (2002–2008). Its PoA submissions have had limited detail, consistent with the comparatively low reporting rate across the Asia-Pacific region noted by UNODA.
Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces
Strategic position and defence posture
Thailand occupies a central position in Southeast Asia, sharing borders with Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Malaysia. As noted by the International Crisis Group, Thailand faces security challenges along multiple axes simultaneously: unresolved tensions with Cambodia following two rounds of fighting in 2025, the long-running Patani-Malay insurgency in the southernmost provinces, spillover from the conflicts in Myanmar, and the impact of transnational organized crime.
The insurgency in Thailand’s southern border provinces – Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala, and parts of Songkhla – remains the most persistent and resource-intensive internal security challenge since the resurgence of conflict in early 2004. Successive governments have maintained a substantial security presence in the southern provinces, consisting of military personnel, police, rangers, border patrol police and local defence volunteers under the command of the Fourth Army Region and the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Estimates have varied over time, ranging from approximately 40,000 professional security personnel in the late 2000s to around 70,000 security personnel, including police and volunteer forces, following the 2014 military coup. As of May 2025, Asia News Network reported the Fourth Army Region deployed nine regiments (144 companies) and six female ranger units organized under seven task forces. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army directed Interior Ministry village security volunteers to assume responsibility for local checkpoints in areas where regular military units had been reduced, reflecting an ongoing shift towards locally based security arrangements.
Counter-insurgency operations continue to command significant public resources. During parliamentary consideration of the FY2024 budget, approximately 25 billion baht was allocated for security operations in the southern border provinces, representing an increase of around 6.5 per cent over the previous year, while more than 5 billion baht was allocated to the ISOC for security-related operations.
Thailand’s defence spending remains significant. The FY2025 defence budget was approved at almost 201 billion baht (approximately US$5.55 billion), representing 5.3% of the national budget and a 2.6% increase compared with FY2024, according to ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute analysis. SIPRI military expenditure data places Thailand’s total military spending at approximately US$5.98 billion in 2025, compared with US$5.52 billion in 2024, reflecting differences between defence budget allocations and broader military expenditure calculations. In addition to the regular defence budget, the armed forces receive classified or non-transparent allocations (‘secret funds’), reportedly raising concerns regarding oversight accountability.
In 2025, Thailand experienced its most significant interstate military confrontation in decades when hostilities erupted along the disputed border with Cambodia (see below). The conflict highlighted the importance of air power, air defence, and long-range strike capabilities in Thailand’s defence posture, although the extent to which it directly shaped procurement decisions cannot be conclusively established. Shortly after the July hostilities, reportedly the Cabinet approved the first phase of the Royal Thai Air Force’s planned acquisition of 12 Gripen E/F multirole fighter aircraft, authorizing procurement of four aircraft under a long-term modernisation programme. Following the renewed fighting in December 2025 with Cambodia, it was also reported that the Cabinet approved an additional 5.05 billion baht (approximately US$160 million) from the central budget to support military operations and a further 206 million baht for the Royal Thai Army to procure military equipment, while noting that operational details would remain classified.
Thailand’s defence planning is guided by the National Security Policy and Plan B.E. 2566–2570 (2023–2027). The Royal Thai Army’s first Defence White Paper (2024) outlines modernization priorities through 2027, including armoured vehicles, artillery, air defence, armed drones, aviation assets, surveillance, intelligence and communications systems. Reportedly, the paper argues that the army need additional weaponry to defend the nation from all types of threats. The white paper gave an overview of the requests for weaponry and related equipment, but did not include details. Apart from armed drones and attack helicopters, the document stated that the army also needed tanks, wheeled armoured vehicles, patrol helicopters, transport aircraft, defence radar systems, territorial monitoring systems and better intelligence and communication equipment.
Composition of the Royal Thai Armed Forces
The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) are governed by the Ministry of Defence, with the King as the titular Head of the Armed Forces under Section 8 of the 2017 Constitution of Thailand.
The Act on Internal Security (2008) establishes ISOC under the Prime Minister’s Office as central agency for managing internal security threats. Led by the Prime Minister and closely integrated with military and security institutions, ISOC coordinates government responses and implements Cabinet-approved security plans through central, regional, and provincial structures.
The RTARF comprise the Royal Thai Army (RTA), the Royal Thai Navy (RTN, including the Marine Corps), and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). Defence assessments place active personnel at approximately 360,000, including around 245,000 Army personnel, 70,000 Navy personnel and 46,000 Air Force personnel, supported by approximately 200,000 reserves. The armed forces are supported by official paramilitary forces, including the Army’s Thahan Phran (Thai Rangers), the Border Patrol Police under the Royal Thai Police, and the Volunteer Defence Corps under the Ministry of Interior.
Thailand maintains a system of compulsory military service for eligible men. Under the Military Service Act (1954, B.E. 2497), male citizens are required to register at age 18 and are liable for conscription from age 21. Each year, eligible men who do not volunteer participate in a lottery-based selection process to determine whether they will perform compulsory military service.
Royal Thai Army
The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is the principal land force, responsible for border security, counter-insurgency, internal stability, and national defence. It is commanded by a Commander-in-Chief, also serving within ISOC, underscoring its domestic security role. Operational readiness is supported through close US defence ties and exercises such as Cobra Gold.
The RTA is organized into four army regions: 1st (Bangkok/central-west), 2nd (northeast – Cambodian border), 3rd (north/west – focusing on narcotics and preventing incursions from Myanmar), and 4th (south – dealing with ongoing insurgencies in the southern provinces). It fields infantry-centric formations supported by armour, artillery, reconnaissance, engineers, and combat support units, with functional branches covering intelligence, aviation, air defence, and special operations. Forces can be rapidly deployed for border security and internal contingencies.
The RTA is widely dispersed with border concentrations along Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia, and a strong presence around Bangkok. Southern deployments are partly supplemented by paramilitary forces due to ongoing insurgency. Historical tensions along the Cambodian border underline persistent (managed) frontier instability.
The RTA is not known to have a blueprint for a co-ordinated modernization of the inventory. The upgrades are far and few despite the ageing equipment. Consequently, resources are expended on maintenance, repair and overhaul of the weapons. Only the VT-4 and T-84 Oplot main battle tanks (from Ukraine) are newer acquisitions alongside the VN-1 and M1126 armoured vehicles and CAESAR and ATMOS artillery platforms. Rotary-wing platforms consist of Mil Mi-17V-5, UH-72A Lakota, AW139 and Black Hawks. The RTA has also acquired the Israeli UAVs such as the Heron 450. However, the inventory of these new platforms is relatively small compared to the hundreds of M113 and Type 85 armoured personnel carriers that continue to demand resources for upkeep.
Armour
- Tanks and armoured vehicles and munitions
- Artillery
- Small arms and munitions
- Light weapons
- Combat aircraft
The RTA operates a mixed armoured fleet comprising modern acquisitions and ageing legacy systems. Main battle tanks include 60 VT-4s from China and 49 T-84 Oplots from Ukraine, the latter procured to replace the ageing M41 light tanks; the decision to acquire the type was taken in 2011, with the first five tanks delivered in 2013 and the final batch delivered by 2018. The RTA’s M60 fleet comprises 125 M60A3 and 53 M60A1, procured from the United States. Elbit Systems replaced the analogue fire-control system on the M60A3 with a digital one in 2016, enhancing accuracy for long-range engagements against moving and stationary targets. The M60A3 uses 105 mm shells and was deployed during the 2008 Thai-Cambodian border dispute.
The RTA also operates an array of light tanks and fire-support vehicles, including 106 Stingray and 65 Scorpion light tanks purchased in the 1970s for direct offence and fire support, though most of this equipment is aged and requires replacement. 126 Ukrainian BTR-3E1 IFVs support a mobile infantry regiment, in variants covering infantry mobilisation, command, 81 mm and 120 mm grenade launcher, anti-tank rocket, and medical and salvage roles. The baseline BTR-3E1 is fitted with a BM-3M turret or Shturm combat module comprising a 30 mm ZTM-1 cannon, a 30 mm automatic grenade launcher, a 7.62 mm machine gun, and a twin launcher for the Barrier anti-tank guided weapon, and has replaced the ageing V-150 armoured vehicles. The RTA additionally procured 68 VN-1 IFVs from China, delivered in batches in 2019, 2020 and 2022. The DTI is developing the 8×8 Black Widow Spider IFV in collaboration with ST Kinetics, with local firm Preecha Taworn building the prototypes; it can be fitted with a remote weapon station, carry nine troops, and is armed with a 30 mm automatic cannon with a stated top speed of 100 km/h, with the RTA evaluating a prototype ahead of a planned production contract bid.
The RTA’s mechanised combat strength is primarily centred on its APC fleet, led by legacy tracked platforms including 390 YW531H (Type 85), 367 25 mm GBI-A01, and 337 M113, supplemented by more recent wheeled systems such as 147 M1126 Stryker vehicles. Additional specialised variants provide command, recovery, and anti-tank functions, including 12 M577A3 command vehicles, 18 M901A3 anti-tank variants, 11 VS27 recovery vehicles, 10 Bronco Troop Carriers, and 101 REVA III patrol and protected vehicles.
The RTA maintains a highly diverse artillery inventory combining legacy US, European, and limited locally produced systems. Towed artillery remains the dominant capability, supported by a small number of self-propelled systems and newer acquisitions. The towed howitzer inventory includes 285 M425, 116 M198, 36 GH N-45 A1, 32 M-71, 24 LG1 Mk II, 22 L119, 12 Model 56 (anti-tank), 6 LG1 Mk III, and 6 CAESAR 6×6. Self-propelled systems comprise 20 M109A5 howitzers and 24 ATMG autonomous truck-mounted howitzers. Fire support is further reinforced by mortar and rocket systems, including 60 YW306 rocket systems, 21 M125A3, 12 M1064A3, and 12 ATMM mortar carriers, 18 BTR-3M1 and 4 BTR-3M2 mortar vehicles, and 107 mm M30 mortars. Overall, the artillery force reflects a mixture of ageing platforms requiring sustained maintenance and limited modern systems introduced through incremental upgrades and domestic production rather than comprehensive modernization.
Gun-based air defence is supplied by 24 M163 self-propelled systems, in service since 1977. The Skyguard 3 Air Defence System (4 in service) comprises the Oerlikon Skyguard 3 fire-control system paired with eight 35 mm Oerlikon GDF007 twin guns using airburst ammunition, replacing the RTA’s ageing 37 mm NORINCO Type 74 and 57 mm Type 59 anti-aircraft guns and understood to be operational in central Bangkok.
The RTA operates a diverse inventory of small arms reflecting decades of procurement from Western, Israeli, and Eastern Bloc suppliers. Infantry small arms centre on 5.56 mm assault rifles, with the M16A1/A2 and HK33 forming the backbone of the rifle inventory alongside the more modern Israeli Tavor TAR-21. Sub-machine gun capability is provided by the 9 mm Heckler & Koch MP5 and Uzi. Sidearms include the 9 mm SIG Sauer P-220/230 and Glock pistols alongside the legacy 0.45 M1911A1. Light machine gun support is drawn from the 5.56 mm Negev and Minimi and the 7.62 mm M60/73 general-purpose machine gun.
The 0.50 in Browning M2 HB serves as the RTA’s primary heavy machine gun. Grenade launcher capability is provided by the 40 mm M79 and M203.
Infantry anti-tank capability relies on a mix of guided and unguided systems. Guided weapons include the TOW and its improved M901 variant, and the FGM-77 Dragon anti-tank guided missile. Unguided direct-fire capability is provided by the M72 light anti-tank weapon, the 106 mm M40 and 75 mm M20 recoilless rifles, and the RPG-2/7 rocket-propelled grenade. A planned acquisition of approximately 300 Javelin FGM-148 missiles and 50 launch units, approved by the US DSCA in July 2021 to replace the ageing M40, was cancelled following RTA budget cuts. An undisclosed number of medium-range Spike anti-tank guided missiles and launchers were delivered from Israeli firm Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in 2020.
Man-portable air defence is provided by the legacy FIM-43 Redeye and Chinese HN-5A, alongside 72 more capable Starstreak LML launchers.
Light mortar support is provided by 60 mm M19 and 81 mm M29 mortars.
The RTA has operated the Bell AH-1F Cobra attack helicopter since 1990. Replacement options were studied from 2017, and in 2019 the US Department of State cleared the sale of more than half a dozen AH-6i helicopters, intended to provide reconnaissance, light attack, and close air support to infantry and special forces. The package included 50 AGM-114R Hellfire missiles, 200 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rockets, Dillon M134 miniguns, GAU-19/B Gatling guns, Hydra rockets, night-vision goggles, and WESCAM MX-10Di EO/IR cameras, with a total value of approximately USD400 million. A US$103.8 million production contract was announced by the US Department of Defense in 2022, with Boeing building the helicopters at its Mesa, Arizona facility under a deal running to May 2025. The procurement will enable the RTA to retire its seven ageing AH-1F Cobras. The RTA also operates the AS 550C3 Fennec light-attack helicopter, approved for purchase in September 2011 with delivery completed in 2014, boosting armed reconnaissance capability; local media reported in April 2016 that these helicopters have been fitted with 12.7 mm FN Herstal HMP400 gun pods and 70 mm FZ220 rocket launchers.
Recent and current operations
Peacekeeping Operations
Thailand contributes troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations, though at a significantly smaller scale than its regional population and military size would suggest. As of 2026, Thailand had 257 troops, 12 experts on mission, 3 staff officers, and 20 police personnel deployed across UN operations.
Past deployments include UNAMID (Darfur, 2010–12, in administrative roles), UNMISS (South Sudan, engineer battalions, 2018), and UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan, military observers). Thailand does not currently feature among the top UN troop- or police-contributing nations.
Thailand-Cambodia Border Conflict (2025)
In 2025, Thailand experienced its most significant military confrontation with Cambodia in more than six decades, triggered by escalating tensions over disputed territory in the Preah Vihear area. Fighting began on 24 July 2025 near the Prasat Ta Muen Thom Temple and involved RTA ground operations – including Operation Sattawat – alongside RTAF airstrikes, with a second major escalation on 8 December 2025 after an earlier ceasefire collapsed. A ceasefire was reached in late December 2025 and remains broadly in effect as of mid-2026, though sporadic incidents continue. Further detail on conduct, casualties, and IHL-relevant incidents is addressed under Compliance with IHL by the Armed Forces.
Deep South Insurgency – Non-International Armed Conflict
Thailand’s southern border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and parts of Songkhla have experienced a protracted non-international armed conflict (NIAC) since the resurgence of organized violence in January 2004. The conflict is fought between Thai state security forces, including the Royal Thai Army, Royal Thai Police and paramilitary units, and Malay-Muslim separatist groups, principally the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). The BRN seeks self-determination for the historic Patani region and is widely regarded by independent analysts as the dominant insurgent organisation, exercising operational influence over most participating armed elements.
The contemporary phase of the insurgency began on 4 January 2004, when insurgents raided the Rajanagarindra military camp in Narathiwat Province, killing security personnel and seizing several hundred military firearms and substantial quantities of ammunition, significantly strengthening insurgent capabilities. Counter-insurgency operations are conducted principally by the RTA’s 4th Army Region, supported by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), Royal Thai Police, Border Patrol Police and Thai Ranger units operating under the emergency security framework applicable in much of the region.
Malaysia has facilitated peace dialogue between the Thai Government and the BRN since 2013. Although negotiations resumed during 2024 and continued through 2025, discussions remained intermittent and no comprehensive political settlement or permanent ceasefire had been achieved as of mid-2026.
Army’s Domestic Political Role
The conduct of both Thai security forces and the insurgent groups raises significant issues under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, examined below under the section Compliance with IHL by the Armed Forces. The conflict also contributes to Thailand’s arms diversion risk through documented thefts of State weapons and illicit cross-border trafficking networks, discussed in the Diversion Risk section.
The Royal Thai Army (RTA) plays a central role in Thai politics, with a documented history of mounting coups and establishing military rule, most recently in 2014, when it declared nationwide martial law – granting the military broad emergency powers over public order, movement, detention, and censorship – before overthrowing the elected government and governing through the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).
Impacts of the armed conflict in Myanmar
The ongoing armed conflict in Myanmar has continued to affect Thailand’s security environment and military deployments along the western border. Fighting between the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) and ethnic armed organizations has periodically spilled over towards the Thai frontier, prompting Thailand to reinforce border security and contingency planning.
In April 2024, Myanmar’s conflict saw one of its greatest escalations so far, when the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) battled the Tatmadaw for control of Myawaddy town in Myanmar’s southern Kayin State, which is a strategic trade hub on the Thai border. The remaining 200 Tatmadaw soldiers withdrew from Myawaddy town and took shelter close to Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge No. 2. In response, Thailand reinforced security along the border, deployed additional military personnel, and placed the Royal Thai Air Force on alert to respond to any unauthorized incursions into Thai airspace.
The escalation also generated significant cross-border displacement. Following the Thai government’s announcement that it was prepared to provide temporary refuge for civilians fleeing the fighting, several thousand displaced persons crossed into Thailand, where temporary humanitarian assistance was provided pending improvements in the security situation.
Border security operations along the Lao border
On 3–4 May 2025, clashes between Lao government forces and armed groups in Bokeo Province near the Thai border resulted in stray gunfire entering Thai territory. In response, the RTA reinforced surveillance and security measures along the Thai-Lao border, including deployments by the Pha Muang Task Force and coordination with Lao authorities. The incident illustrates the continuing role of the Thai armed forces in securing Thailand’s northern borders against spillover from violence in neighbouring States.
Royal Thai Air Force
The Royal Thai Air Force serves as the aerial warfare branch of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, responsible for national air defence, maintaining aerial sovereignty, and conducting coordinated operations with the army and navy. The air chief marshal commands the service, directing national air defence, strategic planning, and military modernisation. The RTAF operates from a network of airbases across the country, organised into command, combat, support, training, and special service units. Combat elements are commanded by the Directorate of Air Operations Control, which oversees several wings and independent squadrons, while Security Forces Command controls anti-aircraft and special operations units.
The RTAF is implementing a comprehensive long-term modernisation initiative under the National Strategic Defence Plan (2018–2037), which aims to begin replacing its ageing F-16 fleet with Saab Gripen E/F fighters from 2029. The plan further includes upgrading training aircraft, enhancing UAV and surveillance capabilities, and advancing cyber-defence operations. An attempt to procure F-35 fighter jets, announced in January 2022, was declined by the United States in May 2023 on technical and training grounds, with the US instead offering upgraded F-15 and F-16 variants. The RTAF subsequently opted for the Gripen E/F in 2025.
The RTAF is concentrated in central Thailand and along the Lao and Cambodian borders. The sea approach to Bangkok and the country through the Gulf of Thailand is secured by the RTAF’s presence along the Bay of Bangkok and in southern Thailand. The geography of the southern region, separating the Andaman Sea from the Gulf of Thailand, gives the air force an advantage in projecting air power over both maritime regions with minimum assets and faster redeployment between the two areas. The RTAF presence in this region is also crucial for supporting counter-insurgency operations in the southernmost provinces bordering Malaysia. The RTAF presence in the north and along the Myanmar border is less substantial, although central and southern bases could readily support operations in these areas. Force distribution is largely determined by bases inherited from the United States during the Cold War, several of which were constructed in the north and east of the country to facilitate US deployments over Vietnam, with additional bases added later to address geographical asymmetry.
Army rotary-wing attack
The RTA has operated the Bell AH-1F Cobra attack helicopter since 1990. Replacement options were studied from 2017, and in 2019 the US Department of State cleared the sale of more than half a dozen AH-6i helicopters, intended to provide reconnaissance, light attack, and close air support to infantry and special forces. The package included 50 AGM-114R Hellfire missiles, 200 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rockets, Dillon M134 miniguns, GAU-19/B Gatling guns, Hydra rockets, night-vision goggles, and WESCAM MX-10Di EO/IR cameras, with a total value of approximately USD400 million. A US$103.8 million production contract was announced by the US Department of Defense in 2022, with Boeing building the helicopters at its Mesa, Arizona facility under a deal running to May 2025. The procurement will enable the RTA to retire its seven ageing AH-1F Cobras. The RTA also operates the AS 550C3 Fennec light-attack helicopter, approved for purchase in September 2011 with delivery completed in 2014, boosting armed reconnaissance capability; local media reported in April 2016 that these helicopters have been fitted with 12.7 mm FN Herstal HMP400 gun pods and 70 mm FZ220 rocket launchers.
Fixed-wing fighters
The RTAF operates three combat aircraft types. The F-16A/B Fighting Falcon forms the backbone of the combat fleet with 36 F-16A and 13 F-16B in service. A mid-life upgrade initiated in 2012 extended the service life of approximately 18 aircraft to 2028, incorporating AN/APG-68(V)9 radar, AN/APX-113 transponder, AN/ALQ-213 electronic warfare management system, and a countermeasures’ dispensing system. The RTAF is seeking to replace the F-16 fleet, and in June 2025 confirmed the procurement of 12 Gripen E/F multirole combat aircraft, with four aircraft to be delivered by 2029 to begin replacing F-16A/Bs in 102 Squadron at Korat. These will comprise three single-seat Gripen Es and one two-seat Gripen F, equipped with the Skyward-G IRST system, Arexis electronic warfare suite, and Raven ES-05 AESA radar. The RTAF also operates 7 JAS 39C and 4 JAS 39D, undergoing MS20 configuration upgrades initiated in June 2022, expected to complete by 2025, enabling the aircraft to carry MBDA Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. The F-5 fleet has been upgraded to F-5TH/THF standard, with 11 F-5TH and 2 F-5THF in service, featuring the Grifo-F radar, Rafael Litening III targeting pods, Rafael Sky Shield jamming pods, Rafael Derby BVRAAMs, and Elbit DASH helmet-mounted display, with IRIS-T missiles being introduced to replace the AIM-9 Sidewinder.
Trainer and light attack aircraft
The RTAF also maintains an extensive trainer and light attack fleet. The T-50TH (14 in service) performs escort, light attack, and combat search and rescue in addition to training. The Alpha Jet (14 in service) has been upgraded with new avionics, weapon systems, and Link-T datalink enabling communication with the Gripen and F-16 fleets, and is planned to remain in service into the 2030s. The T-6C Texan II (12 in service) was delivered from November 2022, and the AT-6 (5 in service) from 2024. Basic training is supported by 20 CT/4E, 6 CT/4B, 14 DA42, 8 DA40NG Tundra Star, and 7 T-41D, supplemented by 6 EC135P3 rotary-wing trainers.
Airborne early warning
Airborne early warning is provided by 2 Saab 340 AEW&C Erieye aircraft.
Royal Thai Navy
The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) is one of the three services of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. It comprises the Naval Fleet, the Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC), and the Air and Coastal Defence Command (ACDC), and is commanded by a Commander-in-Chief headquartered in Bangkok. The RTN is responsible for safeguarding Thailand’s maritime sovereignty, protecting its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, securing sea lines of communication, and supporting national maritime security operations.
The Naval Fleet is organised into three geographically based Naval Area Commands (NACs): the 1st NAC, responsible for the northern Gulf of Thailand; the 2nd NAC, covering the southern Gulf of Thailand; and the 3rd NAC, responsible for the Andaman Sea. The RTMC provides amphibious warfare, coastal defence, expeditionary operations, and the protection of naval bases and strategic maritime installations. The ACDC is responsible for coastal and naval air defence, coastal missile and artillery units, surveillance, and the protection of key naval facilities and maritime approaches.
The Royal Thai Navy’s (RTN) primary mission is to safeguard Thailand’s maritime interests, with priority given to securing the Gulf of Thailand, the country’s principal maritime gateway to the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. The RTN maintains its main operational bases along the Gulf coast, while southern facilities support operations in both the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, providing access to the Indian Ocean. In addition to conventional maritime defence, the RTN supports counterinsurgency operations in southern Thailand through the Royal Thai Marine Corps and conducts maritime security, counter-piracy, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Although capable of protecting Thailand’s immediate maritime approaches, the RTN’s effectiveness against more advanced regional adversaries is constrained by a diverse and ageing fleet, limited maritime air capabilities, and ongoing resource and modernization challenges.
Its principal combat capability is centred on frigates, corvettes, and offshore patrol vessels, while maritime patrol aviation and anti-submarine warfare capabilities remain comparatively limited, requiring close coordination with the Royal Thai Air Force. The Royal Thai Marine Corps is regarded as a well-trained force with high operational readiness. The RTN is pursuing a long-term modernisation programme aligned with Thailand’s National Strategy (2018–37), prioritising new surface combatants, enhanced maritime surveillance, and upgrades to naval aviation. Progress, however, has been constrained by budgetary pressures, political uncertainty, and inconsistent procurement planning.
Aircraft Carrier
Thailand is the only Southeast Asian nation to operate an aircraft carrier. It can operate S-70B, S-76B, and MH-60S helicopters, and its defensive systems include 20 mm Rheinmetall Rh 202 cannons, machine guns, and surface-to-air missile launchers. Financial constraints have left the carrier largely moored at Sattahip, where it is used for crew training, disaster relief, and military exercises. Saab was awarded a contract in April 2012 to upgrade the combat system, incorporating a Sea Giraffe AMB G-band 3D surveillance radar, a new datalink enabling communication with the RTAF’s JAS 39 Gripen and Saab 340 Erieye aircraft, and a 9LV Mk 4 combat management system; its operational readiness remains questionable.
Submarines
The RTN planned to commission the first S26T submarine — an export variant of China’s Yuan-class (Type 041) diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion — in 2023–24. The deal was scrapped in October 2023 after Beijing was unable to source a German-made MTU396 engine due to EU military sanctions, and was substituted with the delivery of a frigate or two patrol vessels. A separate proposal for two additional submarines (THB22.5 billion / USD685 million) was shelved in April 2020 due to COVID-19 fiscal constraints. The government also approved in 2018 an RTN project to develop an indigenously designed midget submarine, provisionally the Chawalan-class, displacing approximately 200 tonnes with a top speed of 10 kt and a range of 300 nautical miles, with a seven-year development timeline and production planned for the mid-2020s if the prototype proves successful.
Frigates
The frigate fleet comprises 13 platforms across seven entries. The most modern, the Bhumibol Adulyadej (DW3000-class) from South Korea, displaces 3,650 tonnes with a maximum speed of 30 kt and a range of approximately 4,000 nautical miles; armament includes a 76 mm OTO Melara gun, a 20 mm Phalanx CIWS, an 8-cell Mk.41 vertical launch system, eight Harpoon missiles, and four Mk.32 torpedo tubes with Mark 54 torpedoes, with a second vessel planned for local construction under a technology transfer agreement. The two Naresuan-class frigates, based on the Chinese Type 053 design, carry Saab 9LV Mk 4 CMS, CEROS 200 fire control, and Raytheon RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, though both suffer design deficiencies in fire suppression and damage control. The inventory also includes 2 Type 053 HT(H) and 2 Type 053 HT frigates commissioned in 1991–92, four Chao Phraya-class frigates retaining Chinese armament (Type 79 guns, Type 76 guns, C802A missiles, Type 81 ASW rocket launchers), a legacy Yarrow-class frigate, and a Cannon-class training frigate.
Corvettes
Three corvette classes are in service: the Tapi-class PF 103 (1, US-procured, 76 mm OTO Melara gun, 40 mm Bofors, Mk.32 torpedoes), the Rattanakosin-class (1, US-procured, 76 mm gun, Aspide air defence missiles, RGM-84 Harpoon), and three Khamronsin-class corvettes built locally with UK assistance, carrying a 76 mm gun and 30 mm autocannon. All were last procured in 1992 and have not been replaced.
Offshore Patrol Vessels
Two OPV classes are in service: two Pattani-class OPVs (76 mm gun, Denel autocannons, Selex radar), with plans for additional vessels stalled since the 2006 coup, and two Krabi-class OPVs built locally under a UK technology transfer agreement, commissioned in 2013 and 2019, the second equipped with twin Harpoon Block II launchers.
Patrol Forces
Patrol forces include the Ratcharit/Prabparapak fast attack craft (3 Chon Buri-class, due for decommissioning by 2026), several locally built coastal patrol classes (M36, M58, M21), a 16-boat T 997-class coastal patrol programme under way, and riverine craft including PBR Mk II, PBR Thailand-2, and M10 variants.
Amphibious Forces
The RTN commissioned HTMS Angthong, an Endurance-class LPD built by ST Marine of Singapore, in 2012, capable of carrying over 1,000 tonnes of cargo and approximately 300 troops, armed with a 76 mm OTO Melara Super Rapid gun and two 30 mm MSI Seahawk mounts; the RTN also operates approximately 90 assault boats of unspecified type and origin.
Naval Aviation
Fixed-wing maritime patrol is provided by the upgraded Dornier 228 fleet. The upgrade was funded by the US government to enhance ISR capability for counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and EEZ law enforcement. The first modernized aircraft was re-inducted in 2023 and the second followed soon after.
Rotary-wing assets include 2 MH-60S helicopters, delivered in August 2011 and configured for SAR, logistics, VIP, and troop transport, intended as a partial replacement for the ageing S-70B Seahawks on HTMS Chakri Naruebet. The H145M helicopters replaced ageing Bell 212 helicopters and operate from Pattani-class OPVs and HTMS Angthong for light attack, SAR, and maritime surveillance. The Super Lynx 300 operates primarily from the Naresuan-class frigates for maritime surveillance, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare.
Recent and Current Operations
The RTN’s recent operations centre on humanitarian relief, search-and-rescue, and counterpiracy. In 2015, it deployed vessels to locate Rohingya refugee boats fleeing Myanmar and supported Nepal earthquake relief via U-Tapao air base. Flood relief missions followed in 2017 and 2022, marking the first deployment of H145M helicopters and involving HTMS Chakri Naruebet.
Internationally, the RTN deployed two ships, around 350 personnel, and two helicopters to the Gulf of Aden in 2010 under Combined Task Force 151 – Thailand’s first overseas force deployment – followed by a second deployment in 2011 with an OPV, RTMC, and special forces. The RTN also conducts joint patrols with Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia under the Malacca Straits Patrol initiative.
Compliance with IHL and Human Rights by the Armed Forces
Thailand’s compliance with IHL and applicable international human rights law is shaped by two distinct operational contexts: (i) prolonged internal security operations, particularly in the southern border provinces and during episodes of political unrest, and (ii) the 2025 international armed conflict with Cambodia.
Deep South NIAC – Conduct of Hostilities and Accountability
Thailand’s conduct of counter-insurgency operations in the Deep South has been the subject of sustained scrutiny by UN treaty bodies, international human rights organizations and independent experts. Across successive reporting cycles, concerns have been raised regarding allegations of arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment, enforced disappearance, unlawful killings, excessive use of force, and persistent failures to investigate and prosecute alleged violations by military and law enforcement personnel.
According to Deep South Watch, the conflict has killed 7,830 and injured 14,879 since the resurgence of violence in 2004. Although annual violence has declined significantly from its peak around 2012, regular shootings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, targeted killings, and other armed incidents continue to demonstrate the protracted nature of the conflict.
The conflict has also seen manifold serious abuses by non-State armed groups. Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group and other observers have documented deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including Buddhist monks, teachers, local defence volunteers, police officers and children, through shootings, assassinations and improvised explosive devices. Such attacks raise serious concerns about the protection of civilians under IHL, in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality.
Thai military, police and paramilitary counter-insurgency operations have likewise been associated with allegations of arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearance and unlawful killings. The UN Human Rights Committee, in its 2017 Concluding Observations, expressed concern regarding reports of torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances, including in the southern border provinces, and called upon Thailand to ensure prompt, impartial and effective investigations into allegations of unlawful or excessive use of force by both military personnel and law enforcement officials, and to ensure accountability where violations were established.
Human Rights Watch has documented allegations of torture and ill-treatment of detainees during counter-insurgency operations, particularly affecting ethnic Malay Muslim detainees held by military and police authorities, while more recent reporting has continued to document allegations of enforced disappearances and persistent accountability gaps.
The Tak Bai incident of 25 October 2004 remains one of the most significant accountability cases arising from security operations. Security forces opened fire while dispersing demonstrators outside Tak Bai police station in Narathiwat Province, killing seven protesters. Approximately 1,300 people were subsequently detained and transported in military trucks, in the course of which 78 detainees died from suffocation and crush injuries, bringing the total death toll to 85. In October 2024, criminal proceedings against fourteen former military and government officials terminated following expiry of the twenty-year statute of limitations. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organisations criticized the outcome as a serious failure of accountability for alleged grave violations.
Security operations in Thailand’s southern border provinces operate under an overlapping set of legal regimes: the Martial Law Act B.E. 2457 (1914), the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations B.E. 2548 (2005), and the Internal Security Act B.E. 2551 (2008).
Martial Law, in force in parts of the Deep South since 2004, grants military authorities extensive powers over search, detention (up to seven days), movement restrictions, and security control without ordinary judicial warrants. It places primary authority in the hands of military commanders. The Emergency Decree (2005) provides an executive-led emergency framework enabling restrictions on fundamental rights, extended detention without charge under certain conditions, and broad operational authority for security forces. It also contains provisions limiting liability for officials acting under emergency powers. The Internal Security Act (2008) establishes a permanent internal security governance structure led by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). It provides extensive administrative and coordination powers in designated security situations and is frequently described as a less restrictive alternative to emergency rule, though it still enables significant security-related restrictions on rights in practice.
Although the geographical application of the Emergency Decree has been adjusted over time in parts of the southern border provinces, it continues to operate alongside Martial Law and the Internal Security Act in a layered security governance framework. These regimes may apply concurrently in the same areas, producing overlapping authorities for military, police, and civilian security actors.
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has criticised the Emergency Decree for granting broadly defined executive powers, enabling restrictions on fundamental rights with limited judicial oversight, and weakening access to effective remedies. The ICJ has further noted that such emergency frameworks may contribute to accountability gaps in the context of security operations. The ICJ has also described the Internal Security Act as conferring extensive discretionary powers on the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), including in relation to security governance and operational control, while being presented as a less restrictive alternative to emergency rule.
The US Department of State continues to report concerns regarding arbitrary killings, torture, ill-treatment, prolonged detention and impunity involving security forces operating in the Deep South, noting that investigations into alleged abuses are frequently delayed, remain unresolved, or fail to result in effective accountability. It further reported that the Emergency decree provides military, police, and civilian authorities significant powers to restrict some basic rights and delegates internal security authority to the armed forces while also providing certain protections from prosecution for officials acting under emergency powers. Martial Law, imposed in 2004, is also identified as significantly strengthening military authority in the southern border provinces.
Overall, although the intensity of the insurgency has declined from its peak, independent monitoring bodies continue to identify serious concerns regarding compliance with both IHL and human rights law by all parties to the conflict, including attacks on civilians by insurgent groups, alleged violations by state security forces, and persistent structural deficiencies in accountability mechanisms.
Internal Security Operations
The Thai armed forces have also been involved in internal security operations that have contributed to broader concerns regarding the use of force. During the 2010 crackdown on United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD/‘Red Shirt’) protests in Bangkok, military units were deployed alongside police forces in operations to disperse demonstrations, during which more than 90 people were killed and more than 2,000 injured. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented concerns regarding the use of excessive force by State security forces during the 2010 protest dispersals, including allegations involving the use of live ammunition, and have repeatedly raised concerns about the lack of effective accountability and prosecutions for those responsible for deaths and injuries.
Thailand-Cambodia Border Conflict (2025)
The 2025 Thailand-Cambodia border clashes constitute the most significant interState armed confrontation between the two countries in several decades, involving sustained military operations along multiple points of the approximately 800-kilometre frontier.
On 28 May 2025, a brief exchange of fire occurred near the border in Ubon Ratchathani province, resulting in one Cambodian soldier killed, although Thai authorities said the incident was not intended as an armed engagement. Subsequent low-level border tensions heightened in June and into July. On 24 July 2025, hostilities further escalated significantly following incidents reported by Thailand involving alleged Cambodian drone surveillance and armed engagement near the Prasat Ta Muen Thom and Prasat Ta Kwai temple complexes. Cambodia disputed this account and alleged that Thai forces initiated the confrontation during border fortification activities. The situation is widely assessed in legal commentary as amounting to an international armed conflict (IAC) from 24 July 2025.
The situation rapidly escalated into sustained cross-border armed clashes involving artillery exchanges and air operations. Cambodia fired rockets into Thai territory, while Thailand deployed F-16 aircraft against military targets in Cambodia. Reports further indicate Thai air operations striking targets approximately 30 kilometres inside Cambodian territory, raising prima facie issues under the IHL principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Open-source reporting indicates significant humanitarian consequences during the July 2025 phase of hostilities: approximately 40 total fatalities according to BBC, and between 331,158 and 650,000 displaced persons. In January 2026, World Vision reported around 409,000 remaining displaced persons due to the conflict.
A ceasefire was reached in late July 2025. However, military deployments along contested border areas reportedly continued, and tensions persisted. Hostilities resumed on 7–8 December 2025, involving renewed exchanges of fire, artillery operations, and air activity along the border. Reports describe continued strikes and military engagements across multiple sectors of the frontier. A second ceasefire was reached in late December 2025 following renewed diplomatic engagement. Available reporting suggests this second ceasefire produced a more sustained cessation of hostilities, although no formal legal determination of termination has been issued.
Cambodia alleged that Thai forces conducted airstrikes well inside Cambodian territory, including strikes near civilian displacement sites and against infrastructure located substantially beyond the immediate border area. Thailand maintained that the strikes were directed exclusively against military objectives and complied with international humanitarian law. Cambodian authorities also alleged that Thai airstrikes and artillery fire damaged the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear Temple and further accused Thailand of employing cluster munitions during the hostilities. The RTA initially denied these allegations. Subsequently, the RTA stated that cluster munitions had been used where considered necessary against military objectives and maintained that their employment complied with the principle of proportionality under IHL.
Thailand is not a State Party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch claimed that use of cluster munitions in populated areas is indiscriminate because of their wide-area effects and the risk posed by unexploded submunitions, and therefore may violate IHL. It also recalled that Thailand previously used cluster munitions during the 2011 border conflict with Cambodia.
A delegation of ASEAN inspectors documented the recent laying of landmines along the Thai-Cambodian border, without allocating any responsibility. Thailand, which is a State Party to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine BanConvention, has accused Cambodia of unlawfully laying anti-personnel mines on its territory.
Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies
Law enforcement in Thailand is primarily conducted by the Royal Thai Police (RTP), operating under the supervision of the Prime Minister with an estimated strength of approximately 200,000–230,000 personnel. The Border Patrol Police (BPP) is a specialised paramilitary police unit within the RTP responsible for border security, rural security, and counter-insurgency support, including in the southern border provinces. The Thahan Phran (Rangers) are a separate paramilitary force under the Royal Thai Army, deployed extensively for territorial security and village protection duties in the Deep South.
Legal Framework
Thailand’s policing and internal security framework is primarily governed by the Royal Thai Police Act B.E. 2565 (2022), the Criminal Procedure Code, and related secondary legislation. The 2022 Police Act replaced the earlier Police Act B.E. 2547 (2004) as part of broader institutional reform of the police system, but Thailand still does not have a comprehensive statutory framework regulating the use of force by law enforcement officials in accordance with international standards.
Police and security operations are further governed by a layered legal framework combining ordinary criminal law with emergency and internal security legislation. As discussed above in relation to the Deep South insurgency, the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations B.E. 2548 (2005) and the Internal Security Act B.E. 2551 (2008) continue to provide the principal legal basis for security operations in parts of Thailand’s southern border provinces. The Emergency Decree grants authorities expanded powers, including preventive detention, enhanced search and arrest powers, and legal protections for officials acting under emergency measures. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has criticized these provisions, together with limitations on judicial oversight and immunity clauses, as creating accountability gaps and restricting access to effective remedies for alleged human rights violations. Although the geographical application of the Emergency Decree has gradually been reduced in some areas, it has in practice been partially supplemented by the Internal Security Act. The ICJ has further observed that the Internal Security Act confers broad discretionary powers on the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) affecting liberty, freedom of movement, and civilian oversight. Together with the continued application of Martial Law in parts of the Deep South, these overlapping legal regimes continue to shape security operations in the region.
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) provides important constitutional safeguards relevant to law enforcement. Section 28 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty and prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It further requires the State to protect vulnerable persons from violence and unfair treatment. Section 44 guarantees the right to peaceful and unarmed assembly, permitting restrictions only where prescribed by law and necessary for reasons including national security, public safety, public order, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
During the police reform process, the Draft National Police Act (2018) proposed limited provisions governing the use of force by police commanders in internal disciplinary situations. While these provisions incorporated principles of necessity, good faith, and proportionality, they did not establish a comprehensive legal framework governing police use of force against civilians. The ICJ recommended that Thai legislation explicitly incorporate the safeguards contained in the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, including requirements to exhaust non-violent means where possible, restrict the use of firearms to situations involving an imminent threat to life or serious injury, and apply these standards to all law enforcement operations. The draft legislation was subsequently superseded by the Royal Thai Police Act B.E. 2565 (2022).
The current Royal Thai Police Act primarily regulates police organization, administration, appointments, disciplinary matters, and institutional governance. It does not establish a comprehensive statutory framework governing operational police use of force against civilians, including explicit requirements concerning legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution, last resort, and the protection of life consistent with international standards. The absence of such a dedicated framework has been identified as contributing to broader concerns regarding legal certainty, operational guidance, and accountability following allegations of excessive or unlawful use of force – see further below.
Open-source reporting further indicates that many Royal Thai Police officers procure their own service handguns rather than being issued standardised firearms by the State. This practice may affect standardisation of equipment, firearms accountability, training, and operational oversight, with potential
Police Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights
Despite constitutional protections and the existence of formal oversight institutions, international monitoring bodies continue to identify significant shortcomings in the prevention, investigation, and accountability of excessive or unlawful use of force by law enforcement officials. Concerns persist regarding operational safeguards, the independence and effectiveness of investigations, and compliance with international standards governing the use of force.
Thailand’s law enforcement agencies have faced sustained international scrutiny for the policing of public assemblies. During the pro-democracy protests between 2020 and 2023, riot police employed water cannon mixed with chemical dye, tear gas, rubber bullets, batons, and other crowd-control weapons against demonstrators. Amnesty International documented numerous incidents involving beatings of restrained protesters, unnecessary use of force during arrests, and the deployment of water cannon against largely peaceful assemblies.
Beyond public-order policing, allegations concerning excessive force have also arisen in the context of internal security operations in Thailand’s southern border provinces, where policing functions frequently overlap with military operations conducted under the Emergency Decree, the Internal Security Act, and Martial Law. International monitoring bodies have continued to report allegations of unlawful killings, torture, ill-treatment, prolonged detention, and impunity involving security personnel operating in the region. These issues are addressed in greater detail in the section on compliance by the armed forces above.
As discussed above, the 2010 dispersal of United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD/”Red Shirt”) demonstrations involved joint police and military operations that resulted in more than 90 deaths and over 2,000 injuries. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented allegations of excessive and unlawful use of force, including the use of live ammunition during crowd-control operations, while subsequent investigations and prosecutions have produced only limited accountability for those responsible.
International Standards and Treaty Body Findings
United Nations human rights mechanisms have repeatedly expressed concern regarding the conduct of Thai law enforcement and security forces, particularly in relation to torture, excessive use of force, deaths in custody, and accountability.
The UN Human Rights Committee, in its 2017 Concluding Observations on Thailand expressed concern regarding allegations of torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances. It called for prompt, independent, and effective investigations into all allegations of unlawful or excessive use of force, and for prosecution of those responsible.
The UN Committee against Torture, in 2014, raised serious concerns regarding credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment by police, military, and prison officials, particularly in the southern border provinces, and highlighted deficiencies in investigative independence and accountability mechanisms.
Accountability and Oversight
Police misconduct is primarily investigated through internal Royal Thai Police disciplinary and criminal investigative mechanisms. External oversight is exercised principally by the Office of the Ombudsman and the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT), both of which are empowered to investigate complaints concerning maladministration and alleged human rights violations by public authorities.
Nevertheless, Thailand does not maintain a fully independent civilian body with comprehensive powers to investigate and sanction police misconduct comparable to an independent police complaints commission. International human rights bodies have consistently identified shortcomings in the effectiveness, independence, and timeliness of investigations into allegations of torture, excessive use of force, unlawful killings, and deaths in custody involving police and other security personnel. Reported concerns include delays in investigations, limited transparency, low rates of prosecution, and persistent allegations of impunity.
Broader institutional factors have also affected police accountability. Following the 2014 military coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) exercised extensive executive authority under Section 44 of the Interim Constitution, significantly limiting judicial and legislative oversight during the military administration. Although the NCPO has since been dissolved, international observers continue to identify institutional legacies affecting civilian oversight and accountability across Thailand’s security sector.
Risk of Diversion and Re-Export of Imported Weapons
Thailand’s risk of diversion and re-export of imported weapons is assessed as high, driven by internal armed conflict in the south, regional trafficking routes, and limited transparency in arms transfer controls.
First, the ongoing insurgency in the southern border provinces creates a continuing domestic diversion risk. Insurgent groups have repeatedly targeted police and military installations to acquire weapons and ammunition, most notably during the 4 January 2004 raid on the military camp in Narathiwat, in which approximately 400 firearms were seized. Subsequent reporting indicates that insurgent groups have continued to rely primarily on captured or locally available weapons and improvised explosive devices rather than sustained external arms supply networks. While attacks on security installations highlight vulnerabilities in stockpile security in conflict-affected areas, publicly available reporting does not indicate systematic diversion from Thai state arsenals.
Second, Thailand forms part of broader regional trafficking networks across Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia, where established routes for narcotics and illicit goods may also facilitate small arms movement. Regional conflict reporting in Southeast Asia identifies porous border corridors as enabling opportunistic arms flows. However, there is no conclusive evidence of systematic large-scale arms transshipment through Thailand.
Third, Thailand’s position outside the ATT framework limits external transparency over end-use monitoring and diversion risk mitigation. While Thailand reports through the UNROCA and the PoA, reporting is irregular and does not provide comprehensive transaction-level transparency comparable to ATT obligations.
Fourth, UN reporting has raised concerns regarding Thailand’s role in commercial procurement networks linked to Myanmar’s military following the 2021 coup. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has documented cases involving Thailand-based entities supplying dual-use goods, industrial equipment, and military-related components to Myanmar-linked actors through commercial channels, highlighting risks associated with private-sector intermediaries rather than direct state transfers. Subsequent 2024 and 2025 reporting indicate that Myanmar’s military procurement networks have adapted by rerouting supply chains through alternative jurisdictions and intermediaries following increased international scrutiny. The Special Rapporteur called on the Government of Thailand to strengthen oversight and investigate allegations involving Thailand-based entities, noting Singapore’s 2023 actions to investigate transfers linked to Singapore-based companies as an example of a government response to similar concerns.
Overall, while diversion from State stockpiles appears episodic rather than systemic, the combination of internal armed conflict, regional trafficking exposure, and limited transparency mechanisms supports a high diversion risk assessment.