International legal context

Adherence to all treaties

Disarmament Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)	State Party
1980 CCW Protocol I (Non-Detectable Fragments)	State Party
1996 CCW Amended Protocol II on mines	State Party
1980 CCW Protocol III on incendiary weapons	State Party
1995 CCW Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons	State Party
2003 CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war	State Party
2001 Firearms Protocol	State Party
Optional Protocol to the CAT	State Party

International Humanitarian Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1949 Geneva Conventions	State Party	Common Article 3 governs all three ongoing NIACs – JNIM, Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA).
Additional Protocol I of 1977	State Party
Additional Protocol II of 1977	State Party	Applicable to the JNIM conflict; and, since late 2025, the conflicts with ISSP and the FLA.

International Criminal Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	State Party	Withdrawal notified 24 June 2026, effective 23 June 2027. The existing ICC investigation into the situation in Mali is unaffected for the period during which Mali remains a State Party.
Amendments to the Statute on the crime of aggression	Not Party
Amendment to the Statute on blinding laser weapons	Not Party
Amendment to the Statute on the intentional starvation of civilians in NIAC	Not Party

International Human Rights Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	State Party
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR	State Party
1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	State Party
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights	State Party
1948 Genocide Convention	State Party
1984 Convention against Torture	State Party
1988 Protocol to the African Charter on the African Court	State Party	Mali has deposited the declaration under Article 34(6) allowing individuals and NGOs to directly submit cases before the Court — the basis for the TRIAL International/PALU/FIDH case filed 20 April 2026 concerning FAMa/Wagner conduct.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	State Party
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	State Party

Membership to International Organisations

Organisation	Status	Comment
United Nations	Member State
International Court of Justice	Did not accept compulsory jurisdiction
African Union	Member State
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Member State	Safeguards agreement in place

Domestic Legal Context

Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base

Mali is primarily an arms importer. Its arms transfers are governed by the ATT. Mali submitted its first reports in 2015 but has submitted none since.

Mali’s UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) record contains only a single, largely uninformative, submission for 2006; disaggregated data on conventional arms and small arms and light weapons transfers to Mali are drawn almost entirely from the reports of trading partners rather than from Mali itself.

SIPRI data for 2020–24 identify Mali among several West African States – Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal – mostly accounting for the doubling of arms imports in the region between 2015–19 and 2020–24. Russia was Mali’s key supplier over this period, accounting for 54% of Russian major-arms exports to West Africa in 2020–24. SIPRI also notes that the United States provided military aid to Mali by donating arms before the 2020–21 coups and Mali’s subsequent foreign-policy realignment.

According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, Mali’s inventory was dominated by Soviet equipment, including 16 MiG-21s (1976) and 5 MiG-17 (1967) fighter aircraft, 30 T-34-85 tanks (10 from Czechoslovakia in 1963, a further 20 from the Soviet Union in 1981), 20 PT-76 light tanks (1975), and 18 Type-62 light tanks supplied by China (1981). Also received were a range of armoured personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles, Grad multiple-barrelled rocket launchers, S-125 Pechora surface-to-air missile systems with 100 missiles. Non-Soviet deliveries in this same period included 24 armoured personnel carriers and a single AS-350 armed light helicopter from France (1966 and 1988, respectively).

From the 1990s, and particularly since 2020, Mali significantly diversified and expanded its procurement. Pre-2020 acquisitions included six Mi-24D combat helicopters and 78 armoured vehicles from Bulgaria (delivered across three batches, in 2007–12), a MiG-21MF from Czechia (2005), 48 Grad multiple rocket launchers from Slovakia and Bulgaria, 19 armoured personnel carriers from Ukraine, 4 Super Tucano light attack aircraft from Brazil, 18 Bastion APCs from France, and 100 Typhoon, 30 Cougar, and 10 Python-LAMV APCs from the United Arab Emirates, alongside 24 Storm APCs from Qatar.

Since 2020, SIPRI records a marked increase in deliveries from Russia – including 4 Mi-35M and 3 Mi-24P combat helicopters, and 2 Su-25 ground-attack aircraft – and from China, including 80 VP-11 and 22 WZ-551 armoured personnel carriers, 5 self-propelled guns, 5 SR-5 multiple-barrelled rocket launchers and 5 self-propelled 120mm mortars. Turkey’s only recorded transfer is an order for Bayraktar TB2 armed drones placed in 2022, for which SIPRI’s database records none delivered thus far (but see the section below, ‘Use of Armed Drones’). The database also records 20 Guardian APCs and 8 BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers from unidentified suppliers, and 8 VAMTAC-BN armoured vehicles from Spain (2022).

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

National framework

The principal domestic instrument governing civilian and commercial arms and ammunition was Law No. 04-050 of 12 November 2004 Governing Arms and Ammunition, implemented by Decree No.  05-441/P-RM of 13 October 2005. Mali’s own police leadership subsequently identified specific weaknesses in this framework – the absence of comprehensive weapons marking, incomplete tracing of FAMa stockpiles, and unregulated brokering – in a presentation by the Contrôleur Général de Police on behalf of the national SALW commission’s Permanent Secretariat. Independent analysis reached a similar conclusion, attributing Mali’s SALW proliferation to a combination of legislative gaps and structural institutional weaknesses and calling for accelerated legal reform.

This framework was repealed and replaced by Law No. 2021-028 of 31 March 2021 Governing Arms and Munitions adopted during the transition period and presented by the authorities as an effort to bring Mali’s legislation closer to its regional and international commitments, including (at the time) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2006 Abuja Convention) and the ATT. The 2021 law regulates the manufacture, repair, acquisition, possession, carrying, trade, importation and exportation, brokerage, and storage of civilian and commercial arms, ammunition and related materials, and directly targeted the marking gap identified above by extending marking requirements to all small arms and light weapons — domestically manufactured, imported, and already held in national stockpiles. Its implementing Decree No. 2021-0968/PT-RM of 31 December 2021 introduced further administrative procedures, including a biometric firearms-carrying permit system intended to strengthen identification and traceability of legally held weapons.

This framework, however, does not govern the State-to-State import/export of military procurement that accounts for the bulk of the equipment herein documented. That category of acquisition is instead expressly exempted from Mali’s standard public procurement rules by Article 8 of Decree No. 2015-0604/P-RM of 25 September 2015, which permits derogation from ordinary procurement transparency requirements where ‘they concern national defence and security requirements requiring confidentiality, or where the protection of the essential interests of the State is incompatible with publication and transparency requirements’. The specific derogatory regime for defence and security acquisitions falling under ‘secret defence’ is set by a further decree— currently Decree No. 2023-0275/PT-RM of 3 May 2023 — itself reported to be under further revision as of January 2026 specifically to strengthen this framework. In practice, military procurement as well as major military agreements – such as the April 2024 Mali–Russia military-technical cooperation accord, covering equipment maintenance, modernisation and munitions production – proceed via Ministry of Defence initiative, approval in Council of Ministers, and ratification by the National Transition Council, rather than through any published licensing procedure.

Institutional responsibility is correspondingly split. The Ministry of Security, through the Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères (CNLPAL) was established in 1996 to assist the President in designing, implementing and coordinating national SALW policy. Along with its operational arm, the Secrétariat Permanent (SP-CNLP), it administers the civilian regime under Law No. 2021-028. The Ministry of Defence and the Council of Ministers administer military procurement under the derogatory decree regime described above. Customs plays an enforcement role at the border – it received weapons-marking equipment as part of Mali’s ECOWAS Convention-era obligations, although this predates Mali’s withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2025.

Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of weapons held by Malian forces was supported by multiple actors before Mali’s post-2022 pivot away from Western and UN-adjacent partners. Between 2015 and 2018, CNLPAL-coordinated Standard Operating Procedures – developed by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) – were implemented in the field by the NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which reported securing more than 21,000 weapons and training 169 Malian Defence and Security Forces personnel. Separately, UNMAS (the UN Mine Action Service) have rehabilitated 68 armouries and ammunition storage areas and trained 612 Malian Defence and Security Forces personnel in safe weapons and ammunition management since 2013.

The European Union Training Mission (EUTM Mali) advised FAMa leadership directly between 2013 and 2024. EUTM Mali’s operational activities were suspended from April 2022. EU foreign policy chief explained that ‘there were not sufficient guarantees … on non-interference by the Wagner group’, which he said was likely ‘responsible for some very serious events which have led to tens of people being killed in Mali in recent times’. The statement came one week after France raised concerns over reports that Malian soldiers and Wagner mercenaries had killed more than 200 civilians at Moura in March 2022. The mission was formally terminated in May 2024 when the EU declined to renew its mandate; on 18–19 May 2024, all personnel operating under the EU flag left the country, with participating States confirming the mission had trained over 20,000 Malian soldiers over its more-than-decade-long presence.

China and Türkiye’s engagements with Mali are confirmed in independent reporting as principally equipment supply, with technical assistance limited to the specific systems sold. Russia’s public description of its bilateral cooperation with Mali emphasizes weapons supply, military training, and combat effectiveness, with no reference to stockpile security, accountability, or destruction capacity. The pre-2022 PSSM infrastructure therefore appears to have lapsed without replacement. This is consistent with, and potentially contributing to, documented internal diversion of FAMa equipment to Wagner/Africa Corps (see below the section ‘Private Military and Security Actors’).

On paper, elements of Mali’s legal framework address several of the specific functions – marking, brokerage regulation, and import/export authorization for civilian arms. But in practice, these operate with limited institutional capacity (see the section below ‘National Capacity to Prevent Diversion’).

Transparency and Reporting

Mali became a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty on 24 December 2014. Its Initial Report required under Article 13(1) has never been submitted. Separately, Mali submitted a single Annual Report under Article 13(3), covering calendar year 2015 and filed on 27 June 2016 by the Ministry of Defence’s (Direction du Matériel des Hydrocarbures). That report recorded nil exports but substantive imports. Since then, no ATT report has been submitted.

Mali’s transparency record on arms transfer is further limited; its sole UNROCA (UN Register of Conventional Arms) submission, for 2006, contains no substantive information.

Institutionally, CNLPAL is responsible for coordinating national policy on small arms and light weapons (see National framework, above, and National Capacity to Prevent Diversion, below, for the structure and programme activities).

Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces

Strategic position and defence posture

Mali is a landlocked Sahelian State bordering Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Since the 2020–21 coups (the 18 August 2020 removal of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and the 24 May 2021 ‘coup within a coup’ that brought Colonel Assimi Goïta to power), Mali has been governed by a military transitional authority. A new Constitution promulgated on 22 July 2023 designates the President as Chef suprême des Forces Armées et de Sécurité, chairing both the Conseil de Sécurité nationale and the Comité de Défense nationale. Elections originally due in February 2022 have been repeatedly postponed; between April and July 2025, the transitional authorities banned all political parties and extended President Goïta’s mandate to 2030 without elections, formalizing indefinite military rule.

Mali’s defence posture has been fundamentally reshaped by the withdrawal of major international military missions and the country’s deteriorating security environment. Following the end of France’s Operations Serval and Barkhane (completed in 2022), the suspension of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), and the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023, the transitional authorities have reoriented their defence strategy towards greater military self-reliance and closer security cooperation with Russia, while also expanding defence ties with China and Turkey. Wagner Group personnel, deployed from December 2021 under a bilateral security agreement, initially provided training, force protection, and operational support to FAMa. Since mid-2025, these combat and support functions have been assumed by Russia’s Africa Corps.

Mali’s military expenditure was estimated by Trading Economics at approximately US$952.9 million in 2025 (up from US$933 million in 2024). As a share of GDP, this represented approximately 4.2% in 2024, up from 3.8% in 2023 (World Bank/SIPRI data) — placing Mali just below SIPRI’s own reported 2024 average of 4.4% for countries experiencing major or high-intensity armed conflict, and well above the 1.9% average for countries without such conflict. According to SIPRI, Mali’s military expenditure grew by 38% over 2020–24. This is part of a broader pattern among the Sahel’s military-ruled States, which have turned to Russia for support: Burkina Faso’s rose by 108% in 2021–24 and Niger’s by 56% in 2022–24, all three having severed security cooperation with France and substantially increased spending since their respective coups — reflecting the scale of the ongoing NIACs as discussed below.

At regional level, Mali has reoriented its defence policy towards closer security cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger through the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES), established by the Liptako-Gourma Charter in September 2023. The Alliance provides a framework for collective defence, mutual assistance, and the coordination of efforts to combat terrorism and organized crime, reflecting Mali’s strategic shift away from traditional Western security partnerships.

Mali’s defence posture is shaped by three parallel non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) pitting State forces against organized non-state armed groups: between FAMa and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (see Recent and Current Operations, below, for each group’s formation, history, and legal classification under international humanitarian law, IHL). The resumption of hostilities between the Malian authorities and the FLA followed the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, which the transitional authorities terminated unilaterally on 25 January 2024 amid deteriorating relations with Algeria and renewed fighting with Tuareg-led groups. The authorities subsequently launched a domestically led reconciliation process that Tuareg-led movements did not join, creating an additional security challenge particularly in northern Mali. For additional historical background and the latest developments, see War Watch.

The security environment further deteriorated during the first half of 2026. According to the UN Secretary-General, JNIM expanded its operational tempo through coordinated attacks on military installations, blockades of key transport routes, and increased pressure on government-controlled areas, while northern Mali remained highly contested as fighting between FAMa, the FLA, and JNIM intensified around strategic locations including Anéfis, Gao, Kidal, and Sévaré. Reports indicated that a short-lived international armed conflict may have occurred between Mali and Algeria in April 2025; this situation has since been declassified and is not considered ongoing. The legal classification of these conflicts and the applicable law are examined in the Compliance section.

In response, the Malian Armed Forces have prioritized territorial defence, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations, and the restoration of State authority throughout the national territory (see Ground Operations below for details). Recent force modernization has focused on improving tactical mobility, armoured protection, firepower, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), air support, along with limited air-defence capabilities through the acquisition of new equipment adapted to asymmetric warfare. The armed forces also maintain explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capabilities, supported by international partners to strengthen national capacity and facilitate civilian protection and humanitarian access.

Composition of the Armed Forces

The Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes – FAMa) comprise the Army (Armée de Terre), the Air Force (Force Aérienne de la République du Mali), the National Gendarmerie, and the National Guard, under the authority of the Ministry of Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs. Reported personnel strength has increased significantly since the 2020–21 coups. Estimates for 2025–26 place total active strength at approximately 40,000 personnel, including around 25,000 Army personnel and approximately 550 Air Force personnel, together with National Gendarmerie and National Guard components.  

In presenting the Government’s 2025–26 Action Plan to the National Transition Council on 16 May 2025, Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga announced recruitment of a further 24,000 personnel – 15,000 soldiers and 9,000 members of the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) – together with acquisition of equipment and construction of new military camps.

FAMa’s institutional organization rests on two legal layers. The umbrella framework is Law No. 04-051 of 23 November 2004 organizing national defence, adopted alongside a companion instrument the same day, Law No. 04-052 of 23 November 2004 which established the Armed Forces General Staff. Pursuant to this 2004 framework, the transitional authorities subsequently issued the 2019 ordinances reorganizing the individual corps: Ordinance No. 2019-001/P-RM (Army) and No. 2019-002/P-RM (Air Force), both of 4 March 2019; Ordinance No. 2019-003/P-RM (National Guard); and Ordinance No. 2019-008/P-RM of 27 March 2019 creating the National Gendarmerie as a distinct corps within the Armed Forces and Security.

After more than two decades in force, the 2004 law has itself been assessed by the transitional authorities as inadapted to current security challenges. On 25 June 2026, the Council of Ministers adopted a draft law to replace it, and on 9 July, the National Transition Council (NTC) unanimously adopted the new Law organising Defence and Security. The broadened title – from the 2004 law’s narrower ‘Défense nationale’ to ‘Défense et Sécurité’ – signals integration of the security services alongside the armed forces. This is consistent with the 2022 militarization of the National Police and Civil Protection (see below). According to the responsible minister, General Daoud Aly Mouhammedine, the reform is intended to correct insufficiencies identified in the application of the 2004 law, to clarify command structures and institutional responsibilities, and to unify the operational response of Mali’s defence and security forces within the framework of the Alliance of Sahel States.

As of 10 July 2026, the law had been adopted by the NTC but had not yet been promulgated or entered into force. Whether it formally supersedes the 2019 corps-specific ordinances, amends them, or leaves them as subordinate implementing texts was not clear at time of writing.

Army

The Malian Army (Armée de Terre) is the largest component of the FAMa. It is commanded by the Chief of Staff of the Land Forces, who is responsible for army planning, direction, coordination, and oversight. Operational command is exercised through a system of ‘Military Regions’, each headed by a general or senior officer. Combat forces are organized into branches of infantry, armour and cavalry, and artillery, supported by special forces battalions, air-defence units, and an engineer battalion.

Military service is governed by a national conscription framework requiring male citizens aged 18–35 years to complete two years of service. In practice, recruitment combines selective conscription with voluntary enlistment. Janes notes that recruitment continues to face structural challenges, including high levels of illiteracy among the eligible population, limiting recruitment into technical and administrative specializations.

The Army has sought to improve operational mobility and combat capability by acquiring new armoured vehicles. With an estimated procurement budget of US$10 million to 15 million annually for much of the past two decades, procurement has been sporadic and heavily dependent on foreign military assistance and donations. Since 2021, however, procurement has accelerated significantly through acquisitions from , China, Qatar, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Air Force

The Republic of Mali Air Force (Force Aérienne de la République du Mali: FARM) constitutes one of the principal branches of the Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes: FAMa), alongside the Army and other support services. The headquarters are in Bamako and the service is headed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who reports directly to the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Operationally, FARM is organized around fixed-wing combat and light-attack aviation, helicopter units, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) elements. These components provide close air support, limited strike capability, troop and equipment mobility, casualty evacuation, and intelligence support to FAMa ground operations.

The Air Force divides its territorial responsibilities into three Air Regions (numbered 1, 2 and 3), each incorporating air bases, air detachments, and associated air defence and force protection elements. However, the service remains relatively small and faces persistent limitations in personnel, training, maintenance capacity, and operational readiness. FARM is estimated to comprise about 2,000 personnel. Specialist shortages, particularly in aviation maintenance and ISR capabilities, continue to constrain operational effectiveness. International assessments have also identified weaknesses in recruitment systems and professionalisation, compounded by the impact of repeated coups, political instability, and the ongoing conflict.

Historically dependent on Soviet-origin aircraft and helicopters, the FARM has sought to develop a more autonomous combat capability since 2016 through a programme of acquisitions and external assistance. This has included the acquisition of attack helicopters, light-attack aircraft, transport aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including Bayraktar TB2 systems. These acquisitions have improved Mali’s ability to conduct independent aerial operations, although limited pilot training, maintenance capacity, and logistical constraints continue to restrict sustained operations.

The Air Force does not participate in international military deployments and remains focused primarily on domestic operations against armed groups operating in northern and central Mali.

Navy

Mali is landlocked and does not operate a navy in the conventional sense.

Recent and current operations

Conflict Landscape and Legal Classification

Mali has been engaged in multiple, legally distinct non-international armed conflicts for more than a decade, rooted in a combination of ethnic tensions, fragile State institutions, and limited government control over peripheral regions. Three concurrent NIACs are ongoing: Mali (supported by Africa Corps) against JNIM; Mali (supported by Africa Corps) against ISSP; and Mali (supported by Africa Corps) against the FLA. All three are governed by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary IHL; Additional Protocol II applies directly to the JNIM conflict (and, from late 2025, the ISSP conflict) given each group’s requisite territorial control. Additional Protocol II now also applies to the FLA conflict, following its April 2026 capture of Kidal.

JNIM, formed in 2017 through the merger of five jihadist organisations (including Ansar Dine and Al-Mourabitoun) under Iyad Ag Ghaly, is the largest and most operationally capable jihadist coalition in the Sahel; JNIM and ISSP have demonstrated increasing capacity to conduct coordinated attacks against security forces. ISSP was formed in 2015 as an Islamic State affiliate and has clashed with both FAMa and, periodically, with JNIM. The FLA seeks the independence of ‘Azawad’ in northern Mali; it traces its lineage through several successive coalitions before its establishment in November 2024. Hostilities resumed following the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement (see Strategic Position and Defence Posture, above, for the political context and the termination of the Agreement on 25 January 2024).

Ground Operations

FAMa remains primarily engaged in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and territorial security operations across the country. Since the withdrawal of international military missions, the Army has expanded its independent operational role, including the deployment of reconstituted battalions to northern regions such as Kidal and Timbuktu – a reach reversed in part by the loss of Kidal to the FLA in April 2026.

Air Operations

The Air Force’s operational role has evolved substantially since the outbreak of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012. In the conflict’s early years the Air Force had limited independent capacity and relied heavily on foreign partners (principally France) for ISR and strike support; since the end of Operation Barkhane, FARM has struggled to replace these capabilities. Combat aviation development accelerated from 2016: Mali inducted four Embraer EMB-314/A-29 Super Tucano light-attack aircraft in 2018, its first fixed-wing strike capability since the retirement of its MiG-21 fleet, though pilot training, weapons integration and sustained availability have remained open questions. Rotary-wing capability expanded with the acquisition of the Mig attack helicopters.

Recent Developments

For the continuously updated, incident-level chronology of this conflict, see War Watch, which serves as the primary evidentiary source for this profile’s ongoing conflict tracking. Since mid-2025, four developments are of particular relevance to this profile’s risk assessment.

First, Wagner Group personnel, who first deployed to Mali in December 2021, were formally absorbed into the Russian State-controlled Africa Corps by June 2025. Second, from September 2025, JNIM sustained a months-long blockade on Mali’s main fuel supply corridors, destroying more than 300 tankers, closing schools in Bamako, and prompting a partial Western diplomatic drawdown. Third, this escalation occurred against a backdrop of stalled reconciliation: Mali’s National Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, established by Act of 22 August 2025 as the domestically-led successor to the terminated Algiers Accord, was drafted without the participation of Tuareg-led separatist movements (the political community the FLA represents).

Fourth, on 25 April 2026, within eight months of the Charter’s adoption, a coordinated JNIM-FLA offensive, the largest since 2012, struck targets across Bamako, Kati, Gao, Kidal, Sévaré and Mopti, killing Defence Minister Sadio Camara in a suicide car-bomb attack on his residence and resulting in the JNIM–FLA coalition’s capture of Kidal. JNIM renewed its blockade of Bamako on 28 April 2026, explicitly framed as retaliation for civilian cooperation with Malian forces during the offensive. Fighting and blockade conditions have continued to fluctuate through mid-2026.

Use of Armed Drones

The use of armed drones by both State and non-State actors in Mali has increased markedly, part of a global trend the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions examined in a dedicated 2020 thematic report on the use of armed drones for targeted killings, which found that proliferating drone capability across state and non-state actors has consistently outpaced the development of clear legal standards and accountability mechanisms governing their use. Analysis by Megatrends Africa found that the number of drone strikes doubled within a year, from 21 (October 2022–September 2023) to 48 (October 2023–September 2024); by December 2024, roughly one in three FAMa air strikes was drone-delivered, a proportion that has continued to grow, with casualties from drone strikes nearly doubling to 318 over the same period, some 60% reportedly civilian.

Strike intensity is concentrated in northern Mali – roughly three in four strikes, most heavily in Kidal – while Ménaka, the ISSP stronghold, has been struck comparatively rarely. Non-State armed groups have also acquired drone capability: the FLA is reported to operate FDG410 quadcopter-type drones (reportedly sourced via Libya) and has claimed repeated strikes on FAMa/Africa Corps positions, including at Tessalit in August and September 2025; JNIM has used commercial drones to drop improvised munitions. The specific incidents in which FAMa drone strikes have caused civilian casualties are documented under Compliance with IHL and Human Rights by the Armed Forces.

Peacekeeping and Regional Deployments

Mali no longer hosts a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA completed its withdrawal in December 2023). Since December 2025, Mali has integrated forces into the AES’s 5,000-strong Unified Force (FU-AES), a joint regional intervention and counterinsurgency unit with Burkina Faso and Niger, reflecting the shift from UN-mandated stabilization to an AES-led regional security architecture. Mali’s own contribution to UN peacekeeping elsewhere has correspondingly narrowed over the same period, consistent with the broader post-2020 reorientation away from UN- and Western-aligned security frameworks.

Compliance with IHL and Human Rights by the Armed Forces

Conflict environment and relevant actors

Mali’s armed forces operate within a fluid operational environment in which organized armed groups frequently operate among civilian populations, creating significant challenges for the conduct of hostilities and the protection of civilians under international humanitarian law. As mentioned, FAMa is engaged in concurrent non-international armed conflicts against JNIM, ISSP and the FLA.

Since late 2021, many major military operations have been conducted jointly with Russian personnel — initially the Wagner Group and, following its rebranding in late 2023 and full organisational absorption by June 2025, the Russian State-controlled Africa Corps. Although formally distinct from FAMa, these personnel have participated in planning, force protection, and combat operations alongside Malian forces, giving rise to recurring allegations of joint responsibility for violations of IHL and international human rights law. In January 2023, UN human rights experts called for an independent investigation into ‘horrific executions, mass graves, acts of torture, rape and sexual violence, pillaging, arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances’ attributed to FAMa and Wagner ‘since 2021’ in the Mopti area and elsewhere.

The operational environment is further complicated by the involvement of community-based militias, particularly dozo traditional hunters . The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali has reported credible allegations that dozo militias participated in operations conducted jointly with FAMa and Wagner Group/Africa Corps personnel, warning that this involvement risks exacerbating intercommunal tensions, reinforcing perceptions of ethnic bias, and contributing to abuses against civilian populations, particularly Fulani communities. This actor is treated separately (under Operations Involving Community-Based Militias, below), given the distinct attribution and command-responsibility questions dozo involvement raises.

Non-State armed groups have themselves committed serious IHL violations, including attacks against civilians, forced displacement, sexual abuse, the use of IEDs, and the recruitment and use of children. While these violations form an important part of the conflict environment, the present assessment focuses on compliance by State armed forces and associated actors operating alongside them.

Legal Status of Wagner Group/Africa Corps

Wagner Group operated as a nominally private military company; Wagner rebranded as ‘Africa Corps’ in late 2023, and by June 2025 all remaining Wagner units in Mali had been absorbed into it. Africa Corps is placed under direct Russian Ministry of Defence command. This set-up is described as ‘calibrated for legal impunity’. The extent to which the conduct of the company is attributable to Mali (or treated as that of an independent non-State actor) is the question underlying the April 2026 filing before African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (discussed below under ‘International Accountability Mechanisms’).

The UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries has engaged repeatedly on Mali on this same basis, co-signing joint statements on 20 January 2023, 14 March 2025 and 30 April 2025. Its mandate applies specifically because Africa Corps retains enough independent character to be examined as a State agent, rather than being treated as simply an organ of FAMa or the Russian armed forces.

Monitoring Constraints and Accountability Backdrop

Assessment of compliance remains challenging due to severe restrictions on independent monitoring since MINUSMA’s December 2023 withdrawal, compounded by restrictions affecting journalists, civil society organizations and international observers. Nevertheless, reporting by OHCHR, the UN Independent Expert, UN Special Procedures, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others has credibly alleged serious violations involving elements of FAMa and associated foreign personnel – unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, torture, conflict-related sexual violence, and military operations causing excessive civilian casualties – a significant proportion of which relate to counterterrorism operations affecting Fulani communities who are frequently perceived by the security forces as supporting or collaborating with Islamist armed groups.

In April 2025, UN human rights experts jointly stated that they were ‘deeply troubled by the apparent total impunity and lack of prosecution or prevention’ of violations allegedly committed by Malian defence and security forces and foreign military and security personnel associated with the Wagner Group and Africa Corps. This persistent lack of accountability forms an important backdrop to the assessment that follows. Positive developments whose implementation could contribute to improving the situation include the National Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, established by Act of 22 August 2025 (see Strategic Position and Defence Posture, above), and certain measures in the transitional government’s 2025–26 Action Plan, adopted by the National Transition Council on in May 2025.

Conduct of hostilities: civilians under attack

Attacks directed against civilians

Multiple attacks by parties to the armed conflicts in Mali have involved the killing of civilians — serious violations of customary and treaty IHL. Ground operations conducted by FAMa, frequently alongside Russian military partners, have generated repeated allegations of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property. Counterinsurgency operations are conducted in areas where organized armed groups frequently operate among civilian populations, presenting significant operational challenges. Nevertheless, parties to a non-international armed conflict remain bound by the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, and civilian property may only be destroyed where justified by imperative military necessity.

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali has repeatedly expressed concern regarding the conduct of military operations by FAMa and associated foreign personnel. In his 2025 report, he was ‘extremely concerned by the high number and seriousness of violations of human rights or international humanitarian law attributed to the national defence forces and their foreign partners’, referring to allegations of arbitrary killings and destruction of civilian property.  He cited the Human Rights Watch December 2024 report, which alleged that, since May of that year, FAMa and Wagner personnel had deliberately killed at least 32 civilians, forcibly disappeared 4 others, and burned at least 100 houses during military operations in central and northern Mali.

In January 2025, UN experts expressed concern over the arbitrary execution of at least ten civilians in an operation conducted in the Dioura area, Mopti region, warning that the killings may constitute war crimes. Between 2 and 4 January, six men, three women, and a two-year-old child were reportedly killed during a counterterrorism operation conducted by FAMa, accompanied by Russian personnel linked to the Wagner Group; the victims were travelling from Niono (Ségou Region) toward the Mbera refugee camp in Mauritania when their vehicle was intercepted by a joint FAMa-Wagner Group patrol. They subsequently disappeared, and their bodies and burnt vehicle were found two days later near Fatissouma, close to Dioura, with some bodies concealed or improperly buried. The UN experts called for a prompt, independent, and transparent investigation, recovery and identification of remains, prosecution of those responsible, and reparations to victims’ families. They expressed concern over statements by the Malian military leadership dismissing reports of abuses as ‘false’ or ‘defamatory allegations’, warning this reflects a pattern of impunity for both Malian forces and foreign military personnel.

Between 21 and 22 January 2025, during joint operations in the Douentza region of central Mali, the same two actors were accused of executing at least ten civilians across several localities. On 21 January 2025, three Dogon men from the commune of Dinangourou were abducted and later found decapitated. The following day, in the village of Bouldé in southern Mopti region near the Burkina Faso border, five Fulani civilians, aged between 14 and 73, were executed and four others wounded by gunfire; witnesses described early morning raids, victims killed in their homes, around forty millet granaries set ablaze, and the destruction of several motorbikes. Later the same day, two Dogon and three ethnic Bellah individuals were executed in the village of Niangassadiou; some victims were identified as fuel sellers, suggesting they may have been targeted for supplying fuel to the ‘enemy’.

As fighting flared up from April 2026, the warring parties again carried out grave abuses against civilians, ‘repeating former patterns of harming civilians’ according to Human Rights Watch. On 17 May 2026, Malian soldiers conducted an operation in Guirowel, Mopti region, a Fulani village in a JNIM-controlled area. Soldiers arrived with several pick-up trucks and about 100 motorcycles, surrounded the village, and opened fire on residents outside their homes, killing seven Fulani men. Witnesses reported some soldiers attempting to halt the shooting while others continued. Around ten men were detained and later released;  the soldiers allegedly threatened further killings if residents remained on their return. The attack followed two earlier May raids on Guirowel, including homes searches and the burning of a resident’s house over alleged JNIM links. Residents raised concerns about military conduct with local authorities, who reportedly assured them the armed forces were acting to protect civilians.

Air strikes – use of armed drones

The operational and capability dimensions of FAMa drone use are addressed above (Use of Armed Drones/Recent and Current Operations). Between February 2024 and 2026, several reported drone strikes raised concerns regarding compliance with the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack:

16 February 2024: strikes on a wedding ceremony and subsequent funeral gathering in Konokassi (Ségou Region) reported by Human Rights Watch.

17 March 2024: strikes in Amasrakad (Gao Region); Amnesty International reported at least thirteen civilians killed, including seven children, and more than a dozen injured.

23 March 2024: strike on a Koranic school (madrasa) in Douna (Mopti region) reportedly killed fourteen civilians, including at least ten children, and injured more than a dozen. This was one of the deadliest single strikes recorded and, given the target, directly relevant to the school-attack figures (discussed under Protection of Children, below).

25 August 2024: strike on Tinzaouaten; Human Rights Watch documented the deaths of at least seven civilians, including five children, while Malian authorities stated the operation targeted armed-group members and equipment. A separate account (via the FLA-aligned Collective for the Defence of the Rights of the Azawad People) put the toll at 21 dead including 11 children. These figures should be treated as contested pending independent corroboration.

21 October 2024: strikes on the Inadiatafane market, Timbuktu Region; Amnesty International reported at least eight civilians killed, including six children (among them a four-month-old infant), and approximately 15 injured. 

18 March 2025: strike reportedly hitting a weekly market in Timbuktu region, fifteen kilometres north of the city of Lerneb killing at least eighteen and injured seven, while FAMa claimed the attack had targeted terrorists.

25 April 2026: strike in the central villages of Guimbé killed 12 children and teenagers according to Human Rights Watch.

17 May 2026: strike reportedly conducted by the military, killing at least ten civilians in Tené village, as residents gathered for a traditional wedding.

The UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Mali documented allegations concerning further drone strikes during late 2025, including reported attacks on a wedding ceremony in Baydi (29–30 October), the village of Tangatta (13 November) and a nomadic encampment near Albouhera (14 November), allegedly killing many civilians, including women and children.

While the factual circumstances remain contested in several cases, the recurrence of allegations involving civilian casualties across multiple operations – non exhaustively reported – reinforces concerns regarding targeting procedures, civilian harm mitigation, and post-strike accountability.

Use of landmines and other improvised explosive devices

No credible evidence was identified that FAMa, Africa Corps/Wagner, or affiliated Dozo militias (see below) employed anti-personnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices. Available UN reporting attributes the use of such devices primarily to JNIM. Mali, a State Party to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, is required under Article 5 to clear and destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control, irrespective of the party responsible for laying them. Mali’s original mine-clearance deadline expired on 1 March 2009. During the 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Mali informed States Parties that it intended to submit a deadline extension request in 2026, with the Convention calendar setting 31 March 2026 as the deadline for such submissions – which was done on schedule. The 2026 Intersessional Meetings documentation lists Mali among the States that have submitted extension requests, pending consideration at the 23^rd Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2026.

Operations involving community-based militias

In his 2026 report, the UN Independent Expert noted his deep concern about persistent and credible reports of attacks against civilians by community-based militias, including dozo traditional hunters, and the involvement of these in certain operations carried out by the Malian Defence and Security Forces and/or Wagner Group or Africa Corps. The use of militias orself-defence groups such as dozo risks exacerbating intracommunal tensions and creating a perception of bias or complicity among other communities, particularly those that are victims of abuses by dozo and other community-based militias. Dozo militias do not constitute a single, unified armed actor but rather a fragmented network of locally organised self-defence groups whose structure, leadership and relationships with State authorities vary considerably across central Mali. ACLED notes that the militarization of dozo groups accelerated after 2015 as the deterioration of the security environment and the withdrawal of State authority prompted Malian authorities to rely increasingly on local self-defence groups for territorial security. Over time, this informal support, including reported provision of training, weapons and logistical assistance, contributed to the transformation of traditional hunting fraternities into armed militias engaged in counterinsurgency operations. According to ACLED, dozo groups have repeatedly operated alongside FAMa and, more recently, Wagner Group/Africa Corps personnel during military operations in central Mali, blurring the distinction between State and non-State actors and complicating questions of command responsibility and attribution of conduct.

ACLED further concludes that increasing integration of dozo militias into counterinsurgency operations contributed to the militarisation of local disputes and the escalation of communal violence. Dozo militias were among the earliest armed groups in central Mali to carry out large-scale attacks against civilian populations, including killings, village burnings and abductions, particularly targeting Fulani communities accused of supporting JNIM. ACLED cites Human Rights Watch investigations into abuses by self-defence groups in central Mali and International Crisis Group documents how the arming of community militias and retaliatory violence accelerated intercommunal conflict and undermined civilian protection. Following the deployment of Wagner personnel in late 2021, ACLED observes that joint FAMa-Wagner operations, sometimes involving dozo militias, increasingly resulted in alleged arrests, killings, destruction of civilian property, and large-scale cattle theft, while subsequent withdrawals often left militia members exposed to reprisals by JNIM.

The precise nature of the dozos’ relationship with the State remains ambiguous. Despite their differences, all dozo factions intermittently cooperate with the Malian army and its foreign partners, and despite the government publicly condemning major dozo abuses and calling for disarmament, the groups have continued to operate. After the March 2019 attack in Ogossagou, which left 160 members of the Fulani community dead, the Malian government ordered the dissolution of the dozo group Dan Nan Ambassagou, allegedly involved in the attack. As of March 2025, the UN Independent Expert reported the group was still operating and had continued to commit human rights abuses with impunity. In 2023 and 2024, however, Malian and Wagner Group forces mounted a series of operations targeting Dozo networks in Mopti and Segou, including arrests, disarmament, and, in some cases, killings of local militia leaders and their associates. 

Violations by FAMa alongside dozo militias continue. In June 2026, Human Rights Watch reported dozens of Malian soldiers in at least 10 pickup trucks, accompanied by dozo militiamen on about 20 motorbikes, entered Sarkala Werè village on 14 May and fired on civilians trying to flee or hide, killing at least 31 Fulani civilians – including 23 children, 13 of them under 10 years of age – and one woman, burning homes and looting up to 700 animals. Two survivors said while JNIM operates around Sarkala Werè, no JNIM fighters were present before or during the attack, which they believe targeted residents solely because they were Fulani; the attack displaced the entire community.

Protection of Persons in the Power of the FAMs and Partners

Killings of civilians

The worst incident of civilian killing documented in Mali’s conflict occurred at Moura (Mopti region) between 27 and 31 March 2022. A MINUSMA Human Rights Division fact-finding mission found ‘strong indications’ that more than 500 people were killed, the vast majority summarily executed, during a five-day FAMa operation supported by foreign military personnel (i.e., the Wagner Group). The operation began on market day, 27 March, when helicopter gunships fired into the crowded weekly market, killing approximately 30 people; FAMa and Wagner personnel then took control of the town, arrested an estimated 3,000 people, and over the following days summarily executed the majority of those subsequently found dead. The report also documented rape and torture. Malian authorities repeatedly denied the fact-finding team access to Moura, and the report’s publication was itself delayed by roughly six months, including as a result of the government’s expulsion of MINUSMA’s human rights chief.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called the findings ‘extremely disturbing’. The Malian Ministry of Defence had already announced, on 1 April 2022, its own count of 203 ‘terrorists’ killed and 51 captured – a figure the UN’s fact-finding report later recorded. At the UN Security Council following the report’s publication, Mali’s delegation denounced what it called the ‘instrumentalization’ of human rights ‘for political or destabilizing purposes’, aligning itself with China’s position on the issue.

At Hombori (Mopti region), on 19 April 2022, FAMa and Wagner personnel opened fire on the town’s weekly market after a Malian army vehicle struck an IED nearby, killing a Wagner operative; a Malian aid worker present described soldiers ‘attacking everyone, robbing them of their jewellery, money and telephones, while others fired in all directions’. MINUSMA’s own investigation found that the operation killed at least 50 civilians, including one woman and one child, and led to the arrest of more than 500 others. On 24 April 2022, following coordinated JNIM attacks on FAMa camps at Sévaré, Niono and Bapho, a Malian soldier allegedly summarily executed 20 of the 27 civilians then still detained at the FAMa camp in Hombori. Sixteen were shot dead, with the other four dying of their wounds. Mali’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally rejected MINUSMA’s findings in a written response submitted ahead of the report’s publication, characterising the allegations as ‘very often tendentious, uncorroborated, reported on the basis of uncontested testimony, unsupported by any tangible evidence’, and often made ‘under threat from terrorist groups’.

On 12 April 2025, around 100 men, most Fulani, were arrested by FAMa and the Wagner Group in Sebabougou. FAMa confirmed conducting military operations between 11 and 15 April 2025 in several areas, including Sebabougou and Kwala, stating its soldiers were searching for Islamist fighters; witnesses and UN reporting indicate the victims were targeted on the basis of ethnicity, with FAMa personnel accusing Fulani of being jihadists. Approximately sixty of the men arrested on 12 April were taken to Kwala military camp in Koulikoro region, where they are said to have been tortured, including by whipping, during interrogation about alleged ‘terrorist’ links; the Wagner Group was then accused of taking the victims out of the camp and executing them by gunfire. Between 21 and 22 April 2025, several dozen decomposing bodies, believed to be those arrested in Sebabougou, were found near the  Kwala military camp by people searching for their relatives; while the exact death toll is unclear, at least 65 people are reported to have disappeared or gone missing after the Sebabougou arrests, with UN experts receiving a list of 54 named male victims from credible sources.

Similar allegations arose on 12 May 2025 in Diafarabé, where 22 livestock traders were reportedly arrested by FAMa soldiers alongside dozo militias, before being found dead. Although the Malian army has neither confirmed nor denied the facts, the General Staff of the Armed Forces announced that a ‘gendarmerie investigation’ had been opened, with no public information on its outcome subsequently released. On 19 May 2025, the National Human Rights Commission of Mali issued a statement calling on authorities to fully investigate the allegations.

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance

Abductions, detentions and enforced disappearance have been performed by FAMa, the Wagner Group, and armed actors. The above mentioned cases, notably the May 2025 alleged arrest in Diafarabé by the Malian Army at a market is an example where families were left with no information about their whereabouts, until the bodies of the men were found three days later in mass graves. All the men had been beheaded.

Conflict-related sexual violence

Rape and other forms of sexual violence in connection with armed conflict are prohibited and constitute serious violations of IHL and war crimes. The armed conflicts in Mali have been marked by severe incidents of gender-based violence, with women and girls most often targeted, though men are also affected and particularly reluctant to come forward. Reports indicate that both armed groups and State actors have perpetrated acts of gender-based and sexual violence, used both as a method of intimidation and to ‘reward’ fighters, particularly in regions controlled by or supporting armed groups. These acts may even form part of a strategy, particularly in regions controlled by, or in support of, armed groups.

Some significant reported incidents occurred during military operations conducted by FAMa and the Wagner Group between 10 and 12 February 2025 in villages near Goundam (Timbuktu Region), where women from several villages were reportedly tied up, assaulted, and raped.  Numerous alleged rape cases involving Wagner personnel were previously reported in Gouni, Nia-Ouro and Moura in 2022.

Although it is often difficult to establish a direct link between individual incidents of sexual violence and the armed conflict, indicators including the perpetrators’ affiliation with a party to the conflict and the victims’ real or perceived affiliation may be sufficient to establish such a nexus. Beyond individually documented cases, War Watch, citing the 2024 Gender-Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS) registered 15,136 incidents of gender-based violence, of which 3,570 involved cases of sexual violence; these figures are probably under-reported owing to trauma, social stigma, fear of reprisals, and the lack of adequate services and reporting mechanisms.

The UN Independent Expert has repeatedly highlighted conflict-related sexual violence as a continuing protection concern, noting the limited availability of investigations and accountability mechanisms. Between April and June 2025, service providers using the GBVIMS documented a total of 905 cases (a 22.71% decrease from the previous quarter’s 1,171 cases) and, between July and September 2025, 833 cases (a 7.95% decrease); of the 833 cases, 20% involved sexual violence, including rape (18%) and sexual assault (8%), and 5% involved forced marriages, with underage girls comprising 66% of rape victims, 25% of sexual assault victims and 59% of forced-marriage victims. Thirty-three pregnancies resulting from rape were reported for April to June 2025, one resulting in a birth.

Separately the UN Secretary-General’s 2025 annual report on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2025/389) identifies Mali as a situation of concern and lists four non-State armed groups—JNIM (including Ansar Eddine), GATIA, and the MNLA/CMA—as parties credibly suspected of committing patterns of conflict-related sexual violence. Neither the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) nor the Wagner Group/Africa Corps are listed, despite allegations documented by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, highlighting a gap between incident-level reporting and the UN’s formal listing mechanism. The report also records 157 cases of conflict-related sexual violence attributed to armed actors in 2024 (120 women and 37 girls), including gang rapes in Gao, Ménaka, Bandiagara, and Koro, while emphasizing that the figures almost certainly understate the true scale of violations following the withdrawal of MINUSMA and the dismantling of its monitoring mechanisms. It further notes the continued absence of prosecutions for prioritised 2013 cases and observes that Mali’s December 2024 Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure broadened the legal definition of rape, while simultaneously criminalising homosexuality.

The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, together with the UN Independent Expert, has underlined that children have increasingly been victims of violence, including rape, sexual assault, and forced marriage; his fifth report (S/2024/883) recorded 48 verified cases of sexual violence against girls aged 12 to 17, compared with 50 in the previous reporting period (see Protection of Children below). Monitoring and reporting on sexual violence continue to be limited by prevailing insecurity, fear of reprisals, lack of protection for victims and witnesses, limited service provision,  restricted access to justice, and sociocultural stigma.

Protection of children

Under IHL, children are afforded special protection in armed conflicts, recognizing their particular vulnerability. Children have however been extensively affected by the armed conflicts – from all sides – as shown by the above cases. Two distinct UN reporting cycles on children and armed conflict in Mali currently exist and should not be conflated: the dedicated fifth Mali country report (S/2024/883, submitted January 2025) covers 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2024 and provides the detailed breakdown below; a separate, more recent dataset for calendar year 2024 specifically is drawn from the Secretary-General’s global annual CAAC report (A/79/878-S/2025/247, published 17 June 2025). Both are cited here with their respective reporting periods made explicit.

As per report S/2024/883 (April 2022–March 2024), the Secretary-General’s country task force verified 2,091 grave violations against 1,782 children (1,433 boys, 334 girls, 15 of unknown sex), similar to the 2,095 violations verified in the previous period, though the number of children victims increased from 1,473. Recruitment and use of children remained the most prominent violation, followed by killing/maiming and abduction of children, each increasing 14%, 23% and 27% respectively over the previous period verified attacks on schools/hospitals and denial of humanitarian access decreased by 70% and 53% respectively, while instances of sexual violence against children remained constant.

The country task force verified the recruitment and use of 1,052 children (972 boys, 80 girls) (an increase from 901 in the previous period). Of these, 78 cases were attributed to Malian Defence and Security Forces, including 72 to FAMa specifically and 19 to dozo traditional hunters. The highest concentrations occurred in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. During the reporting period, 40 boys were captured or arrested by Malian Defence and Security Forces and international forces for alleged association with armed groups; 20 were handed over to State child protection structures under the 2013 UN-Government Protocol on the Release and Handover of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups, while 18 others were detained for extended periods in contravention of the Protocol (the situation of the remaining two was unknown), with release further hampered by lack of valid civil documentation proving age.

Killing and maiming of children remained a significant protection concern during the same reporting period. These findings indicate that, while non-State armed groups remained the principal perpetrators, verified incidents involving FAMa and associated actors demonstrate that child protection concerns also arise in relation to State military operations. The UN country task force verified 530 child casualties (235 killed and 295 maimed), representing a 30 per cent increase compared with the previous reporting period. Although most verified violations were attributed to unidentified perpetrators (281) or non-State armed groups, the UN also attributed 59 violations to FAMa, four to foreign security personnel, and one to Dozo traditional hunters. The highest number of verified child casualties occurred in the regions of Mopti, Gao, Bandiagara, Ménaka and Timbuktu, reflecting the concentration of military operations and armed violence. Most casualties resulted from explosive devices and firearms, while 16 were killed or injured in air strikes.

For the 2024 dataset, the UN verified 892 grave violations against 778 children (plus 87 violations from previous years verified within this cycle), with 285 children recruited and used; separately, 32 girls were raped, 22 attacks on schools/hospitals were verified, 119 children were abducted, and 47 incidents of denial of humanitarian access were recorded. The Malian Defence and Security Forces detained 12 boys for alleged association with armed groups, with 11 held for extended periods in violation of the 2013 handover protocol.

The continued recruitment and use of children by all parties, including verified cases involving FAMa and associated community-based militias, raises concerns regarding Mali’s compliance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, customary IHL, and the prohibition on recruiting or using children under 18 in hostilities (see also the CRC Committee’s 2024 Concluding Observations under International Standards and Treaty Body Findings, in Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies, above).

Refugees and internally displaced persons

According to the most recent figures, between 30 April and 30 November 2025, the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Mali increased by approximately 27% (from 136,472 to 174,019); the number of Malian refugees in neighbouring countries increased by approximately 1.5% (from 330,215 to 335,035); and the number of internally displaced persons increased by approximately 6.3% (from 378,363 to 402,167). Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2026 separately assessed that more than 737,000 Malians were displaced by late August 2025 as a result of the broader conflict and associated violations, with 1.5 million facing acute food insecurity.

International monitoring and accountability mechanisms

Domestic accountability

Domestic accountability for alleged violations by FAMs and associated foreign personnel has remained limited. The absence of effective domestic accountability has been repeatedly highlighted by human rights bodies, particularly regarding extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture, conflict-related sexual violence and attacks affecting civilians during joint operations by FAMa-Africa Corps. The consistency of the reporting indicates recurring concerns as to compliance with the IHL principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, as well as the protection of civilian objects during ground operations. The absence of effective, transparent investigations into these allegations has further contributed to accountability concerns. 

International monitoring and documentation

MINUSMA’s withdrawal in December 2023 significantly reduced the international community’s capacity to monitor and document IHL and human rights violations. Prior to withdrawal, MINUSMA’s Human Rights Division was the principal UN mechanism for documenting violations, supporting investigations, and publicly reporting on abuses by all parties. Following its departure, monitoring has relied on a fragmented set of mechanisms whose engagement on Mali varies considerably in depth and consistency.

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali (five reports since 2021 – A/HRC/49/94, A/HRC/52/81, A/HRC/55/79, A/HRC/58/79 and A/HRC/61/76, plus regular statements) remains the principal mechanism. A cluster of thematic mandates has repeatedly co-signed Mali-specific joint statements, documented at the relevant points of this profile: the Working Group on the use of mercenaries (see Legal Status of Wagner Group/Africa Corps, above); the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions and the Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism (see Killings of Civilians, above); the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (see Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty and Enforced Disappearance, above); and the Special Rapporteurs on freedom of opinion and expression and on freedom of peaceful assembly and association (see Restrictions on Political Participation and Civic Space, above). The Secretary-General’s separate thematic reporting cycles on children and armed conflict and on conflict-related sexual violence have also produced Mali-specific findings (addressed under Protection of Children and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, above).

An International Commission of Inquiry for Mali was established by the UN Secretary-General in January 2018, pursuant to the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, with a mandate covering violations committed since January 2012; its mandate expired in June 2020 without renewal, and no equivalent mechanism has been established to cover the period since. A further accountability-adjacent mechanism has since been actively closed off rather than merely left to lapse: the Security Council’s Mali sanctions regime, established in 2017 with a Panel of Experts tasked with tracking abuses by both armed groups and Malian security forces, lost field access when Mali revoked the Panel’s visas in June 2022, and was not renewed after Russia vetoed the Security Council resolution extending it on 30 August 2023.

International accountability mechanisms

International avenues for accountability have narrowed considerably. Although Mali remains a State Party to the Rome Statute, the transitional authorities announced in September 2025 their intention to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC), with formal notification deposited on 24 June 2026 (effective 23 June 2027 under Article 127). Mali remains bound by its obligations regarding existing ICC proceedings and cooperation for crimes committed while it remains a State Party.

The Court’s investigation into the situation in Mali, referred by Malian authorities themselves in 2012 and formally opened in 2013, has already produced two convictions: Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (2016, for the destruction of cultural heritage in Timbuktu, later held liable for €2.7 million in reparations) and Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz (convicted 26 June 2024 of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Timbuktu, sentenced 20 November 2024 to ten years); a reparations decision in the Al Hassan case remained pending as of Mali’s withdrawal notification. An outstanding arrest warrant, unsealed on 21 June 2024, names Iyad Ag Ghaly, JNIM’s leader, for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in northern Mali between January 2012 and January 2013. UN experts have recalled that, under international law, military commanders and other superiors (including government officials) can be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by armed forces under their effective command and control.

One potentially significant remaining avenue is the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In 2025, TRIAL International, the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) and FIDH initiated proceedings before the Court concerning serious human rights violations allegedly committed against civilians in Mali in 2022 by FAMa and the Wagner Group/Africa Corps. The application seeks to establish Mali’s responsibility not only for violations committed on its territory, but also for its alleged failure to prevent abuses, protect civilians, investigate and prosecute perpetrators, and provide effective remedies to victims. The case is supported by documentation from the Berkeley Human Rights Center and INPACT – All Eyes on Wagner and concerns operations in central Mali, including the Hombori and Moura incidents in 2022 documented above, during which more than 500 civilians were reportedly killed, with others subjected to torture, arbitrary detention, sexual violence and enforced disappearance.

The proceedings represent the first known case before the African Court seeking to hold a State accountable for hosting and contracting private military and security companies (PMSCs), and the first time the Court has been called upon to examine allegations involving both a State’s armed forces and a foreign PMSA jointly. The applicants argue that States remain bound by their African Charter obligations when foreign or private armed actors operate with State support, including obligations to prevent violations, ensure accountability, and provide remedies. The filing comes amid continuing reports of serious violations and limited progress in domestic accountability; in this context, regional mechanisms such as this may provide an increasingly important avenue for victims.

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

Internal security in Mali is shared among the National Police (Police Nationale, under the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection), the National Gendarmerie — a paramilitary branch of FAMa itself — and the National Guard (both under joint Defence/Interior authority). The Gendarmerie’s mandate spans internal security and public order, territorial defence, humanitarian operations, intelligence-gathering and rural property protection; the National Guard is responsible for the security of government installations and prisons, public order, humanitarian operations, aspects of border security and intelligence, and maintains a specialised camel-mounted unit for desert patrol.

Legal Framework

Institutional and Statutory Basis

Mali’s internal security architecture rests on a set of 2019 founding ordinances that reorganised the security sector: Ordonnance No. 2019-001/P-RM (Army), No. 2019-002/P-RM (Air Force) and No. 2019-003/P-RM (National Guard), all of 4 March 2019, and Ordinance No. 2019-008/P-RM of 27 March 2019 creating the National Gendarmerie as a distinct corps. Historically, the Gendarmerie and National Guard sat within the Ministry of Defence’s chain of command – the President of the Republic is Commander-in-Chief, assisted by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff – whereas the National Police was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, with responsibility for maintaining public order and security and ensuring the enforcement of laws and regulations. As explained below, this institutional split has been substantially reshaped since October 2022.

Militarisation of the National Police (2022–25)

On 27 October 2022, Mali adopted Law No. 2022-037 on the militarisation of the National Police and Civil Protection repealing Ordinance No. 04-026/P-RM of 16 September 2004. Article 1 declares the National Police and Civil Protection ‘militarized’; Article 2 places their personnel under the general statute applicable to military personnel. Administrative authority over the two corps nominally remains with the Minister in charge of Security.

The reform was operationalized in 2023 through a revised general statute of military personnel (Ordinance No. 2023-015/PT-RM of 21 March 2023, as amended), integrating Police and Civil Protection personnel into the military pay scale and replacing the 2002 civil-service statute that had previously governed police officers. Malian authorities presented the reform as strengthening the Armed Forces and Security operational capabilities and giving police and civil protection personnel deployed on operations the same benefits as other military personnel.

The main practical consequence for this risk assessment is that police deployment and operational engagement now fall, as a matter of military organization, under the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, notwithstanding the Interior Ministry’s nominal administrative authority – a dual structure whose day-to-day operation has not been fully clarified in the sources reviewed. Most significant for accountability purposes, police discipline is now processed through military rather than civilian channels: Decree No. 2025-0899/PT-RM of 30 December 2025 records the dismissal of a Commissaire Principal de Police following a military Board of Inquiry of 27 November 2025; a decree of the same date (No. 2025-0900/PT-RM) applies an equivalent military disciplinary procedure to a National Guard officer.

On 31 December 2025, Ordinance No. 2025-031/PT-RM establishing the Directorate General of the National Police – expressly invoking Law No. 2022-037 and Ordinance No. 2023-015/PT-RM as its legal basis – formally placed the new Directorate General ‘within Armed and Security Forces’ and cancelled the 2004 Ordinance, expanding police functions to include military police duties and participation in territorial defence. A companion Ordinance No. 2025-032/PT-RM of the same date creates an equivalent Directorate General for Civil Protection.

Taken together, this legislative sequence reduces the traditional distinction between civilian policing and military functions, with direct implications for civilian oversight, applicable use-of-force rules, and compliance with international human rights standards governing law enforcement. This is not merely theoretical: by 3 May 2025, when National Police units dispersed the Palais de la Culture demonstration (see below), it had already been legally reconstituted, since October 2022, as part of the Armed and Security Forces. Officers carrying out ordinary protest policing were, as a matter of law, exercising a function integrated into the military structure, even though no formal military chain of command appears, from the sources reviewed, to have directly ordered that specific dispersal. The reform is also relevant to arms-control and end-use monitoring: police personnel now operating under military status may have access to equipment and capabilities traditionally associated with the armed forces (see Armament, below).

Use of Force and Firearms

Even before the 2022 militarization reform, the Gendarmerie was constituted as a military corps exercising law-enforcement functions rather than a civilian police force; the 2022–23 reforms extend an equivalent military status to the previously civilian National Police. Malian law does not establish a comprehensive statutory framework governing the use of force by law enforcement officials. Instead, relevant guidance is provided primarily by the 1997 Code de Conduite des Forces Armées et de Sécurité du Mali, adopted by the Ministry of Armed Forces and Former Combatants. The Code incorporates a number of international human rights and IHL principles applicable to internal security operations.

The Code requires the Armed Forces and Security Forces to respect, protect and assist civilian populations (Article 7), and provides that internal security missions must be carried out in accordance with applicable laws and regulations (Article 11). Regarding assemblies, it prohibits the use of force and firearms to disperse illegal but non-violent gatherings and provides that, where gatherings become violent, forces must use only the minimum necessary force and treat civilians humanely and in accordance with the law (Article 12). It further provides that the Armed Forces and Security Forces must avoid infringing upon the life or physical integrity of persons in all circumstances, except in cases of legitimate self-defence or defence of others (Article 26).

The Code also establishes safeguards relating to arrest and detention, requiring that arrests comply with procedures prescribed by law, that individuals be informed of the charges against them, and that they be brought before a judicial authority within legally prescribed time limits (Article 27). It affirms that personnel remain individually responsible where they violate human rights while executing manifestly unlawful orders (Article 25). During periods of exception, including states of siege or emergency, the actions of the Armed Forces and Security Forces must remain consistent with the law and international human rights standards (Article 30).

The Code expressly prohibits serious violations of human rights and humanitarian principles, including murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, outrages upon human dignity, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, hostage-taking, collective punishment and acts aimed at destroying the physical or moral integrity of individuals (Article 31). It also prohibits violence against wounded, sick, shipwrecked or deceased persons and requires forces to provide assistance to those in need (Article 32). During internal disturbances, personnel using firearms must report their use to the chain of command, identify themselves beforehand and issue clear warnings before opening fire (Article 34). Following the use of firearms, they must provide medical assistance to injured persons, inform victims’ families, prepare a report and initiate an investigation where necessary (Article 35).

The 2001 Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure have been replaced. On 31 October 2024, an entirely new Penal Code (Law No. 2024-027) and Criminal Procedure Code (Law No. 2024-028) were adopted. The new Criminal Procedure Code (Article 5) states that ‘liberty is the rule and detention the exception’, and that restrictive measures must be strictly limited to procedural necessity and proportionate to the offence. Article 512-59(4) of Mali’s 2024 Penal Code criminalizes the dissemination, through information and communication technologies, of rumours or false information concerning the condition or operations of armed forces engaged at the front where carried out with the intent to undermine troop morale or to spread panic and doubt among the population. The provision forms part of the offence of treason and has raised concerns regarding its potential impact on freedom of expression, particularly in the context of reporting on military operations.

Despite some safeguards, the legal framework does not provide a complete operational framework equivalent to the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. While it establishes important principles of restraint and protection of life, it does not expressly articulate the stricter international standard limiting the intentional use of potentially lethal force to situations where it is strictly unavoidable to protect life against an imminent threat of death or serious injury. Nor does it provide detailed provisions concerning operational planning, firearms management, command accountability, independent oversight, or mandatory review mechanisms following every use of force resulting in death or serious injury – gaps that the UN Human Rights Committee’s 2024 list of issues for Mali implicitly presses the government to address (see below). These gaps have contributed to ongoing concerns regarding accountability and compliance with international standards governing the use of force by Malian security forces.

Armament

No consolidated public inventory of small arms and equipment issued to the National Police, Gendarmerie or National Guard has been identified in the sources reviewed for this draft. Because the Gendarmerie and National Guard are under the Malian Armed Forces, their individual and collective armament is presumed to be drawn from the same arms procurement pool documented under Army above, rather than from a separate law-enforcement-specific supply chain. Less-lethal equipment (crowd-control munitions, riot-control agents) used in the policing of demonstrations has likewise not been documented in the sources reviewed.

Oversight

There is no independent external police oversight body in Mali. The Police General Inspectorate (Inspection Générale de la Police), an internal division of the national police, is charged with oversight of police action.

Police Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights

Excessive Use of Force in the Policing of Assemblies

The killing of at least 14 demonstrators  in Bamako between 10 and 12 July 2020 remains the principal documented instance of excessive use of force by Malian law enforcement. A MINUSMA investigation, published in 2020, found that the Gendarmerie Nationale, National Police, National Guard and the Forces Spéciales Anti-Terroristes (FORSAT) had made ‘abusive use of force’ during the interventions: 14 male demonstrators, including 2 children, were killed and at least 40 protesters were injured, alongside 118 injured security personnel; approximately 200 people, including six women and seven children, were arbitrarily arrested and held at Gendarmerie Camp I and three Bamako police stations before being released on 13 July on prosecutors’ instructions. Human Rights Watch separately documented that security personnel shot at least nine people dead near the residence and mosque of imam Mahmoud Dicko, a M5-RFP leader, after their vehicle became stuck; witnesses described panicked security force members firing on demonstrators as they approached the vehicle and on others as they fled, and government figures put total injuries at 303 (176 protesters/bystanders, 127 security personnel).

In its 2024 list of issues prior to reporting, the UN Human Rights Committee requested information from Malian authorities on investigations, prosecutions, sanctions and reparations relating to the July 2020 deaths and injuries, reflecting continuing international concern about accountability for this episode (see International Standards and Treaty Body Findings, below). The clearest evidence of the practical accountability gap is not an absence of process but its obstruction by security personnel themselves: the FORSAT commander incarcerated over his alleged role in the 2020 crackdown was forcibly freed on 4 September 2021 when armed, uniformed police stormed the facility holding him, in a mutiny the transitional government publicly condemned; no subsequent prosecution, retrial or other accountability outcome for this or any other security force member has been identified in the sources reviewed.

Beyond this episode, general arrest and detention practice also raises compliance concerns relevant to arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment more broadly. Malian law requires that detainees be transferred to the prosecutor’s office within 72 hours of arrest, but the US State Department’s 2024 human rights report found that authorities sometimes held individuals at police stations beyond this limit; detainees’ right to bail is limited, and while conditional release is often granted for minor and civil offences, lawyers report that it is rarely granted for more serious offences even where the legal conditions for release are met.

The most recent documented instances of protest policing occurred in April and May 2025: per Amnesty International’s 2026 annual report, security forces ‘violently repressed’ multiple demonstrations against the proposed dissolution of political parties in Bamako over this period. The best-documented of these is the 3 May 2025 dispersal of several hundred people gathered outside the Palais de la Culture, which was the first significant pro-democracy demonstration since the 2020 military takeover.

International Standards and Treaty Body Findings

Mali has not been reviewed by the Human Rights Committee since 2003, when the Committee considered Mali’s second periodic report and adopted Concluding Observations noting, among other matters, the State party’s own 20-year delay in reporting. Mali ratified the Convention against Torture in 1999 but does not appear to have ever had a report examined or Concluding Observations adopted by the Committee against Torture. In 2020 the Committee adopted a list of issues prior to reporting, requesting five years of statistical data on deaths of persons in detention (including in police detention centres), disaggregated by place of detention, sex, age group and ethnic origin, together with information on the outcomes of related investigations and the number of deaths attributed to excessive force or lack of timely medical assistance by public officials.

There is no ICC or African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights caselaw specifically addressing the use of force by the Malian police, though the April 2026 filing discussed above concerns the broader FAMa/PMSA accountability question.

Accountability and Oversight

At national level, the clearest domestic precedent for prosecuting police conduct in Mali does not, in fact, concern Malian security forces at all: Aliou Mahamane Touré was the self-styled ‘Islamic police’ commissioner appointed by the jihadist group MUJAO during its 2012–13 occupation of Gao and thus not a member of Mali’s own National Police, Gendarmerie or National Guard. He was sentenced on 18 August 2017 by the Assises Court of Bamako for a series of criminal offences arising from his role imposing punishments on residents during the occupation, though a separate war crimes charge against him was dismissed. The case is included here only as a point of contrast, not as an example of accountability for Malian security-force misconduct: it demonstrates that Malian courts are institutionally capable of trying individuals for grave abuses committed under colour of a ‘policing’ function, yet no equivalent domestic prosecution has been brought against any actual member of the National Police, Gendarmerie, or National Guard for any of the incidents documented here. 

Overall, the absence of an independent external police oversight mechanism, the lack of legislation directly regulating law-enforcement use of force, the 2021 obstruction of the one identified prosecution arising from the July 2020 Bamako killings, and the continuing pattern of arrests and enforced disappearances documented above collectively point to structural weaknesses in Mali’s law-enforcement accountability architecture, compounding the broader impunity concerns documented in relation to the armed forces. The 2022–23 militarization reform risks further entrenching these weaknesses.

Risk of Diversion and Re-Export of Imported Weapons

Mali is at the centre of one of West Africa’s most significant illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) trafficking environments, within a broader transnational organized crime landscape that UNODC’s dedicated Sahel threat assessment identifies as a direct driver of regional instability: Sahel-wide arms seizures rose by 105% between 2017 and 2021. The country’s prolonged armed conflict, weak border governance, limited stockpile-control capacity and the presence of multiple non-State armed actors create conditions conducive to diversion, circulation, and re-export of weapons both within Mali and outside.

Illicit Markets and Sources of Diversion

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s 2025 mapping of illicit-economy hubs across West and parts of Central Africa notes that intensified fighting in northern Mali has itself disrupted long-standing Libya-sourced trafficking routes; separately, and as detailed under Cross-Border and Outward Flows below, GI-TOC field research confirms that weapons linked to the war in Sudan have, since late 2024, proliferated via Chad and Libya as far as Mali itself.

Principal sources of illicit arms feeding Malian markets include battlefield capture and looting of national stockpiles, a legacy of the 2011–12 collapse of Libya — described by UN News as ‘a pivotal moment’, when Tuareg soldiers returning from the Libyan army looted weapons and brought them into Mali, and extremist groups subsequently captured Malian military and police bases, adding to their arsenals. This pattern of battlefield diversion has persisted: UNODC‘s own threat assessment concludes that ‘the diversion of weapons from national armed forces — whether through capture on the battlefield, theft from armouries, or purchase from corrupt elements in the military — is the primary source of firearms in the Sahel countries today’.

Alongside stockpile leakage, artisanal and craft production in illegal workshops contributes significantly to illicit proliferation, including the conversion of alarm and blank-firing handguns into functioning firearms. This channel is particularly significant in Bamako itself: a 2024 study found that nearly 80% of weapons seized in the capital originated from artisanal workshops concealed in caves, hillsides and ravines around the city.

Reported prices in the Gao–Timbuktu–Ménaka corridor — AK-pattern rifles around USD 750, cartridges around 70 cents each — illustrate the accessibility of the resulting market to armed groups, criminal networks and community-based actors alike. More recent GI-TOC field data shows these prices have since risen sharply: an AK-47 that cost CFA 200,000–300,000 (€300–450) in Gao before the 2023 FAMa/Wagner northern offensive reached CFA 600,000 (€920) by February 2025, reflecting supply disruption on established Libya-sourced routes rather than falling demand.

Cross-Border and Outward Flows

Diversion risk in Mali runs in both directions across its borders, not only inward. Small Arms Survey field research in the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali tri-border area documents organized trafficking networks moving significant arms quantities north of the Niger River, alongside lower-level, locally intermediated ‘ant-trade method’ to the south, driven by communities’ self-defence needs amid banditry and jihadist activity, the requirements of traditional hunters and non-State security providers, and the gold-mining economy. Mali features in this corridor not only as a destination for illicit arms but as a documented source of outward flows: ENACT’s Organized Crime Index for Burkina Faso identifies cross-border smuggling from conflict-affected Mali (alongside Libya) as one of the principal channels feeding Burkina Faso’s own illicit arms market, alongside looting from Burkinabè military depots, purchases from corrupt personnel and artisanal production. This confirms that materiel diverted within Mali feeds at least one neighbouring State’s own illicit arms market directly, with GI-TOC’s broader road-corridor mapping (87% of illicit hubs region-wide sit near major roads) indicating the physical infrastructure exists for further onward reach into the wider West African trafficking network.

Mali-sourced arms have reached other conflict zones, such as Nigeria. GI-TOC research published in October 2025 reported that armed bandits in north-west Nigeria have become increasingly entrenched in the regional arms trade, buying arms in the Sahel and distributing them to conflict actors in the North West and North Central areas of Nigeria. The bandit leader Kachalla Halilu Sububu, killed in a gun battle with state forces in September 2024, was a major arms trafficker, importing weapons from Mali and Niger, illustrating that armed groups operating along these corridors act as end users as well as arms distributors.

Inbound routes have also shifted. The same field-based GI-TOC research suggests that while most Sudan-linked weapons spilling over from that conflict remain in neighbouring Chad and Libya, some have, since late 2024, reached as far as Mali itself — moved via Chad’s Tibesti region or the Libyan hubs of Ubari and Ghat through the Salvador Pass into northern Niger, sourced in part through cross-border Tuareg trading networks and dedicated JNIM and FLA buyers. Separately, several sources report a newly emerging northern Nigeria-Niger-Mali corridor strengthening arms-supply links between ISSP and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), reversing the more typical historical pattern of weapons moving out of the Sahel into Nigeria rather than the other way around

Gold Mining, Financing and the Arms–Illicit Economy Nexus

Artisanal and small-scale gold mining is closely intertwined with arms proliferation: criminal actors seek weapons to target miners, who in turn arm themselves for protection, a dynamic the Small Arms Survey identifies as a specific driver of demand in the Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire–Mali tri-border corridor.  

State-to-State Transfer Risk

Mali’s rapid rearmament since 2022–23 has drawn overwhelmingly on Russian, Chinese and Turkish suppliers, replacing the French/European relationship following the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane. Their formal obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty differ: Russia has never signed it; Türkiye signed in 2013 but never ratified; China acceded in 2020 and is a State Party, meaning Chinese transfers are, on paper, subject to the same export risk-assessment requirements as any other ATT member’s exports.

No UN Security Council arms embargo applies to Mali.

Private Military and Security Actors

The presence of Wagner Group/Africa Corps as a foreign combat and combat-support partner operating alongside FAMa introduces a distinct diversion and accountability risk, separate from the State-to-State transfer question above: equipment reaching this force does not appear to pass through any conventional export-control or end-use-monitoring channel.

The precise provenance of individual shipments illustrates this uncertainty rather than resolving it. One analysis published shortly after the fall of the Assad government in December 2024, suggested that tanks and armoured vehicles delivered to Mali around that time were ‘likely evacuated from Russian military bases in Syria’. GI-TOC’s October 2025 analysis, cited by other sources, found that Wagner “did not arrive in Mali with a full arsenal” but instead sourced weapons ‘by taking stock from’ FAMa itself, with armoured vehicles and possibly attack drones rerouted from FAMa to Wagner. This breaches Mali’s ATT obligations, since end-user certificates issued for the original transfers would have named Mali, not the Wagner Group, as the sole intended recipient.

Africa Corps is thought to have imported cluster munitions into Mali in violation of the CCM and the ATT (Article 6, paragraph 2).

National Capacity to Prevent Diversion

Domestic institutional capacity to prevent diversion – weapons marking, stockpile management and tracing, and regulation of brokering – remains limited, notwithstanding a substantial capacity-building effort (see National Framework, above). The military-stockpile dimension of this capacity gap (i.e., physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) for weapons already held by FAMa), has  increased following Mali’s 2022 pivot away from Western partners.

On the civilian side, SP-CNLP conducts weapons collection and destruction campaigns – 1,200 weapons and munitions destroyed on 9 July 2025, marking the International Day for the Destruction of Illegal Arms– alongside community sensitisation activities. Since 2025, the UNDP/UN Office for Disarmament Affairs-backed SALIENT project has trained more than 5,000 community and institutional actors, validated 12 communal security plans, established 12 conflict-management committees, mapped the country’s artisanal gunsmiths, developed an SOP for artisanal manufacture, and operationalized three regional field offices of SP-CNLP.  A National Action Plan against SALW proliferation (PAN ALPC) for 2026–30 has been developed under the same project, alongside a technical dialogue framework among AES member States’ national SALW commissions – the trilateral Mali–Niger–Burkina Faso cooperation framework.

Despite this effort, comprehensive weapons marking, stockpile tracing and brokerage regulation remain incomplete in practice: Mali’s biometric firearms permit system, intended to establish who holds which weapon under what authorization, depends on reliable civil registries and consistent enforcement that have not been independently verified as functioning at scale. This institutional gap is corroborated by independent third-party diversion-risk assessment. The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security has formally designated Mali as one of 36 ‘High-Risk Destinations for Firearms and Related Items’, a classification based explicitly on ‘diversion risks, terrorism risks, corruption risks, human rights and political violence risks, state fragility risks, organized crime/gang risks, and drug trafficking risks’, and has ended US commercial firearms exports to Mali and revoked existing licenses on this basis.

The Small Arms Survey’s 2017 estimate placed Mali’s civilian firearm holdings at approximately 206,000 (1.1 firearms per 100 population). This figure almost certainly understates current circulation given the intervening decade of conflict escalation.

Overall Diversion Risk Assessment

Taken together, these dynamics place Mali’s diversion and re-export risk at the very high end of the scale. Four pathways are documented above. Domestically, battlefield capture and stockpile leakage feed JNIM, ISSP, FLA, and criminal networks directly. Outbound, materiel diverted within Mali has reached at least two neighbouring conflict markets – Burkina Faso’s own illicit arms market via the tri-border corridor, and, further afield, north-west Nigeria’s banditry economy. Inbound, Mali is now also a documented, if secondary, destination for weapons spilling over from the war in Sudan via Chad and Libya, and for a newly emerging Nigeria-Niger-Mali corridor strengthening ISSP-ISWAP supply links.

Any future transfer of conventional arms or ammunition to Mali should account for this layered exposure. For transfers from Russia or Turkey, neither of which is bound by any ATT obligation, that exposure is entirely unmitigated by external legal review. For transfers from China, a formal Article 6/7 risk-assessment obligation applies in principle, though this profile has, at time of drafting, searched no evidence of how rigorously that obligation is applied generally and to Mali specifically. In every case, the underlying risk is the same: materiel is diverted to non-State armed actors within Mali, and that it is subsequently re-exported, informally or illicitly, beyond Mali’s borders into a regional illicit arms market that this profile has shown Mali both feeds on and draws from.