Nicaragua
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Nicaragua’s Armed Forces present a high risk of unlawful conduct using imported weapons. The principal IHL and human rights compliance concern regarding the army relates to its involvement in the government response to the 2018 socio-political protests and the subsequent repression of opposition actors. There is also limited transparency in arms procurement and transfers with Nicaragua a State not party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Nicaragua’s continued reliance on imports from China and Russia significantly reduces external oversight of procurement practices, delivery chains, and end-use monitoring.
The Nicaraguan police operate under government control with little accountability. The security forces have been used for political repression; during the protests in 2018, imported weapons were used to suppress demonstrations unlawfully. Nicaragua has no dedicated, independent police oversight body. It is under investigation by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity committed in the repression of protests.
Diversion risk in Nicaragua is also high, driven by the weak transparency and limited political oversight endemic in the country. Nicaragua has a substantial illicit arms trade, having been documented as a source for illicit arms flows toward Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico. In the 2018 protests, it was alleged that weapons were distributed to unofficial pro-government actors who similarly used them to violate fundamental human rights. Back in 2000, assault rifles and ammunition intended for official export were redirected to the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) using falsified end-user documentation.
International legal context
Disarmament Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) | State Party | |
| 1996 CCW Amended Protocol II on mines | State Party | |
| 1980 CCW Protocol III on incendiary weapons | State Party | |
| 1995 CCW Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons | State Party | |
| 2003 CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war | State Party | |
| 2001 Firearms Protocol | State Party |
International Humanitarian Law Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1949 Geneva Conventions | State Party | |
| Additional Protocol I of 1977 | State Party | |
| Additional Protocol II of 1977 | State Party |
International Criminal Law Treaties
International Human Rights Treaties
| Instrument | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights | State Party | |
| Optional Protocol to the ICCPR | State Party | |
| 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights | State Party | |
| 1969 American Convention on Human Rights | State Party |
| Organisation | Status | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| United Nations | Member State |
Domestic Legal Context
Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base
Nicaragua is primarily an arms importer and has no significant arms export activity. Public information on military acquisitions is limited. Nicaragua is not a party to the ATT and its UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) reporting has been inconsistent and largely non-public. Nicaragua’s original UNROCA submission dates from 1992, with the last direct national submission covering 2005–06; other entries in the UNROCA database are sourced from its trading partners’ own reports.
From available UNROCA reports, no measurable major conventional arms exports from Nicaragua have been recorded and data on major conventional arms imports are similarly unavailable. Nicaragua’s own reporting recorded a total of 4,119 SALW imports across two sub-categories: 3,315 revolvers and self-loading pistols in 2007–16 and 804 rifles and carbines between 2008–10.
SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database records Nicaragua’s arms exports as reflecting its historical role as a regional supplier of surplus Soviet-era weapons rather than a major arms producer. The most significant transfers involved portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS) to two recipients: the FMLN in El Salvador (1989–90) and Peru (1992–93). MANPADS supplied to the FMLN comprised 100 Strela-2 systems (delivered in 1990), 45 Strela-3 systems (delivered in 1990), 10 Redeye (FIM-43) systems (delivered in 1989), and 10 Igla-1 systems (delivered in 1990). Nicaragua transferred to Peru 15 Mi-17 transport helicopters, 7 Mi-24D combat helicopters, 216 Igla-1 missiles, and air-search radar sets. An Mi-17 was also transferred to Costa Rica in 1993.
Following Daniel Ortega’s return to power in 2007 and Nicaragua’s closer alignment with the ALBA bloc, Russia re-emerged as the nation’s principal arms supplier. The most significant acquisition was 50 T-72B1 main battle tanks, announced in 2016 at a reported cost of US$80 million – a sum exceeding Nicaragua’s entire 2015 defence budget – marking a qualitative shift in Nicaragua’s armoured capability. Regional analysts described this as operationally inexplicable from a defensive doctrine perspective. Army Commander General Julio César Avilés disputed the cost, claiming that the transfer was effectively a gift rather than a purchase.
Since 2023, China has emerged as a significant second supplier. In May 2025, Nicaragua signed a major arms supply agreement with Poly Technologies — a subsidiary of China Poly Group Corporation that was sanctioned by the United States in June 2024 for facilitating the trade of sensitive military technologies to sanctioned Russian defence firms. The agreement covers the provision of new military equipment to the Nicaraguan Army. China donated riot-control equipment, including suits, shields, helmets, batons, and bulletproof vests, to the Nicaraguan National Police, the primary repressive arm of the Ortega government. President Ortega, speaking in July 2025, confirmed that China had provided written assurances of ‘all kinds of assistance to Nicaragua, including defence aid’.
Russia has gone beyond arms transfers. A Russian Interior Ministry training centre based in Managua trains Nicaraguan security forces. In 2024, the US Treasury sanctioned this training centre alongside two Nicaraguan companies linked to gold industry revenue streams financing the regime. Russia has also been financing and conducting upgrades to Nicaraguan military bases. In September 2025, Russia and Nicaragua signed a new military cooperation agreement covering tactical training, officer education, logistics, intelligence sharing, and joint manoeuvres.
Nicaragua also maintains supplier relationships with Cuba and Venezuela, primarily of a training and advisory nature, as well as historical ties with Czechia, India, Indonesia, and Poland. Former suppliers include Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine.
Nicaragua has a substantial number of illegal weapons in circulation, many of them civil-war surplus originating from armed groups active during the 1979–1990 conflict period. It is documented as a source point for illicit arms flows toward Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico. The Organised Crime Index 2023 profile for Nicaragua describes this trafficking as facilitated by corrupt police and military officials who control access to arms and allow their illegal distribution. A 2013 InSight Crime case involved the conviction of a Nicaraguan police official for stealing AK-47s and an AR-15 from police stocks and trafficking them to Honduras, illustrating how corrupt State actors are involved in arms diversion (see further below).
In March 2024, the United States imposed restrictions on arms exports to Nicaragua, amending its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and adding Nicaragua to its proscribed nations list in response to human rights violations.
Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty
National framework
Nicaragua has no modern arms export control legislation aligned with international standards. It is not a signatory or State party to the Arms Trade Treaty and has not adopted national legislation implementing ATT-equivalent criteria. Nicaragua’s arms import framework is administered through the Ministry of Defence and the Army’s General Command, with no independent oversight of procurement decisions.
Nicaragua’s firearms control framework is primarily governed by Law No. 510 of 2005 (Ley Especial para el Control y Regulación de Armas de Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y Otros Materiales Relacionados), consolidated in 2023, and its implementing Decree No. 28-2005 which establish licensing, registration, and regulatory mechanisms for firearms, ammunition, explosives and related materials. The Directorate for the Registration and Control of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Related Materials is a specialized unit of the National Police, with decentralized representation through which the Police exercises authority for the law’s implementation and enforcement.
Nicaragua also has a domestic arms manufacturer, the Industria Militar Coronel Santos López, which repairs and maintains Soviet-era hardware, produces small arms ammunition, and manufactures military uniforms and tactical gear.
Transparency and Reporting
Nicaragua remains outside the international ATT framework, limiting its formal commitments to global standards on conventional arms transfers. It is a State Party to the 2001 Firearms Protocol (acceding in 2004) and to the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (becoming a party in November 1999). However, implementation capacity and reporting under these instruments have been limited, and independent monitoring is absent given the closure of independent media and the impossibility of civil society to operate freely.
Nicaragua last submitted UNROCA reports covering 2005–06; no subsequent submissions have been publicly identified. Nicaragua participated in the March 2024 Regional Preparatory Meeting for Latin America on UN Programme of Action implementation (listed among 19 participating States in UNODA documentation), but its national reporting under the PoA has itself been irregular; the last identified national report submitted in 2022.
Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces
Strategic position and defence posture
Nicaragua’s official defence posture is framed around territorial sovereignty and non-intervention. The Nicaraguan Army is constitutionally described as a non-partisan, professional institution subordinate to the President as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In practice, the Army operates under the direct political authority of the Ortega-Murillo co-presidency. The UN Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) has assessed that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) political party and the State have ‘virtually fused into a unified machine of repression.’
Nicaragua faces no significant external military threat. Its strategic context is defined by maritime boundary disputes with Colombia in the Caribbean (subject to ICJ proceedings) and periodic friction with Costa Rica over navigation rights and environmental management of the San Juan River. The acquisition of T-72 main battle tanks is widely assessed by regional analysts as serving a deterrent and political-signalling function rather than responding to any identified military threat — specifically toward Costa Rica (which has no standing army) and Honduras (which has inferior armoured capability).
Military expenditure has been reported at approximately 0.6 per cent of GDP, low by regional standards, although Russian-financed base upgrades and Chinese equipment donations may not be reflected in official data.
Nicaragua is governed by the longest-serving 21st-century ruler in the Americas: as of 10 January 2026, Daniel Ortega had completed 19 consecutive years in power since returning to the presidency in 2007, surpassing the 16-year rule of Anastasio Somoza García. The 2025 constitutional reform formalised a ‘co-presidency’ shared with Rosario Murillo — the only such spousal arrangement governing any country — and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 2025 report ranks Nicaragua as the least democratic country in Latin America, below both Venezuela and Cuba.
Gang-related violence is primarily associated with localized, community-based pandillas (gangs) rather than the transnational maras that dominate discussions elsewhere in Central America, with risks involving territorial control, criminal activity, and persistent community-level violence. Nicaragua also has a substantial illicit arms trade, having been documented as a source point for illicit arms flows toward Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico (see Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base above).
The armed forces were used to repress social protests beginning in April 2018 alongside the National Police and pro-government ‘parapolice’ (see the ‘Compliance with IHL by the Armed Forces’ section below). In November 2021, the government suppressed opposition parties and staged what international observers, including the United States, characterized as a rigged election in favour of President Daniel Ortega.
Nicaragua has a limited role in international peacekeeping. Its main historical contribution was to ONUCA (1989–92), supporting the regional peace process following Central American conflicts. Nicaragua has not been a significant troop- or police-contributing country to UN peace operations since then and does not currently deploy any personnel to UN peacekeeping missions.
Composition of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces
The Nicaraguan Armed Forces is a unified command comprising three branches – the Land Forces, the Naval Force, and the Air Force – under a General Command. Estimates of total active personnel strength vary: World Bank data reported 12,000 personnel as of 2020, while RESDAL reported 14,496 armed forces personnel in 2024. Both figures represent a substantial reduction from the more than 80,000 active-duty personnel (with an overall fighting strength, including reservists and militia, exceeding 125,000) maintained by the Sandinista Popular Army at the time of the 1990 peace accords following the conflict with the Contras. Military service is voluntary for men and women from 18 years of age; Nicaragua has not had conscription since the early 1990s.
The Armed Forces legal basis rests on the Law on National Defence No. 748 of 2010 and the Code of Military Organisation, Jurisdiction and Social Security No. 181 of 1994, as amended. Both have been substantially modified by the 2025 constitutional reform and an associated Military Code reform approved by the National Assembly on 26 March 2025.
The defence system comprises the President – now co-President jointly with the Vice President under the 2025 reform – as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and the Ministry of Defence as the consultative body for national defence planning. The High Command is led by the General Command of the Army (Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and Inspector General), supported by a Military Council. The National Assembly exercises constitutional oversight through its Committee of Peace, Defence, Interior and Human Rights.
Following the January 2025 constitutional reform and the March 2025 Military Code amendment, the Army is formally subordinated to the co-presidency of Ortega and Murillo as ‘civil authority’ and Commander-in-Chief, though the revised Military Code does not specify which co-president commands the Army in the event of disagreement. The Presidency now also oversees the Ministry of the Interior and the National Police, an arrangement characterized by constitutional analysts as intended to ‘centralize power in the hands of the Executive branch, which, with its current configuration, takes on a distinctly authoritarian role’. The same reform created the Patriotic Military Reserve Forces (Fuerzas de Reserva Militar Patriótica) as a component of the Army under Article 92ter of the Constitution, composed of retired officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, soldiers, and sailors who volunteer for service. A parallel Volunteer Police was established as an auxiliary to the National Police. Critics have characterized these bodies as paramilitary State structures.
In total, the 2025 constitutional reform modified 148 of the Constitution’s 198 articles and repealed 37 others, including the article prohibiting torture. The initiative was widely condemned by the UN, the OAS, and the European Parliament.
Army cooperation with the National Police in public security has its constitutional basis in provisions permitting the President (now co-Presidents) to order military intervention in support of the police when national stability is threatened by serious internal disorder or natural disasters. Army units cooperate routinely on counter-narcotics and rural security. All Army units engage in public security activities.
Army
The Army of Nicaragua was substantially reduced in size following the FSLN (Sandinista) period of rule (1979–90) but remains relatively strong by Central American standards. Its armoured vehicle fleet includes the most capable main battle tank in Central America. Its strengths lie in conventional artillery, counterinsurgency, and security operations. Its principal weakness is a lack of tactical mobility assets. The Army relies on volunteers.
The land force is organised around six regional commands and two specialized military detachments (North and South), with core combat capability in the General Augusto C. Sandino Light Infantry and Mechanized Infantry Brigades, supported by engineers and a dedicated Presidential Guard battalion.
The Army’s primary duty is to safeguard national sovereignty, increasingly complemented by counter-narcotics, humanitarian relief, and cooperation with the police against crime, including human trafficking and theft of livestock. Modernization priorities include formalizing the reserve within the chain of command, expanding the Military Industry Directorate, and restructuring intelligence and electronic warfare elements with Russian and Chinese partnership support.
Tanks
The Army procured T-55 tanks in various batches during the 1980s to deter foreign intervention and counter the Contras. The current operational status of the T-55 fleet is not reflected in open-source information.
In May 2015, Nicaragua’s ambassador to Russia indicated interest in securing 50 T-72B1 tanks to replace the ageing T-55 fleet; the first batch of 20 was publicly displayed at a military exhibition on 15 August 2016. As mentioned, the nature of the transaction (purchase or gift) is disputed. The Army’s stated rationale (counter-narcotics) is difficult to reconcile with the weapon’s characteristics, and regional analysts assess the acquisition as primarily deterrence-signalling toward Nicaragua’s neighbours.
In 2014, seven BMP-1 light tracked infantry fighting vehicles with a low‐profile turret were displayed at a military parade, most likely transferred by Russia as military assistance, replacing PT‐76s light tanks. The BMP-1 can be adapted to carry 9K11 Malyutka (AT‐3 ‘Sagger’) anti-tank missile launchers, which are in Nicaragua’s inventory.
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs)
BTR‐70M APCs were displayed in Managua in 2014. These units were transferred by Russia as part of military assistance and the total transferred fleet may have included at least 15. Four of the vehicles were publicly exhibited without visible weaponry; officials said they would be used for disaster relief.
According to Jane’s, Nicaragua maintains a largely conventional arsenal based on ageing Cold War-era systems, with capabilities focused on artillery, anti-armour weapons, and small arms. The army operates 18 152 mm howitzers – among the most powerful artillery systems in Central America. Although much of this equipment is obsolete and no major modernization plans have been reported, it continues to provide a conventional deterrent capability. Nicaragua fields anti-tank systems (9K11 Malyutka -AT-3 Sagger) including BRDM-2-mounted variants, as well as RPG-7, RPG-16, and RPG-18 rocket launchers, recoilless rifles (82 mm B-10 and 76 mm ZIS-3), and mortar systems including the 82 mm M-41, 120 mm M43, and 160 mm M160.
The small arms inventory includes a mixture of Soviet, European, and Western-origin systems: pistols (9 mm FN 35, 9 mm Makarov, .45 calibre M1911A1); sub-machine guns (9 mm Uzi, vz/23, vz/25); rifles (5.56 mm M16A1, Galil, SIG 540, 7.62 mm AKM, SVD); machine-gun systems (7.62 mm PKT, M60, RPD, RPK, plus the heavier 12.7 mm DShK and .50 calibre Browning M2 HB); and infantry support weapons (30 mm AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher, 40 mm M79 grenade launcher).
Overall, Nicaragua retains a sizeable but ageing conventional force centred on legacy equipment and territorial defence capabilities.
Recent and current operations
The Army’s operations are overwhelmingly domestic, centred on ‘Muro de Contención’ (Containment Wall), a standing national counter-trafficking strategy combining layered patrols, checkpoints, and Army-Police coordination along border areas and transit routes. A recent named operation, ‘Operación Julio Victorioso’ (11 July 2025, El Viejo–Potosí route, Chinandega), carried out by the 2nd Regional Military Command and Special Operations Command, resulted in an exchange of fire, one death, two detentions, and the seizure of approximately 600 kg of cocaine and weapons including AR-15 rifles.
Official messaging asserts that the Muro de Contención has made Nicaragua ‘the safest country in the region’. Independent fact-checking organisations dispute this: Divergentes found the claim unsupported by comparative security data, and Confidencial has reported large cocaine seizures attributed to Nicaragua by international agencies (including a 688 kg seizure in July 2025), indicating the country functions in practice as a cocaine storage and transit point rather than the ‘wall’ described in official communications.
Beyond counter-trafficking, the Army conducts rural security deployments for the coffee harvest, humanitarian assistance and disaster response (including during Hurricanes Eta and Iota in November 2020), and environmental emergency responses such as forest-fire containment. The Army’s international deployments are nil beyond the historical ONUCA contribution; all operational commitments are entirely domestic.
Critically, the Army’s role extends to direct participation in domestic political repression — addressed in full in the Compliance with IHL section immediately below. In brief: the GHREN’s February 2025 report was the first body to establish, based on testimony and documentary evidence, that the Army participated alongside the police and pro-government armed actors in the 2018 crackdown, contradicting years of official denials.
The Army has also been deployed in support of police operations in the Caribbean Autonomous Regions, where it has maintained a presence amid Indigenous land disputes, though its precise operational role there is less documented than that of other State institutions.
Air Force
The Nicaraguan Air Force (Fuerza Aérea del Ejército Nacional, FAEN) operates under the Army General Command and is integrated into the country’s territorial defence structure, headquartered in Managua. Its primary roles are troop mobility, border and maritime surveillance, medical evacuation, and support to ground operations rather than independent air combat. All key assets are based at Managua; in a conflict scenario, aircraft may be dispersed to forward locations to improve survivability. Modernization efforts focus on maintaining ageing Soviet-era platforms, improving air surveillance and radar capabilities, and strengthening ISR capacity, but reliance on Russian support, limited procurement since 2016, and centralized basing constrain operational availability and sustained high-tempo operations.
The Air Force has no combat aircraft. Nicaragua’s financial situation and the Armed Forces’ High Command’s priorities have been the obstacles. In early 2015, reports emerged that the government was negotiating with Russia to procure second-hand MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ aircraft; Nicaraguan authorities declared in March of that year they were no longer interested in combat aircraft, and the defence budget could not have covered the purchase or operating costs. Nicaragua also showed interest in Yak-130 lead-in fighter trainers in 2016 during tensions with Colombia over San Andrés island, but this procurement has not materialized due to lack of funds. Procurement of either type remains unlikely in the medium term.
Logistics aircraft
A single Mi‐17‐1V was delivered in 2009 out of two offered by Russia. Prior to this, between 1998 and 2001, the Mi‐17 helicopter fleet was overhauled in order to extend its operational life. Intensive use has created a pressing need for a replacement or, at the very least, a more extensive refurbishment. In 2008, Russia pledged to help Nicaragua to restore its fleet to service. The helicopters primarily have a utility role, although they also possess a light attack capability. However, no progress has since been reported.
Recent reporting indicates that additional An-26 aircraft may have been transferred or delivered around 2025, alongside other Russian-origin platforms, although the exact nature and classification of these transfers (donation, purchase, or cooperation package) remains unclear.
Recent and current operations
The Air Force is likely to be deployed only on an ad hoc basis for disaster relief operations, given the low availability of assets. The lack of combat aircraft limits contribution to counter-narcotics operations, since drug trafficking aircraft cannot be intercepted; the sole FAEN contribution to counter-narcotics is tracking suspect aircraft and relaying information to the Salvadoran and Honduran Air Forces for action. Effective counter-narcotics results have nonetheless been achieved in joint operations with the Nicaraguan Navy, whose vessels have intercepted drug-carrying ships detected and shadowed by maritime patrol aircraft.
The Air Force is active in supporting the annual coffee production protection plan and has been involved in regional disaster relief operations through the Armed Forces Central American Conference (CFAC). It has not contributed to UN peacekeeping activities. Disaster relief, counter-narcotics support, and coffee harvest security remain the main operational priorities, alongside supporting the transport capabilities of Special Operations rapid-reaction forces.
Navy
The Nicaraguan Naval Force (Fuerza Naval de Nicaragua, FNN) is a coastal defence force tasked also to protect marine resources. Counter-narcotics operations, however, form the majority of the Navy’s missions; the force also engages in operations against illegal use of natural resources, port and vessel control, SAR, and river and lake patrol. Fleet renewal interest has been linked to improving monitoring of maritime territory affected by the dispute with Colombia over the San Andrés archipelago following a 2012 ICJ ruling. However, limited financial resources have restricted major procurement programmes.
The Navy is organized in a Caribbean/Atlantic Fleet District (most assets at El Bluff) and a Pacific Fleet District (based at Corinto), with a significant detachment at San Juan del Sur for river patrols and smaller detachments at major lakes. Naval forces are structured around two regional commands – the Pacific Naval District and Caribbean Naval District – operating patrol craft, high-speed interceptors, and support vessels. Specialist units include the Inland Waters Naval Detachment for riverine and lake security, and the Marine Infantry component for amphibious tasks and port infrastructure protection at Bluefields, Corinto, and Puerto Cabezas.
The Naval Troop Battalion ‘Comandante Richard Lugo Kautz’ was established in 2011 to assist in the fight against narcotics and organized crime, comprising approximately 300 personnel at Puerto Sandino with detachments elsewhere. The Interior Water (Inland) Naval Detachment ‘Comandante Hilario Sánchez Vásquez’ was established in 2012 and is headquartered at Granada, comprising 100–150 personnel patrolling Nicaragua’s rivers and lakes. The Nicaraguan Marines maintain a detachment of special forces ready to assist other services in operations against organised crime and narcotics smuggling.
In December 2017, the National Assembly approved funds to purchase two Stan Patrol 4207 patrol vessels from Dutch shipbuilder, the Damen Group. The two vessels arrived in Nicaragua in 2018 and were incorporated into the naval force in March 2019. These 42.8-metre steel-hulled coastal patrol vessels can carry a crew of 18 and are fitted with mountings for two 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm machine guns.
In October 2019, Nicaragua commissioned two armed-patrol vessels converted from commercial ships. Listed as logistics vessels, they are armed with heavy machine guns and rocket launchers and operate as armed patrol vessels, the last of four commercial vessels to undergo this retrofitting process. In 2017, the Navy had displayed a new converted fish vessel, BA 407 Soberanía, similar to the earlier BA 405 Tayacán (refitted 2006).
Other patrol vessels
The core coastal patrol capability comprises four Rodman 101-class patrol boats delivered by Spain in 2007, with two based on the Caribbean coast at El Bluff and two on the Pacific coast at Corinto. Additional assets include: a Project 1400ME Grif-M Zhuk-class patrol boat returned to service in 2006; three 39-tonne Dabur-class patrol boats refurbished in 2010 with US State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs funding (acquired from Israel in 1996, re-engined between 2004 and 2008); and two Boston Whaler BW370 vessels received in August 2014 from US SOUTHCOM along with other naval base infrastructure equipment.
Recent and current operations
Nicaragua’s naval force remains a small coastal defence fleet centred on patrol and interdiction tasks. Its capabilities support maritime surveillance, counter-trafficking operations, and territorial presence but it lacks larger surface combatants for sustained offshore naval operations. The Navy has no current dedicated operational deployment beyond standing maritime security and surveillance missions.
Armed Forces Compliance with IHL and Human Rights
The principal IHL and human rights compliance concern regarding the Nicaraguan Army relates to its involvement in the government response to the 2018 socio-political protests and the subsequent repression of opposition actors — a response which the government maintained for years was carried out exclusively by the National Police, with pro-government armed groups characterized as independent actors.
The GHREN’s February 2025 report (A/HRC/58/26) was the first of the Group’s three substantive reports to conclude that the Nicaraguan Army had participated in the 2018 crackdown. The two prior GHREN reports – A/HRC/52/63 (2023) and A/HRC/55/27 (2024) – had established that crimes against humanity were being committed by State and non-State actors since April 2018, but it had not previously been in a position to make findings on Army participation specifically. In the words of the OHCHR press release accompanying A/HRC/58/26, the experts ‘were also able, for the first time, to conclude that the Nicaraguan army – despite its denials – had participated together with the police and paramilitary groups in the bloody crackdown against mass national protests in 2018. The report found that military personnel, intelligence structures, and specialized units were involved in operations linked to extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, violations related to nationality and exile, and restrictions on the right to remain in one’s own country. They further concluded that reasonable grounds existed to believe these violations were committed in a widespread and systematic manner for political reasons and constituted possible crimes against humanity. The Army was found to have actively contributed through intelligence activities, operational coordination, and cooperation with the Police and pro-government armed groups, directly contradicting the government’s sustained position that paramilitary actors had acted independently.
In April 2025, a companion document (A/HRC/58/CRP.8) identified 54 specific government, military, and ruling-party officials responsible for crimes against humanity, and called for targeted sanctions against identified individuals and institutions and for States to pursue legal avenues regarding Nicaragua’s international obligations. The events marked a significant shift in Nicaragua’s security environment, with the Army subsequently facing increased scrutiny over its role in internal security and political repression.
The Army has also maintained a presence in Nicaragua’s Caribbean Autonomous Regions, affected by long-running disputes over Indigenous Miskitu and Mayangna communal lands, where increasing attacks, displacement, and land invasions by non-Indigenous settlers have been reported. The GHREN published a dedicated thematic paper on violations against Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples of the Caribbean Coast (A/HRC/55/CRP.7, September 2024). Human rights organizations have criticized State authorities for failing to protect communities, investigate abuses, or enforce communal land rights; the Army’s precise role is less clearly documented than that of other state institutions, but its continued strong presence in the region draws scrutiny in the context of territorial control and Indigenous rights concerns.
Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies
Nicaragua’s legal framework governing police use of force is primarily established under Law No. 872 of 2014 on the Organization, Functions, Career and Special Social Security Regime of the National Police. Article 6(4) requires police officers to use only the force necessary to prevent serious, immediate, and irreparable harm, guided by the principles of congruence, timeliness, and proportionality.
A graduated framework regulating specific equipment, including police batons, and limiting the use of force to what is strictly necessary has been described as set out in Decree No. 26 of 1996. This includes a prohibition (Article 190) on the use of batons against vulnerable areas (head, spine, sternum, kidneys, and sexual organs), and on actions intended to obstruct breathing or cause joint dislocation or bone fractures, except where necessary to protect life or physical integrity.
The framework also regulates firearms use, permitting lethal force only under defined circumstances involving serious threats to life or physical integrity or other exceptional situations. External legal assessments have raised concerns that aspects of Nicaragua’s police use-of-force framework are broader than international standards permit – particularly regarding the circumstances in which firearms may be used – and that constitutional protections (Article 33, right to liberty; Article 36, prohibition of torture; Article 46, recognition of international human rights instruments) have been rendered largely inoperative by the removal of independent judicial oversight. Nicaragua does not regulate and restrict firearms use by law enforcement as international law requires.
The Nicaraguan National Police maintains a mixed inventory of small arms, primarily consisting of Soviet/Eastern European-origin systems supplemented by other foreign-supplied weapons. Reported police-held weapons include AK-pattern rifles (including AK-47/AKM variants), M16-family rifles, semi-automatic pistols, FN FAL rifles, Dragunov-type sniper rifles, and PK-series machine guns. Heavier weapons and specialized equipment are generally associated with specialized operational units rather than routine policing.
Specialized police formations, including the Special Operations Directorate (Dirección de Operaciones Especiales) and anti-riot units (Fuerza Antimotines), are reported to employ additional equipment such as armoured vehicles, tear gas, protective equipment, and less-lethal crowd-control munitions, alongside live ammunition.
The police have also expanded riot-control capabilities through foreign assistance. As mentioned, China donated complete riot suits, shields, gloves, helmets, batons, and bulletproof vests – equipment that entered the inventory of a force engaged in ongoing political repression at the time of delivery.
A distinctive and particularly concerning feature of the Nicaraguan security apparatus is the institutionalized use of paramilitary forces – non-uniformed, armed, masked units operating in coordination with the National Police and reporting directly to FSLN political structures. They are not subject to any published legal framework, chain of command, or accountability mechanism. These forces were documented using hunting rifles, improvised mortars (morteros), and firearms, including sniper rifles, during the 2018 crackdown. According to a former police officer cited by Havana Times, firearms including AK-47 rifles, Dragunov rifles, PKM machine guns, and M16 rifles were taken from DAEM storage facilities and distributed to police personnel operating in civilian clothing and to armed civilian groups.
Police Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights
The National Police is the institution most directly implicated in documented human rights violations, including the 2018 crackdown and the ongoing repression of political dissent. The Police operates without meaningful independent oversight: there is no independent police oversight body, the judiciary operates under political control, and constitutional protections have been rendered largely inoperative by the systematic removal of judicial independence.
International Standards and Treaty Body Findings
Nicaragua’s National Police and associated parapolice structures have been the subject of sustained and severe findings by international human rights mechanisms. The overall assessment across monitoring bodies is consistent: systematic, lethal, and largely unaccountable use of force against the civilian population, operating without meaningful domestic legal constraint or judicial oversight.
The UN Human Rights Committee, in its 2022 Concluding Observations on Nicaragua, expressed serious concern about the human rights situation, specifically: excessive force during the 2018 crisis; alleged cooperation or tolerance of pro-government armed groups; insufficient accountability mechanisms; lack of independent investigations. The Committee also expressed concern that, despite Nicaragua’s legal prohibition of torture, reports of torture and ill-treatment continued. This was particularly the case in police stations and detention facilities including La Modelo, La Esperanza, and the Evaristo Vásquez (‘El Chipote’) police compound. The Committee called for restoration of independent oversight, dismantling of armed civilian groups involved in abuses, accountability for unlawful force, and alignment of police operations with international standards.
The UN Committee Against Torture (2022) documented a pattern of systematic torture and ill-treatment in detention, particularly in the context of arrests linked to protests and political repression. Reported abuses at El Chipote, La Modelo, and La Esperanza included beatings, sleep deprivation, psychological pressure, and coercive interrogation. The Committee highlighted 12,284 complaints against police officers and prison officials registered by the Office of the Human Rights Advocate between 2005 and 2018, and the near-total absence of criminal prosecutions for torture, with responsible officials typically facing only disciplinary rather than criminal sanctions. It expressly criticised the placement of the National Police under the command of the President under Law No. 872 without adequate accountability. It was also deeply concerned about the use of lethal force against peaceful protesters including children, and ill-treatment upon arrest, in the context of the April 2018 protests and the 2021 electoral period.
Use of Force During Political Protests – 2018 and subsequent repression
The GHREN has identified four main phases of repression since April 2018. The first phase (2018–2020) was characterised by a violent and disproportionate crackdown on widespread legitimate protests. The April–August 2018 protest cycle constitutes the single most documented episode of security-force violence in Nicaragua’s recent history: demonstrations against proposed social security reforms on 18 April 2018 rapidly escalated into a nationwide uprising met with systematic state violence by the National Police, pro-government paramilitary, and – as established by the GHREN in 2025 – the Army.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and its Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI) – invited in by the government to investigate and subsequently expelled – documented extrajudicial executions, excessive use of force, and a systematic failure to protect human rights. The GIEI’s comprehensive report concluded that security forces and pro-government paramilitaries had committed gross human rights violations constituting potential crimes against humanity.
The 2018 crackdown resulted in 355 deaths, according to GHREN-linked reporting cited by Human Rights Watch; Amnesty International contemporaneous documentation recorded at least 322 killed by October 2018, with more than 2,000 injured. OHCHR reported that 22 police officers also died during that period.
The IACHR’s GIEI documented, on the basis of autopsies, ballistic analysis, video footage, and witness testimony, that most of the deaths were caused by firearms, that snipers targeted protesters in multiple cities; and that medical personnel and journalists were deliberately targeted. Live ammunition was used from the first days of the crackdown. Pro-government paramilitary forces operated checkpoints and conducted extrajudicial executions. The government’s ‘Operation Clean-Up’ (July–August 2018) represented the most intensive phase of the crackdown, involving coordinated operations to dismantle barricades and retake areas held by protesters – including a prolonged siege of Masaya – across multiple departments. On 8 July 2018, 38 people were killed in a single day, primarily in Carazo and Matagalpa departments, making it the deadliest single day since the protests began in April, according to the Nicaraguan Centre for Human Rights (CENIDH).
The repression had a significant impact on young children and adolescents, documented by the IACHR as including deaths, injuries, arbitrary detention, family separation, displacement, and allegations of sexual violence affecting girls following detention. It highlighted the need for child-specific safeguards, including separation of adolescents from adult detainees and access to appropriate protection measures.
Following the suppression of the 2018 protests, repression shifted to a systematic architecture of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture in custody, forced exile, and denationalization. Between February 2023 and September 2024, 452 Nicaraguans were arbitrarily stripped of their nationality and expelled, including human rights defenders, journalists, religious figures, and opposition politicians — placing many in de facto statelessness. The GHREN documented that members of the Fourth Regional Military Command participated in at least five expulsions via land border crossing points with Costa Rica in coordination with the police, illustrating army participation beyond the 2018 events. The January 2026 constitutional overhaul formalized the co-presidency and entrenched executive coordination over the judiciary and legislature, formally consolidating the removal of institutional checks.
IACHR Jurisprudence cases – use of force
In Roche Azaña et al. v. Nicaragua (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 3 June 2020), the Court found Nicaragua responsible for violations of the American Convention on Human Rights following the 1996 shooting of Ecuadorian migrants Pedro Bacilio Roche Azaña and his brother Patricio by Nicaraguan police and a soldier at an immigration checkpoint. The Court held that the use of lethal force was arbitrary and failed to meet the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. It found that authorities had not demonstrated an imminent threat justifying the use of firearms and criticized the use of assault rifles, described as ‘weapons of war’, for a checkpoint control operation. The Court also found violations related to the victims’ lack of effective access to justice and accountability mechanisms.
The significance of the Roche Azaña case for Arms TRACK purposes is threefold: (1) it constitutes a binding inter-American judgment establishing Nicaragua’s State responsibility for unlawful use of lethal force; (2) it identifies the specific use of assault rifles by Nicaraguan security forces in a law-enforcement context as disproportionate and incompatible with controlling-function standards (directly relevant to the small-arms inventory and use-of-force framework discussed above); and (3) it establishes a pre-2018 judicial record of systemic excessive force, judicial impunity, and failure to provide effective remedies – patterns documented subsequently at far greater scale in 2018 and after. More recent allegations relating to the 2018 repression have not resulted in an Inter-American Court judgment; following Nicaragua’s denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights effective November 2023, the Inter-American Court no longer has jurisdiction over Nicaragua for events occurring after that date, and no further binding judgments are possible through this mechanism.
Accountability and Oversight
Accountability mechanisms for security force misconduct, across both the Army and the National Police, are functionally absent in Nicaragua. There is no independent oversight body for either institution. The judiciary operates under political control and has been used as an instrument of repression rather than a check on security forces; the Constitutional Chamber and the Supreme Court have produced no judgments holding the Army or police accountable for violations committed since 2018. No perpetrators of the 2018 killings have been prosecuted.
The international accountability architecture has been progressively dismantled by the Nicaraguan government. OHCHR was expelled in 2022 and has been unable to maintain an operational presence since. Nicaragua withdrew from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2023, removing the prospect of future binding regional judgments for post-denunciation events. In February 2025, Nicaragua announced its withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council and disengaged from the ILO, UNESCO, UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration. It is not a party to the ATT and is therefore subject to no peer review under that framework.
The UN Human Rights Council renewed the GHREN’s mandate in April 2025 for two additional years (Resolution A/HRC/RES/58/18), but the government’s non-cooperation means that monitoring depends entirely on external sources, satellite and digital evidence, and testimony from exiles and diaspora communities.
Nicaragua is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, and there is therefore no ICC situation or investigation involving Nicaragua. An ICC referral would require a UN Security Council resolution under Article 13(b), which would face a likely veto by Russia. The GHREN has instead called on States to pursue legal action against Nicaragua at the International Court of Justice, specifically for violations of the Convention against Torture and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Nicaragua has been an active applicant at the ICJ in other contexts but there are no current proceedings against Nicaragua at the ICJ for human rights violations.
The release of political prisoners on 10 January 2026 was assessed by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect as a ‘tactical adjustment by authorities rather than a shift in the government’s repressive policies’. Security forces continue to sustain a climate of fear through surveillance, harassment, and arbitrary detention. In August 2025, Human Rights Watch reported in its World Report 2026 that lawyer Carlos Cárdenas and opposition figure Mauricio Alonso died while in State custody following periods of alleged enforced disappearance.
Risk of Diversion of Imported Weapons
Diversion risk in Nicaragua is assessed as high. Several factors underpin this assessment.
First, Nicaragua has not even signed much less become a State Party to the ATT and participates in no equivalent multilateral arms transfer transparency mechanism. Its arms imports from Russia and China occur outside any framework that would allow independent assessment of end-use controls, post-delivery verification, or diversion detection. The Poly Technologies agreement of May 2025 involves a supplier sanctioned by the United States in June 2024 for facilitating the trade of sensitive military technologies to sanctioned Russian defence firms, indicating that Nicaragua’s procurement occurs in a space deliberately insulated from international oversight. In March 2024, the United States added Nicaragua to the list of proscribed countries under its International Traffic in Arms Regulations precisely in response to these concerns.
Second, the documented use of imported arms against Nicaragua’s own civilian population constitutes deployment of weapons against the population of the importing State rather than for the declared purposes of external defence. The 2018 crackdown, in which National Police and paramilitary actors used firearms, including weapons reportedly drawn from state warehouses managed by the DAEM and distributed to personnel operating in civilian clothing, resulted in the killing of more than 300 people. Chinese-donated riot control equipment delivered to the National Police entered the inventory of a force engaged in ongoing repression at the time of delivery.
Third, Nicaragua’s diversion risk includes the SIPRI documented abuse of an official, State-authorised export channel. In 2000, Nicaragua’s National Police authorized the sale of 3,000 AK-47 rifles and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition, ostensibly to the Panamanian National Police; the end-user certificate was subsequently found to have been falsified, and the weapons were instead shipped aboard the vessel Otterloo to Turbo, Colombia, where they were delivered to the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). A second deal was called off following the launch of a joint investigation by Panamanian, Colombian, and Nicaraguan authorities. This case illustrates that Nicaragua’s exposure includes the compromise of official export authorization channels at State level, not only informal or illicit ones. The legacy of the 1979–90 civil war more broadly has left many small arms in the country that continues to feed regional illicit markets, with corrupt police and military officials documented as current facilitators of trafficking toward Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico.
Fourth, the Russian Interior Ministry training centre in Managua, sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2024, integrates Nicaragua’s security apparatus directly into Russian security structures operating outside international norms. The absence of transparency around the activities of Russian military personnel in Nicaragua, authorized under annual presidential decrees since at least 2022, prevents independent assessment of the scope of their activities or the equipment involved.
Nicaragua’s diversion risk is thus driven not primarily by stockpile security failures in the conventional sense, but by the deliberate integration of the security apparatus into an authoritarian repression structure, the documented compromise of an official State-export authorization channel, the absence of any arms transfer control framework, and direct deployment of imported weapons against civilians.