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Belgium

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Belgium is rated as a moderate risk for its armed forces. In relation to NATO operations and maritime forces, no credible allegation of misconduct by Belgian forces has been identified. That said, Belgium’s consistent refusal to acknowledge or investigate confirmed civilian harm in operations in Iraq and Syria in which it was believed to have fired the munitions responsible raises concerns under international humanitarian law about the protection of civilians. Belgium was an early adherent to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

International legal context

Disarmament Treaties

Instrument Status Comment
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) State Party
1980 CCW Protocol I (Non-Detectable Fragments) State Party
1996 CCW Amended Protocol II on mines State Party
1980 CCW Protocol III on incendiary weapons State Party
1995 CCW Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons State Party
2003 CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war State Party
2001 Firearms Protocol State Party

International Humanitarian Law Treaties

Instrument Status Comment
1949 Geneva Conventions State Party
Additional Protocol I of 1977 State Party
Additional Protocol II of 1977 State Party

International Criminal Law Treaties

Instrument Status Comment
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court State Party
Amendments to the Statute on the crime of aggression State Party
Amendment to the Statute on blinding laser weapons State Party
Amendment to the Statute on the intentional starvation of civilians in NIAC State Party

International Human Rights Treaties

Instrument Status Comment
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights State Party
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR State Party
1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights State Party
1950 European Convention on Human Rights State Party
1969 American Convention on Human Rights N/A
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights N/A
1948 Genocide Convention State Party
1984 Convention against Torture State Party
1988 Protocol to the African Charter on the African Court N/A

Organisation Status Comment
United Nations Member State
International Court of Justice Accepted compulsory jurisdiction
NATO Member State
European Union Member State
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Participating State
Organization of American States N/A
African Union N/A
ASEAN N/A
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member State

Safeguards Agreements in place with the IAEA.
Wassenaar Arrangement Participating State

Domestic Legal Context

Belgium has a national arms export and import regime covering a broad range of conventional weapons and is one of Europe’s significant arms exporters, with a defence industry of global reach. Belgium’s arms trade is distinctive—possibly unique—in its national structure of export licensing competence, which is divided between the federal government and three regional authorities (Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels-Capital), each operating under its own legislation while bound by common EU and ATT obligations.

Belgium is home to two of the world’s most prominent arms manufacturers. FN Herstal, based in Herstal near Liège, was the largest exporter of military small arms in Europe in 2012. It is owned by the regional government of Wallonia. Ranked among the world’s top five small arms manufacturers alongside Italy’s Beretta and Germany’s Heckler & Koch, FN recorded €934 million in revenue in 2024 and its firearms are used by the armed forces of more than 100 countries. Belgium is also known for armoured vehicle manufacturer John Cockerill, headquartered near Liège.

According to the ATT Monitor’s 2025 annual report, in 2023, Belgium exported to 53 States, of which 38 were party to the ATT, six were signatories, and eight were other States not party, including India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, and Oman. Belgium reported 124 major conventional arms exports across two categories: armoured combat vehicles and battle tanks, with Czechia (72.6 per cent) and Germany (26.6 per cent) the main recipients. Belgium also reported 6,472 small arms and light weapons exports, predominantly assault rifles (57.6 per cent), with Ukraine as the main importer. Belgium said that exports of missiles and missile launchers to Ukraine were classified, meaning the actual total number of transfers is likely higher than reported.

At regional level within Belgium, exports are dominated by Wallonia, whose arms exports reached €860.7 million in 2024 – a 32 per cent drop from €1.27 billion in 2023 – as sales have shifted increasingly towards European markets since Wallonia banned exports to Saudi Arabia, its former main client. France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are now the region’s leading customers. 

Belgium reported imports in 2023 from 27 States, of which 22 were party to the ATT, three were signatories, and two were other States not party (Belarus and India). All 40 major conventional arms imported were armoured combat vehicles sourced from Italy. Belgium also reported 1,305 small arms and light weapons imports, consisting of revolvers and self-loading pistols (62.8 per cent) and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (37.2 per cent), with Germany supplying the vast majority (98.2 per cent) and Norway the remainder. Under voluntary national categories, Belgium reported ML1 imports totalling €47.6 million, with the United States (24.9 per cent), the United Kingdom (16.5 per cent), and Japan (13.1 per cent) as the leading suppliers by value.

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

National Framework

As mentioned, Belgium operates a largely decentralized arms export control system. Under the Special Law of 12 August 2003, responsibility for licensing military equipment and dual-use goods was transferred to the three Regions: Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-Capital Region. The regions are responsible for authorizing imports, exports, transit, and transfers of military goods and most dual-use items carried out by companies established within their territories. Licence applications are assessed in accordance with regional legislation, Belgium’s international obligations, and the criteria set out in the EU Common Position on Arms Exports.

In Flanders, the national law is the Decree of 15 June 2012 on the import, export, transit and transfer of defence-related products, other military-use equipment, law enforcement equipment, civilian firearms, parts and ammunition (referred to as the ‘Arms Trade Decree’). In Wallonia, it is the Decree of 21 June 2012 on the import, export, transit and transfer of civilian weapons and defence-related products. In the Brussels Capital Region, the relevant law is the Ordinance of 20 June 2013 on the import, export, transit and transfer of defence-related products, other military-use equipment, law enforcement equipment, civilian firearms, their parts, accessories and ammunition (the ‘Arms Ordinance’).

Each Region maintains its own licensing authority and regulatory framework:

The Federal Government retains competence for transfers involving equipment for the Belgian Armed Forces and the Federal Police. See: Federal law of 5 August 1991 (amended by the law of 26 March 2003). The Regional licensing authorities may consult other federal bodies, including the Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, Military Intelligence, and the State Security Service when assessing applications that raise security, foreign-policy, sanctions, or non-proliferation concerns. Cooperation between the Federal State and the Regions is organised through the Cooperation Agreement of 17 July 2007, which establishes procedures for information exchange, policy coordination, and representation in international export-control frameworks. Belgium also operates the 2015 Interfederal Consultation Committee to Combat the Production and Trade of Illegal Weapons (IOBIW), which seeks to prevent illicit arms trafficking and diversion through information-sharing and weapons tracing.

Belgium does not appear to maintain a general federal override mechanism allowing the federal executive to overturn regional licensing decisions. However, federal authorities continue to influence arms-export policy through intergovernmental coordination procedures, international obligations, sanctions implementation, and foreign-policy consultations.

Arms Transfer Control Framework

Imports of controlled items from outside the European Union generally require a licence. Imports from other EU Member States are subject to the authorization system established by Directive 2009/43/EC and relevant regional law. Certain simplified procedures and exemptions apply within the Benelux framework and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU). Imported firearms are subject to inspection by the Belgian Proof House to verify compliance with marking and traceability requirements.

Belgium also regulates transit and trans-shipment, defined as the transport of controlled goods through Belgian territory between third countries, including cases where goods are transferred between modes of transport or temporarily unloaded and reloaded. With the exception of movements between EU Member States, trans-shipments are subject to licensing requirements similar to those applicable to exports. The competent authorities for import, export, transfer, and trans-shipment authorizations are the same regional or federal authorities responsible for arms-transfer licensing.

The Licensing Authorities and Their Operation

Belgium’s licensing system faces pressure from two directions. On the industry side, the Flemish government approved a new arms trade decree in December 2025 to simplify procedures for cooperation within the EU and with NATO cooperation, stating existing safeguards would remain in place. However, IPIS and Amnesty International found the final draft approved on 8 May 2026 significantly weakens controls, exempts certain transactions from oversight, and increases the risk that Flemish companies contribute to serious human rights violations or war crimes. The Council of State’s opinion of April 10, 2026, acknowledged it had been unable, given complexity and time constraints, to assess compliance with international arms trade regimes.

On the civil society side, sustained legal challenges have pushed back against licensing decisions that might threaten human rights. With regard to Saudi Arabia, the Council of State suspended Walloon licences in 2017, confirmed their cancellation in 2019, and suspended further licences in 2020 and 2021 finding them inadequately justified against human rights concerns. That said, no export moratorium was enacted. In February 2021, Vredesactie documented through video footage, satellite images, and photographs that FN Herstal and Mecar weapons were used in the battle of the Jabara Valley in Yemen in 2019, directly refuting the Walloon government’s argument that the Saudi National Guard was not involved in foreign military conflicts. In June 2022, coalition of NGOs launched criminal proceedings against FN Herstal before an investigating judge in Liège for potential complicity in war crimes.

Regarding the UAE, the Council of State suspended three export licences in January 2025.

Regarding Israel, following Wallonia’s suspension of gunpowder licences in February 2024, the Brussels Court of First Instance in July 2025 ordered the Flemish government to block a military cargo container at the port of Antwerp and prohibit all future transit of military equipment to Israel, finding systematic oversight failure and explicitly citing the ATT — the first Belgian court to do so — and imposing a €50,000 fine per violation. A royal decree of January 2026 further prohibited overflights and technical stops carrying military equipment destined for Israeli forces, closing a loophole in Belgium’s framework dating back to 2009. Despite these measures, the Brussels Court of Appeal found in March 2026 that Belgium had failed to act swiftly enough, breaching its international obligations. 

Transparency and Reporting

Belgium consistently submits its ATT annual reports on time and is regarded as one of the more transparent EU arms exporters. However, the ATT Monitor 2025 identified specific gaps: Belgium leaves sections of the reporting template blank rather than stating nil transfers, and does not always clarify whether figures represent authorized or actual exports. Belgium has classified secret its exports of missiles and missile launchers to Ukraine, meaning that reported figures are an undercount. Belgium’s decentralized system is characterised by strong legal constraints but uneven administrative capacity, with transparency, consistency of risk assessment, and oversight effectiveness all subject to growing scrutiny. 

Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces

Strategic position and defence posture

Belgium hosts both NATO’s political headquarters in Brussels and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, making it a structurally significant actor within the Alliance. The Belgian Defence Strategic Vision 2025, approved by the Council of Ministers on 18 July 2025, sets three core objectives: preparing for high-intensity conflict within a collective defence framework, protecting national territory, and anticipating future forms of warfare. NATO is identified as the central pillar of national defence, with Belgium also committed to building European strategic autonomy in complement to NATO.

Belgium’s rearmament takes place within the broader EU strategic initiative launched on 4 March 2025: ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030, which aims to mobilize up to €800 billion in European defence spending, including a €150 billion loan instrument — the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) — targeting missile defence, drones, and cybersecurity, with an EU-wide military mobility area by 2027. 

Belgium met NATO’s target of 2 per cent of GDP defence spending for the first time in 2025, a significant rise from 1.27 per cent in 2024. The Strategic Level Report 2025, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 6 February 2026, confirms that Belgium maintains a defence budget equivalent to 2 per cent of GDP from 2025 until 2033, moving towards 2.5 per cent from 2034. The total defence effort over the period 2026–34 amounts to €139 billion, with land force investment alone budgeted at €13.8 billion.

Operational relevance is maintained through structural integration with neighbouring allies. At sea, the Belgian and Royal Netherlands navies have operated under a single command since 1948, an arrangement formalised on 7 February 1996 and valid in both peacetime and war. The two navies share training programmes and operate identical ship and helicopter types. On land, the Franco-Belgian CaMo partnership integrates Belgian units into French Army doctrine, training, and equipment standards, with the binational battalion Ermesinde as its centrepiece.

Composition of the Armed Forces

Following a 2002 reform, the Belgian Armed Forces were restructured into a single unified organization comprising five components — Land, Air, Naval, Medical, and Cyber — replacing the previously separate branches.

With more than 9,000 military personnel, the Belgian Army is the largest component of Belgian Defence, structured around five motorised infantry battalions and one Special Operations Headquarters. The Belgian military is a professional volunteer force; conscription ended in 1994. The Land Component has, however, experienced sustained personnel shortfalls.

Armour

One of the most significant elements of the restructure was the retirement of the component’s tracked armoured vehicles. The Belgian land component does not operate main battle tanks, having transitioned to a fleet of wheeled armoured vehicles. Overall, more than 1,000 armoured vehicles were retired. At one point, Belgium had 334 Leopard 1 tanks, 514 YPR‐765 armoured IFVs (AIFVs), 528 M113A1‐series APCs, and about 700 combat vehicle reconnaissance (tracked) vehicles (CVR[T]s) (Scorpion, Spartan, Striker, Sultan, and Samaritan).

Under the Capacité Motorisée (Motorized Capability, CaMo) treaty of 2018, the Belgian and French armies will operate the same equipment and systems. Both countries are procuring CAESAR SPHs, Griffons, Jaguar armoured reconnaissance vehicles, and Serval VBMR-L 4×4 light multirole armoured vehicles. In addition to common vehicles, Janes understands that Belgium and France are developing a common doctrine under the SCORPION army transformation programme and have 90 per cent organizational commonality.

Piranha 3C

In order to replace the capabilities of its tracked vehicles, Belgium aimed to procure 242 MOWAG Piranha IIIC 8×8 vehicles in three batches. The initial batch of vehicles was delivered between 2007 and 2013. Two additional tranches were planned, but it is highly unlikely that the second and third options will ever be taken up. This leaves the Belgian Land Component with a reduced inventory of 138 vehicles. The Piranha APC variant is armed with a 12.7 mm M2 machine gun (MG) while the IFV model has an Elbit OWS armed with an ATK Armament Systems 30 mm Mk 44 cannon. All Belgian Piranhas are fitted with an advanced modular armour system, including a double‐layered floor for higher survivability against mines.

Jaguar AFV

In July 2019, Belgium ordered 60 Jaguar armoured reconnaissance vehicles to replace the Piranha IFV and MGS variants for between 2025 and 2030. It is armed with a 40 mm cannon and two MBDA anti‐tank missiles. The vehicles will be identical to those being procured by France, which will likely facilitate enhanced interoperability between the two States.

Griffon AFV

In July 2019 Belgium also placed a contract for 382 Griffon light combat vehicles. The vehicle will replace the Dingo fleets and enter service from 2025 to 2030. As with the Jaguar platform, the Griffons will be identical to those being procured by France, which will likely facilitate enhanced interoperability between the two States.

The Griffon is to be procured initially in APC, medical, and reconnaissance variants. Janes understands that 20 Griffon Véhicule d’Observation de l’Artillerie (artillery observation vehicles) will be delivered between 2027 and 2029. Also, in December 2023 Belgium approved the purchase of 24 120 mm mortar variants. Reportedly, in December 2025, Belgium approved an additional purchase of 92 Griffon and 123 Serval vehicles, raising Belgium’s total Griffon fleet to 498 vehicles and adding the Serval as a lighter complement for reconnaissance and rapid mobility roles.

Light combat vehicles

Fox rapid reaction vehicle

In 2016, Belgium ordered 108 Fox 4×4 RRVs. The first vehicles were delivered in 2018 and delivery was completed in 2019. The Fox RRV is an upgraded and militarised version of the 79 Series Toyota Land Cruiser designed for light strike, reconnaissance, and patrol duties. The vehicle can carry up to nine personnel (depending on configuration) with a range of up to 1,200 km. The command variants are fitted with a 7.62 mm machine gun while the reconnaissance variants have a mount that can be fitted with a 12.7 mm machine gun or 40 mm automatic grenade launcher.

Light troop-transport vehicle

Belgium procured 199 armoured light troop-transport vehicles (LTTVs) from Jankel. They are likely fitted with 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine guns and 40 mm smoke grenade launcher systems. The ballistic protection is STANAG 4569 Level 1, with the vehicle also having mine protection to Level 1.

Caesar 155 mm SPH

In 2022, Belgium placed an order for nine Caesar self-propelled howitzers (SPH), which are expected to be delivered in 2027. In December 2023, an additional 19 platforms were ordered, which will bring the number of Belgian Caesar NGs to 28, of which four are only for training. The Caesar can operate independently for ‘shoot-and-scoot’ operations, where it can enter and exit combat in under two minutes and engage targets at up to 40 km using extended-range full-bore base bleed (ERFB-BB) ammunition, which can be extended to beyond 55 km using rocket-assisted ammunition. It uses NATO-standard 155mm ammunition. The Caesar will be the most significant addition to the land component’s firepower capabilities since the retirement of its main battle tanks.

LG1 Mk II towed howitzer

Belgium has a small number of 105 mm LG1 (105 mm) Mk II towed howitzers. These were delivered starting in 1996. They equip two batteries each with six guns. The remaining pieces are used for training.

Mortars

The Belgian Land Component’s TDA 120 mm Rifled Towed (RT) mortars have, for the time being, been assigned to the single artillery battalion. Once new SPHs enter service, the 120 mm mortars will be reassigned to the manoeuvre battalions.

Mortars

The Belgian Land Component also had M1 81 mm mortars and 60 mm EXPAL mortars. It was due to receive 81 mm EXPAL mortars in 2019 to replace the M1, although the Belgian MoD has not confirmed whether these have been delivered.

Air defence

Belgium will rebuild its very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) capabilities with the establishment of a battery in Nieuwpoort starting in 2025 with Mistral launchers taken out of storage and missiles initially provided by France.

Anti-tank weapons

In 2022, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belgium pledged to procure 200 anti-tank weapons, which could either be M72 LAWs, 90 mm RGW 90s, or a mix of both.

Spike MR

In December 2012, Belgium ordered 60 Spike launchers to replace the MILAN ATGM system in service with the army. The Spike medium-range system offers a significant improvement in capabilities over the wire-guided MILAN system as it is a fire-and-forget system and has a top-attack mode. The first Belgian Spike missiles were fired at the Bergen-Hohne training area in Germany in 2015.

Panzerfaust 3

In 2012, Belgium purchased 111 Panzerfaust 3 shoulder-launched short-range anti-armour weapons to replace its light anti-tank weapons. The man-portable, shoulder-fired, disposable recoilless system provides greater flexibility for infantry units, and the first Panzerfaust 3 entered service in 2013. The Panzerfaust 3 is designed to engage moving targets at ranges up to 300 metres and stationary targets up to 400 metres. All Panzerfaust variants can be fired from confined spaces and use multipurpose warheads.

Army aviation

All Belgian military fixed‐ and rotary‐wing aircraft are operated by the Belgian Air Component. Aircraft that operate specifically to support the Belgian Land Component include the NH90 tactical transport helicopter and A109BA. The Belgian Army does operate its own UAVs. Specifically, a Belgian Battalion has one platoon that operates RQ‐11B Raven tactical mini-UAVs. The Ravens delivered in mid‐2017 were the Belgian military’s first mini-UAVs.

Recent and current operations

The core tasks of the Belgian Armed Forces are to contribute to collective defence through NATO, collective security through crisis management operations, and protect Belgian citizens globally, including through internal security, humanitarian missions, and defence diplomacy. The Strategic Vision 2025 marks a fundamental reorientation of Belgian military ambition, formally committing the Land Component to brigade-level high-intensity collective defence within NATO, replacing the battlegroup-scale crisis management framework that had governed Belgian operations since 2016. The medium brigade is projected to comprise around 7,800 troops and 2,700 vehicles, with full operational capability targeted for 2030, alongside a second light brigade by end 2028.

Belgium’s operational footprint has contracted significantly as Sahel and Central Asian missions wound down. In Afghanistan, Belgium’s commitment ended in August 2021, when Belgian forces evacuated approximately 1,600 Belgian civilians following the Taliban takeover. In Mali, participation in EUTM-Mali concluded in May 2024; MINUSMA — in which Belgium had embedded personnel within a German ISR unit in Gao — was terminated by UN Security Council resolution in June 2023 with full withdrawal by end of year; and Task Force Takuba, to which Belgium contributed three staff officers, was dissolved in 2022 following France’s withdrawal from Operation Barkhane. In Niger, Belgium suspended military cooperation following the July 2023 coup and deployed an A400M to evacuate approximately 240 Belgian and EU citizens. In Iraq, a reduced Belgian presence continues within the international coalition headquarters in Baghdad and Kuwait, focused on commando, medical, and sniper training for Iraqi forces.

Belgium has contributed to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) since its establishment in 2017, with participation significantly intensified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Around 300 Belgian military personnel from the Army and Medical Services are deployed to Romania as part of the NATO Multinational Battlegroup under French framework-nation command. In July 2025, Belgium deployed over 200 soldiers to Lithuania until 31 January 2026 at Germany’s request, as part of the EFP programme. The Lithuania battlegroup is multinational and rotating, composed of soldiers from Germany, Belgium, Czechia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States, with Germany as framework nation. 

Belgium also maintains observer and staff contributions to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO. The UN’s oldest peacekeeping mission, established in 1948, remains operational, deploying 159 military observers from 31 contributing nations, Belgium among them. UNTSO provides military observers to two missions: Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), supporting UNIFIL in south Lebanon, and Observer Group Golan (OGG), supporting UNDOF in the Golan Heights. The number of Belgian observers is not known.

In Africa, Belgium’s military presence is primarily focused on the Democratic Republic of Congo and Benin. A small group of approximately ten Belgian military personnel is deployed in Kindu, in eastern Congo, on a ‘Train the Trainers’ mission for Congolese instructors from an elite unit formed by Belgium between 2008 and 2017. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing this deployment was signed in 2023. Belgium also maintains bilateral military cooperation agreements with a number of African States and has military security officers stationed at Belgian embassies across the continent. 

Belgian Air Force

The Belgian Air Component comprises some 5,700 personnel operating across five air bases, with its mission to monitor and defend airspace, guarantee national sovereignty, and support the other armed forces. Its operational structure comprises four wings, with core tasks including Quick Reaction Alert, Search and Rescue; air defence and surveillance; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); air mobility; and participation in international operations. Combat aircraft are concentrated at two tactical wings: the 2nd Wing at Florennes and the 10th Wing at Kleine-Brogel which operate F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon aircrafts.

The most significant development under the Strategic Vision 2025 is the replacement of the F-16 fleet with the F-35A Lightning II. The initial contract covered 34 aircraft at approximately €4 billion including support, training, and infrastructure, later planned to expand to 45. The first F-35As arrived at Florennes Air Base on 13 October 2025. The aircraft are armed with AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, Joint Strike Missiles — the first cruise missiles acquired by the Belgian Armed Forces — and GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs for precision ground attack. Belgium aims to declare initial operational capability by 2027, with at least four F-35As assigned to QRA duties, and full fleet operational capability by the mid-2030s. A second operational squadron is due at Kleine-Brogel by 2027. In February 2026, Defence Minister confirmed Belgium intends to sign a contract for 11 additional F-35As to increase European industrial participation.

F‐16AM/BM

The Belgian Air Force (BAF) has a fighter fleet of 44 F-16AM single-seat and 9 F-16BM twin-seat aircraft, which it will retire in favour of the F-35A.The F‐16AMs are operated by four fighter squadrons, equally split between Florennes and Kleine Brogel, while most of the F‐16BMs are assigned to an operational conversion unit at Kleine Brogel.

Belgium’s F‐16 fleet has been reduced in size because of attrition and restructuring in light of threat context and budgetary constraints. The BAF maintains an attrition reserve that should enable it to maintain a steady fleet size until the F-16 is replaced. That said, the Belgian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has said that some of Belgium’s F-16s could be used until 2028. Several BAF F-16s are also expected to be transferred to Ukraine.

Belgium’s F‐16s can be armed with Air Intercept Missile (AIM)‐9 Sidewinders and AIM‐120 advanced medium‐range air‐to‐air missiles (AMRAAMs). For ground attack, the aircraft can carry AGM‐65 Maverick air‐to‐surface missiles and a range of laser‐guided bombs. For target designation, the BAF has eight advanced targeting pods and eight older low‐altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night pods. This small inventory limits the number of aircraft that can realistically be deployed on strike missions.

F‐35A Lightning II

In 2018, Belgium selected the conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) F‐35A to replace its F‐16s, formally joining the F-35 multinational programme in 2020. The Belgian MoD has previously stated that a minimum of 40 new combat aircraft is deemed necessary, but current funds only cover 34 Block 4 aircraft. The Belgian government has indicated that at least six of these aircraft will need to be able to participate at any given time in sustained expeditionary operations. The BAC’s F‐35As started entering service in 2023 and a basic operational capability was achieved in 2025. Initial operational capability, which is linked to the ability to undertake limited expeditionary operations, is foreseen in mid‐2027 and full operational capability for late 2030 when deliveries are complete.

The procurement of the F-35 is a significant enhancement of the BAC’s combat capabilities. However, for the F-35A to change how the BAF and the wider Belgian military conduct operations, it will require a shift in operations, maintenance, infrastructure, and security. The F-35 is designed to be survivable in a defensive conflict, and the aircraft will also be able to track incoming stand-off cruise missiles and guide other assets to engage them. Further, the expected acquisition of the AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) will augment the platform’s capabilities against hostile aerial platforms. The procurement of the aircraft will also improve Belgium’s interoperability with international and European partners, with the F-35 in service with, or on order for, or selected by several European nations.

Unmanned aircraft systems

Belgium is not known to have procured armed drones.

Recent and current operations

Although Belgium’s fixed-wing force was substantially reduced in the 1990s, the BAF has sustained a consistent record of international deployments throughout the 2000s. The Strategic Vision 2025 marks a deliberate shift away from expeditionary crisis management toward high-intensity collective defence. The BAF supported NATO operations against Serbia (Operation Allied Force, 1999) and Libya (Operation Unified Protector, 2011). Between September 2008 and September 2014, Belgian F-16s deployed to Afghanistan on a rotational basis. 

Operation Desert Falcon — Islamic State (2014–2021): In September 2014, Belgium deployed six F-16s in Jordan, to support operations against the Islamic State. The first offensive action was on 5 October 2014 when two aircraft engaged ground targets using GPS-guided bombs. Belgium ended this first contribution on 2 July 2015, retaining a force protection platoon as part of the Dutch task force. In June 2016, six F-16s returned to Jordan to relieve their Dutch counterparts, remaining until December 2017 accompanied by approximately 100 personnel. Belgium also expanded activity to include targets in Syria from July 2016. Approximately 40 per cent of sorties involved the use of munitions. 

Naval Component

The Belgian Naval Component (BNC) is a component of the unified Belgian Armed Forces, commanded by a Divisional Admiral. Its mission is to protect Belgium’s maritime interests and sea lines of communication, and to contribute to NATO maritime operations in the North Sea and beyond. All naval vessels are based at Zeebrugge Naval Base near Bruges. The BNC’s vessels operate under the joint Belgian-Dutch Maritime Headquarters (Admiral Benelux, ABNL), located in Den Helder, the Netherlands. Naval helicopters assigned to the BNC are operated by the Belgian Air Component from Koksijde. The BNC’s fleet is undergoing a generational renewal.

The BNC operates with approximately 1,500 personnel, of whom around 600 serve at sea — a relatively high ship-to-shore ratio given the fleet’s size. The BNC recruits approximately 200 new entries annually, with targets to expand to 2,400 personnel by 2030 under the Strategic Vision 2025 manpower plan. 

Surface combatants — Karel Doorman/M-class frigates. The BNC has two Karel Doorman/M-class multi-purpose frigates in service. The frigates are fitted with Boeing Harpoon Block 1C anti-ship missiles, a 16-cell Mk 48 vertical launch system for RIM-7P Sea Sparrow missiles, Mk 46 lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes, a 76 mm Oto Melara gun, two Oerlikon 20 mm guns, and a Goalkeeper close-in weapon system. The helicopter deck has been modified to handle the NH90 NATO Frigate Helicopter (Caïman in Belgian service), which extends radar coverage from 22 to 150 nautical miles.

Future frigate

In 2018, Belgium’s Council of Ministers approved the replacement of the BNC’s Karel Doorman/M‐class frigates with two new multirole frigates, also called M-class. The frigates are being procured under a joint project with the Netherlands and are scheduled to be delivered no later than 2030. The new M-class will be designed for high‐intensity conflicts and expeditionary warfare, focusing on anti-submarine warfare as the primary capability. According to the Strategic Concept for Defence, Belgium also wanted the ship to have a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability provided by a new interceptor missile. Whether this happens in the future is unclear.

Cyber component

The Cyber Force is Belgium’s newest operational component. Established as a full component in recent years, it manages offensive and defensive cyber operations, electronic warfare, and intelligence. Its missions include:

  • Monitoring and defending Defence networks against cyberattacks
  • Securing weapon systems and communication infrastructure
  • Supporting military intelligence operations in cyberspace
  • Conducting offensive and defensive cyber operations when required

Compliance with IHL by the Armed Forces

General assessment

Belgium operates almost exclusively within multilateral frameworks (NATO, EU, UN), which provides a degree of structural constraint on unilateral action.

In relation to Belgium’s participation in NATO operations and maritime forces, no credible allegation of misconduct by Belgian forces in these contexts has been identified. Although no formal legal violations have been established, debate continues regarding the weakening of European arms control frameworks, and the need for transparency and parliamentary oversight within NATO operations. 

Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq/Syria) – Air Force

In the context of Operation Inherent Resolve, Belgium deployed F-16s across three rotations under its national designation of Operation Desert Falcon (October 2014–June 2015; July 2016–December 2017; September 2020–September 2021), conducting operations over Iraq and Syria from Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base in Jordan. The first rotation yielded 796 sorties, 3,552 flying hours, and 163 targets struck, with 324 weapons launched. The second and longest rotation (18 months) logged 605 missions and over 6,080 flying hours, with 675 weapons launched – the highest of any rotation, reflecting the intensity of the Mosul offensive. The third and final rotation logged 302 missions, 3,047 flying hours, and 29 weapons launched – far fewer, reflecting the greatly reduced scale of ISIS operations by that stage. 

The principal IHL compliance concern arising from Operation Desert Falcon centres on specific incidents in which the US-led Coalition confirmed civilian casualties from strikes assessed as credible Belgian actions, yet Belgium publicly denied all involvement. Belgium was directly implicated in two events in Iraq classified as credible by the US-led Coalition – a strike in Al Qaim on 27 February 2017 and another in Mosul on 21 March 2017 – which Coalition assessors determined had killed at least two civilians and wounded four others. Belgium had initially self-reported these incidents to the Coalition but subsequently refused to publicly confirm involvement or accept responsibility, maintaining a position of zero civilian casualties throughout all three Desert Falcon rotations.

Belgium was further implicated alongside France in five additional coalition airstrikes resulting in at least 22 civilian deaths, with neither confirming or denying involvement in any specific incident. A March 2020 joint investigation by Airwars, BBC, Libération, and De Morgen found compelling evidence that Belgium — alongside France and the UK — routinely denied civilian harm from its airstrikes, even where specialist US military personnel within the Coalition had assessed such cases as credible. Belgium responded only that it “was certainly not involved in all events”, refusing to confirm or deny its role in any specific incident.

Belgium stood out among allies in its blanket refusal to acknowledge casualties, even where the Coalition itself had conceded Belgian involvement in specific lethal strikes. On 25 June 2020, the Belgian Parliament adopted Resolution 1298 calling on the government to ensure maximum transparency regarding the prevention, monitoring, and reporting of possible civilian casualties, and to enter into dialogue with the Netherlands about lessons learned from the Hawijah disaster. Despite this, no interim mission reports were published and no tangible improvements were recorded.

No formal IHL violation by Belgium has been established by any judicial or quasi-judicial body. No public acknowledgment of the incidents has been issued, no Belgian investigative findings published, and no civilian harm reporting mechanism established. This contrasts with the Netherlands, which opened a dedicated civilian harm reporting centre in late 2024, developed in collaboration with Utrecht University, enabling civilians and NGOs to formally submit allegations against Dutch armed forces retroactively from the year 2000. Belgium has taken no comparable step.

Belgium’s refusal to acknowledge or investigate Coalition-confirmed civilian harm raises unresolved concerns under the customary IHL obligation to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians (Article 57 AP I) and the duty to investigate alleged violations (Article 87 AP I). The adoption of precision munitions — the GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb — from the third rotation in 2020 reflects a positive operational development, but the accountability gap remains open. 

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

Legal Framework

Law enforcement in Belgium is organized at two levels. The Federal Police (Police fédérale / Federale Politie) operates nationwide and is responsible for specialized functions including combating organized crime. It operates under the authority of the Federal Public Services for Home Affairs and Justice. The Local Police comprises approximately 178 police zones serving one or more municipalities and is responsible for community policing, public order, traffic control, crime prevention, and local law enforcement.

Overall, the Belgian legal framework governing the use of force incorporates the principles of necessity, proportionality, subsidiarity, and accountability, consistent with international human rights standards applicable to law enforcement and custodial settings. The use of force by police officers is governed primarily by the Law of 5 August 1992 on the Police Function. Article 37 establishes the fundamental principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and subsidiarity. Police officers may use force only to pursue a legitimate objective that cannot reasonably be achieved by other means. Any use of force must be reasonable and proportionate to the objective pursued and, except in urgent circumstances, must be preceded by a warning.

Article 38 regulates the use of firearms. Firearms may be used only in strictly defined circumstances, including legitimate self-defence, against armed individuals posing an immediate threat, or where absolutely necessary to protect persons, sensitive sites, dangerous goods, or individuals under police protection. Under international law, the police may only use firearms to confront an imminent threat of death or serious injury to themselves, their colleagues, or a member of the public.

In principle, the use of firearms must be preceded by a warning, including where appropriate a warning shot, unless doing so would render the intervention ineffective. Warning shots are not unlawful but are not generally recommended under the law of law enforcement.

Regulatory instruments on arms

Authorized Weapons by Category

Per the 2007 Royal Decree as amended, individual weapons that are issued nominatively to each officer are the following:

  • Semi-automatic pistol, calibre not exceeding 9 mm
  • Retractable baton (straight impact weapon)
  • Incapacitating devices (OC/pepper spray)

Collective armament (temporarily assigned for specific operations):

  • Long semi-automatic firearm, calibre not exceeding 9 mm
  • Rigid or flexible batons
  • Incapacitating devices
  • Conducted electrical weapons (Tasers)

Specific/specialized armament (for particular missions):

FN SCAR-SC in .300 Blackout — In March 2019, the Federal Police announced the acquisition of a minimum of 1,500 of these rifles (with 175 delivered in 2019), replacing the legacy mix of UZI, Heckler & Koch MP5, and Steyr AUG 9 mm submachine guns. The Interior Minister justified the acquisition as equipping officers with firepower equal to that of well-armed criminals. The weapon is issued as collective armament and is semi-automatic only.

Crowd control and riot equipment (deployed by specialized units)

  • Tear gas (CS) — authorized for crowd control units; confirmed through UN Committee Against Torture Concluding Observations (2021) and deployed during COVID-19 lockdown enforcement and protest dispersals.
  • Water cannon — deployed by the ARRO (Appui Renforcé aux Opérations / Versterkte Ondersteuning bij Operaties), the Federal Police’s specialised riot support unit.
  • FN 303 less-lethal launcher — compressed-air projectile system designed and manufactured by FN Herstal. The FN 303 has been deployed by the Federal Police’s Directorate of Special Units and by several local police forces, including Liège and Antwerp.

Police Oversight and Accountability

Police oversight in Belgium is exercised through a combination of external, independent, ministerial, and internal monitoring mechanisms. Together, these oversight mechanisms are intended to promote transparency, accountability, and compliance with domestic and international human rights obligations in the exercise of police powers.

The Standing Police Monitoring Committee (Committee P) was established in 1991 and became operational in 1993 as an independent body reporting to Parliament. Committee P is responsible for external oversight of police services and monitors the legality, effectiveness, and integrity of police actions. It investigates complaints and allegations concerning police conduct and respect for fundamental rights, and assists the legislature in overseeing the functioning of the police services. Recently, its mandate was expanded to allow it to receive whistle-blower complaints.

The General Inspectorate of the Federal Police and Local Police operates under the joint authority of the Ministers of the Interior and Justice. It is an independent institution within the police structure whose primary mission is to improve the functioning of police services at both the federal and local levels. The General Inspectorate carries out inspections, audits, investigations, and monitoring activities and produces reports, guidance documents, and operational recommendations aimed at strengthening professional standards and performance.

Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights by the Police

Multiple international bodies have documented structural failures in accountability that fall short of Belgium’s obligations under the ECHR and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990).

Use of Force, Police Misconduct and the right to peaceful assembly

Recurrent excessive force in crowd-control contexts has been documented by international human rights bodies. Amnesty International’s June 2020 report, Policing the Pandemic, found that police enforcing COVID-19 lockdowns across Europe, including Belgium, disproportionately targeted ethnic minority and marginalised groups with violence, discriminatory identity checks, and fines, exposing a disturbing pattern of racial bias linked to concerns about institutional racism within police forces.

On 24 January 2021, a demonstration against class and racial injustice in Brussels was dispersed by police. More than 200 people were arrested and locked up, including minors, and several people testified to illegal and arbitrary arrests, sexist and racist insults, and brutality committed by police, prompting investigations by the public prosecutor’s office and Comité P. The police union (CGSP/ACOD) itself complained that colleagues had gone too far during the demonstration. The case attracted significant scrutiny from human rights organisations and oversight bodies as an example of concerns regarding policing of public assemblies in Belgium. Eleven youths subsequently filed a civil action against the Belgian State, the police zone Brussels-Capital Ixelles, the Mayor of the City of Brussels and the head of the police zone for the police abuses they suffered.

UN Treaty Body Findings

In 2021, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) similarly expressed concern about racial profiling, police-related racial violence, and reports of excessive force during the COVID-19 pandemic and anti-racism demonstrations. CERD urged Belgium to ensure prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into alleged police misconduct, prohibit racial profiling in law, and establish an independent complaints mechanism.

The UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) expressed concern about allegations of police ill-treatment and excessive use of force, including incidents resulting in deaths in custody. It highlighted the case of Jozef Chovanec, who died following police restraint in 2018, and criticized the disproportionate use of crowd-control measures, including tear gas, batons, and water cannons during demonstrations in 2021. CAT also questioned the effectiveness of police oversight and accountability mechanisms, citing low conviction rates, lenient penalties, and the frequent suspension of sentences in cases involving police misconduct. The CAT’s 2014 Concluding Observations noted with concern reports of excessive and unjustified force during questioning and arrests, citing in particular the death of Jonathan Jacob at the Mortsel police station in 2010 following physical violence by officers, three years after which no perpetrators had been brought to justice. The Committee called on Belgium to establish a fully independent investigation mechanism and to ensure officers receive training on the UN Basic Principles.

In June 2025, the UN International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement reported that systemic racism permeates Belgian institutions, including law enforcement and the criminal justice system. It documented testimonies of racial profiling and excessive use of force by police against Africans and people of African descent, including children. The Mechanism highlighted the persistence of discriminatory policing practices, disproportionate incarceration of racialized groups, and concluded that existing oversight mechanisms lack sufficient independence, transparency, and enforcement capacity to effectively address systemic abuses.

Cases Before the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has found Belgium to have violated the ECHR in several cases involving police use of force.

In Cakir v. Belgium 2009, the applicant alleged that during his arrest he was pinned to the ground, handcuffed, struck by three officers, dragged to a police vehicle, and subjected to racist threats and insults, including further blows at the police station. The Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR on the basis of inhuman or degrading treatment. This case combines disproportionate force with discriminatory conduct, engaging both the necessity requirement and the non-discrimination standard of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms (Principle 1). 

In Trévalec v. Belgium 2011, journalist Yves Trévalec was shot seven times at close range by two police officers while embedded with a special anti-gang unit in Liège, having been granted official authorization to film. The Court found a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR (the right to life), holding that the police had been careless in setting up the embedding arrangement, meaning the potentially lethal force used was not absolutely necessary within the meaning of the Convention.

In Bouyid v. Belgium 2015, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR (degrading treatment) after two brothers — one a minor — were slapped by officers at a Brussels police station. The Grand Chamber ruled that any recourse to physical force not made strictly necessary by the detainee’s own conduct diminishes human dignity and constitutes, in principle, a violation of Article 3. The ruling was directly adopted by Belgium’s Court of Cassation in 2016, which held that the use of violence by police officers, not strictly necessary, against a person deprived of liberty constitutes a violation of Article 3 ECHR, and that the State is obliged in such cases to conduct an effective official investigation leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. 

In Benladghem v. Belgium 2026, the applicant alleged that during a police intervention he was subjected to excessive use of force, including being restrained and struck by officers in circumstances he considered unjustified and disproportionate. He further argued that the treatment amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case raises issues concerning the necessity and proportionality of force under Article 3 ECHR and engages the requirement under international standards that any use of force by law enforcement must remain strictly necessary, proportionate, and subject to effective oversight and accountability.

Risk of Diversion of Imported Weapons

Belgium maintains a comprehensive system of arms transfer controls, implementing EU Common Position criteria, NATO traceability standards, and international reporting mechanisms, including participation in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Diversion Information Exchange Forum and the EU COARM notification system. Based on available evidence, diversion risks associated with authorized state-to-state transfers appear low, and no significant recent cases have been documented involving the diversion of Belgian-imported conventional weapons to non-state armed groups.

Nevertheless, several contextual risk factors warrant continued monitoring. First, Belgium remains both a destination and transit country for illicit firearms trafficking. The Port of Antwerp has been identified as a major European entry point for criminal smuggling networks, including networks originating in the Western Balkans. High levels of illicit firearms circulation and the complexity of coordination across federal, regional, and local authorities continue to present enforcement challenges.

Second, Belgium’s military assistance to Ukraine exposes it to the wider European risk of conflict-related diversion. While no significant diversion of Belgian-supplied weapons has been documented, European security agencies and research organizations have warned that criminal groups are actively seeking to exploit wartime supply chains and post-conflict stockpiles.

Third, Belgium’s role as a major European logistics hub, centred on the Port of Antwerp and Brussels Airport, together with the increasing integration of dual-use technologies into defence supply chains, requires sustained attention to end-use controls, tracing mechanisms, and diversion-prevention measures.

Overall, diversion risk is assessed as low to moderate. The principal vulnerabilities stem not from Belgium’s formal export-control system, but from its position within European logistics networks, the presence of illicit firearms trafficking routes, and broader conflict-related diversion risks affecting the European security environment.