International legal context

Adherence to all treaties

Disarmament Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)	State Party
1980 CCW Protocol I (Non-Detectable Fragments)	State Party
1996 CCW Amended Protocol II on mines	State Party
1980 CCW Protocol III on incendiary weapons	State Party
1995 CCW Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons	State Party
2003 CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war	State Party
2001 Firearms Protocol	State Party

International Humanitarian Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1949 Geneva Conventions	State Party
Additional Protocol I of 1977	State Party
Additional Protocol II of 1977	State Party

International Criminal Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	State Party
Amendments to the Statute on the crime of aggression	Not Party
Amendment to the Statute on blinding laser weapons	Not Party
Amendment to the Statute on the intentional starvation of civilians in NIAC	Not Party

International Human Rights Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	State Party
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR	State Party
1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	State Party
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights	State Party
1988 Protocol to the African Charter on the African Court	State Party	Senegal has destroyed its stockpile of anti-personnel mines. Minefields from the Casamance conflict continue to pose a risk to civilians. Senegal has requested three extensions of its Article 5 deadline; the most recent runs to 1 March 2029.

Membership to International Organisations

Organisation	Status	Comment
United Nations	Member State
African Union	Member State
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Member State	Safeguards agreement in place
ECOWAS	Member State

Domestic Legal Context

Imports, Exports, and Supplier Base

Senegal is an arms importer. No measurable major arms exports from Senegal have been recorded in recent decades.

Senegal’s 2017 ATT annual report — the only one made publicly available — documented a nil exports report. The content of Senegal’s ATT reporting for 2018–24 cannot therefore be independently assessed.

In its 2017 ATT annual report, Senegal reported imports of 74 major conventional weapons items – 92 per cent armoured combat vehicles and 8 per cent large-calibre artillery systems – from six States, with France (53%), China (24%), and Israel (15%) as the main suppliers. Senegal also reported 2,322 imports of small arms and light weapons (SALW) across five sub-categories: 61 per cent handguns, 21 per cent assault rifles, and 17 per cent rifles and carbines. As Senegal aggregated some data on exporting States, the main SALW exporters cannot be determined from the report.

While Senegal has restricted public access to its ATT annual reports, it reported publicly on its arms imports through its 2024 UNROCA submission. Major conventional arms imports (Categories I–VII) included 10 armoured combat vehicles (CS/VN3) from China, 16 armoured combat vehicles (RAM) from Israel, 4 LG1 light artillery systems from France, and 1 TRF1 artillery system from France. Small arms imports included 1,361 assault rifles from Israel (275 M203, 736 AM15 5.56 mm, and 350 ARAD 5.56 mm), and 100 MK19 recoilless weapons from Türkiye. Light weapons imports included ten 12.7 mm guns from China.

SIPRI data for 2021–2025 identifies Senegal as one of the primary drivers of a 13 per cent increase in sub-Saharan African arms imports, rising to become the second-largest arms importer in the region, accounting for 8.8 per cent of total regional volume. Procurement focuses on weapons to protect offshore energy infrastructure and borders. Recent acquisitions include Puma M36 armoured personnel carriers from South Africa. In 2025, Senegal committed to a €317 million defence agreement with a Turkish supplier. Senegal previously accounted for 79 per cent of France’s major arms exports to West Africa but is increasingly diversifying its supplier base, operating Otokar Cobra II and Nurol Ejder Yalçın armoured vehicles from Türkiye.

Defence-Industrial Base and Military Programming

Senegal currently has no significant domestic defence-industrial base and is almost entirely reliant on imports for its military equipment. However, the development of such a base is an explicit and publicly stated policy priority of the Faye government. President Faye presided over the Armed Forces Day on 8 November 2024 under the theme ‘Towards technological and industrial sovereignty of the armed forces’, announcing a multi-year plan for defence expenditure. The formal adoption of the Military Programming Law by the National Assembly had not been confirmed at the time of writing.

Colonel Clément Chrisogone Nassalan, speaking on Senegal’s national broadcaster RTS on 2 April 2025, declared that Senegal planned to ‘set up an industrial unit to produce small-calibre munitions’ through international partnerships, and to produce drones with domestic engineers ‘in the near future’, with strategic discussions under way with several partner nations.

Arms acquisition decisions operate within a strategic context shaped by peacekeeping commitments, counterterrorism and Sahel border security requirements, the now largely concluded Casamance conflict, and – most consequentially for current procurement – the reorientation toward strategic autonomy following the end of France’s permanent military presence in July 2025, which removed a previously reliable channel for equipment transfers and technical assistance under the 2012 bilateral cooperation agreement. These issues are addressed further below.

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

National framework

Senegal’s arms transfer control framework rests on a combination of national legislation, international treaty obligations, and regional binding instruments. Primary legislation governing the import, export, and possession of arms and ammunition is spread across three instruments.  Law No. 66-03 of 18 January 1966 on the General Regulation of Arms and Ammunition classifies arms into seven categories and establishes licensing requirements for the manufacture, import, export, transfer, and possession of arms in the first five of those categories. Article 6 requires administrative authorization for any import or export. Implementing Decree No. 66-889 of 17 November 1966 then sets out the operational provisions of the earlier law. Article 2 of Law No. 72 of 17 December 1971exempts from the Law’s provisions weapons assigned to the armed forces and State agents whose equipment is governed by specific legal instruments. This framework is outdated and inadequate. Senegal reported to the 2^nd ATT Conference of States Parties and OHCHR in 2016 that it had initiated a review of its arms legislation, describing it as due to be finalized in the near future. In 2019, the Minister of the Armed Forces confirmed publicly that the process was still under discussion.

Senegal is a State Party to the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty and has an obligation to assess arms transfers against the treaty criteria. Responsibility for licensing and control rests with the Ministry of the Armed Forces. Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in licensing decisions (tracking) is also referenced in Senegal’s UN Programme of Action on SALW national reporting. At regional level, Senegal is party to the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. Under the Convention, imports and exports of SALW require an exception from the ECOWAS Commission, and Senegal is subject to those constraints when sourcing or transferring small arms within or into the region.

Transparency and Reporting

Senegal submits ATT annual reports consistently, placing it among the minority of African States Parties to do so, albeit with gaps in completeness and detail. Only the 2017 report has been made publicly accessible, making independent assessment of its reporting impossible. Senegal also submits periodic national reports under the UN Programme of Action, although these have similarly had limited detail.

Key Weaponry in the Armed Forces

Strategic position and defence posture

Senegal maintains a defensive posture focused on territorial integrity, maritime security, and regional stability. Geopolitically, it acts as a buffer state between the volatile Sahel interior and the Atlantic coastline, occupying a strategic position at the westernmost point of continental Africa. Primary security concerns include the spillover of militant Islamist activity from the east – most acutely from the Mali border – and the long-running, low-intensity armed conflict in the southern Casamance region.

In 2025, the Maçina Liberation Front (MLF), part of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) pushed into Mali’s Kayes region, with coordinated attacks on 1 July on towns near the Senegalese and Mauritanian borders. Further JNIM attacks close to the border promoted the Senegalese government to step up security in the zone.

Defence spending has remained at approximately 1.57% of GDP in recent years according to World Bank data, although the substantial procurement surge of 2023–25, including a €317 million Turkish contract, suggests this is headed upward. Procurement and modernization are shaped by the 2025–29 Military Programming Law, which emphasizes technological sovereignty and reduced dependence on foreign logistics.

Senegal’s arms acquisition decisions have been shaped by five principal drivers. The first is its long-standing commitment to UN peacekeeping. Senegal has taken part in more than twenty UN peacekeeping missions, deploying over 25,000 of its military personnel. In 2018, ahead of MINUSMA deployment to Mali, the United States (US) AFRICOM and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) expedited delivery of 2,200 M4A1 carbines, compressing up to 30-month lead times to approximately two months, at a cost of US$1.6 million in Senegalese national funds — its first FMS purchase using national funds since 2007 (source: US Army Security Assistance Command, 4 March 2019).

The second driver is counterterrorism capacity-building. The United States plays a significant role in pre-deployment training of military units and formed police units bound for UN missions, and its Integrated Country Strategy for Senegal identifies the development of internal capacity to store, maintain, generate forces, and deploy in support of peacekeeping as a primary measure of progress. France and Germany have also provided counterterrorism training and equipment, though the French contribution is now restructured following the base withdrawal described below.

The third driver is Sahel border and land security. EU Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1333 of 8 July 2025 approved a €10 million European Peace Facility assistance measure over 36 months providing non-lethal equipment and operational infrastructure – including surveillance systems, river bases, and obstacle courses – for day-and-night land and river surveillance, intelligence gathering, and force protection, aimed at contributing to an integrated EU-Senegal response to the spillover of insecurity from the Sahel.

The fourth driver is the Casamance conflict, now considered concluded by War WATCH following the dramatic reduction in rebel activity since the 2022 peace agreement, although residual elements and legacy landmines continue to pose risks to civilians.

The fifth driver – and the most consequential for current procurement direction – is the reorientation toward strategic autonomy following the end of France’s permanent military presence. President Faye declared that ‘sovereignty does not accept the presence of military bases in a sovereign country’. The final handover of Camp Geille in Ouakam on 17 July 2025 completed the full withdrawal of approximately 350 French troops, ending France’s 65-year military presence in Senegal, following a phased departure that included the return of the Marechal and Saint-Exupéry sites on 7 March 2025, the Contre-Amiral Protet base on 15 May, and the Rufisque base on 1 July. Under the 2012 bilateral cooperation agreement, in exchange for basing rights, Senegal had received priority access to French military schools, technical assistance, and the transfer of military equipment – a channel now closed. The end of this arrangement has reinforced Senegal’s drive to diversify suppliers toward Türkiye, South Korea, and others, as reflected in the €317 million Turkish defence contract signed in 2025, the ISEVEM vehicle plant partnership with South Korea inaugurated in December 2025, and the planned production of drones and small-calibre munitions through international cooperation.

Composition of the Senegalese Armed Forces

The Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) are organised under the Ministry of the Armed Forces and comprise an army, navy, and air force, supported by the National Gendarmerie. As of 2025, the SAF had 18,000–20,000 active military personnel. Senegal has selective conscription for those aged 20 and over, consisting of two years of service; voluntary recruitment begins at 18 years.

The Law of 22 May 1970 establishes the organization of national defence. Under Article 7 of the law, the president defines defence policy; Article 10 assigns responsibility for its implementation to the Ministry of the armed forces; Article 11 assigns civil defence preparation to the Ministry of the Interior; and Article 13 divides the territory into military zones, with Prefects exercising local authority and Governors coordinating regional defence. Jane’s assesses the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) as professionally led, well-trained, and disciplined, with a degree of professionalism rare in the region, attributable in part to Senegal’s military training institutions, including the Officers’ School of Thiès, widely regarded as one of the finest military academies in sub-Saharan Africa.

Army

Recent and current operations

Peacekeeping operations

Senegal is among the world’s most consistent contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, with deployments dating to ONUC in the Congo in 1960. In total, Senegal has taken part in more than twenty UN peacekeeping missions, deploying over 25,000 military personnel. At the end of 2025, Senegal had 1,204 uniformed personnel deployed across active UN missions, ranked 12th globally as a troop and police contributing nation in terms of number of personnel. Of the total, 998 are police – making Senegal 2nd in the world as a police contributor — and 206 are military personnel.

As of March 2026, Senegal was active in MINUSCA (472 troops and police) and MONUSCO (374 troops and police). Notable concluded deployments include MINUSMA in Mali, which ended in December 2023 following the Malian junta’s expulsion of UN peacekeepers.

Casamance conflict (1982–2025)

The conflict between the SAF and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) was the defining domestic military operation for more than four decades. It began on 26 December 1982, driven by historical, political, and socio-economic grievances over perceived marginalisation of the Casamance region. The conflict intensified in the 1990s through guerrilla operations by the MFDC’s armed wing (Atika) and Senegalese counter-operations, causing approximately 5,000 deaths — hundreds from landmines — and displacing some 60,000 people.

The MFDC fragmented after the death of its leader Abbé Diamacoune Senghor in 2007. From 2021, military operations against MFDC bases near the Guinea-Bissau and Gambian borders significantly weakened armed factions, complemented by efforts to disrupt trafficking networks that financed them. Three peace agreements have been concluded: with the Diakaye faction (in May 2023), and with the César Atoute Badiate faction (in February 2025). The Salif Sadio northern faction remains outside the peace process. The gendarmerie has largely taken over security duties in the region from the military. Some rebels remain in the forests and marshes of Casamance, and minefields laid by both sides continue to claim civilian casualties. For further detail, see War Watch’s Casamance conflict profile.

National Gendarmerie

The National Gendarmerie, is a military force integral to the SAF, and which is placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Armed Forces. Organized by Decree No. 63-294 of 11 May 1963 and governed by Decree No. 74-751 of 13 June 1974, it performs defence and internal security missions including judicial police functions, administrative policing, public security, border protection, and military police duties. It operates in areas outside major urban centres where the National Police has primary jurisdiction.

The Gendarmerie maintains a dedicated armoured fleet for border security, counter-terrorism, and public order missions. Its vehicles include nine Bastion armoured vehicles, 22 Cobra II APCs, four CS/VN3C IFVs, five EE-11 Urutu APCs, four VN22 armoured vehicles (including an ambulance and a recovery vehicle), and a Rodman 101 patrol vessel.

Air Force

The Senegalese Air Force has an estimated strength of 1,500 personnel. It is a small force undergoing progressive modernization, focused on transport, maritime patrol, and limited attack support, without a dedicated air defence capability. Dakar-Yoff International Airport serves as the main operating base; the Aviation School of Thiès trains pilots and mechanics and is expected to develop into a regional training hub.

Helicopters

In December 2023, Senegal received the delivery of M-17-1V helicopters, which can also be used as a gunship.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

In January 2024, Senegal purchased five Black Eagle 50H hybrid vertical take-off and landing unmanned aircraft systems (VTOL UASs) from Israel’s Steadicopter, as part of its attempts to boost its unmanned capabilities and improve its security and defence. The Black Eagle 50H is the world’s first hybrid-powered unmanned helicopter capable of performing a wide range of missions in maritime and civilian. The system has a maximum take-off weight of 50 kg and can transport a variety of large and small payloads, including weapons, during the day and at night.

Recent and current operations

The Air Force has no current dedicated operational deployment. It has deployed rotary-wing assets in support of UN missions, including conducting an Mi-35 airstrike against Séléka rebels in the Central African Republic in February 2017.

Navy

The Senegalese Navy has approximately 1,500 personnel. Its primary missions are protection of offshore fisheries, counter-piracy, countering illegal migration and drug trafficking, and maritime patrol. In the absence of sufficient aircraft, landing craft also support logistics for forces in Casamance. The Senegalese Navy has embarked on a revival programme. It has been in regular contact with the US Navy since 2011 through the Africa Partnership Station initiative and participates in the annual US-sponsored Exercise Obangame Express, most recently in May 2024.

Recent and current operations

The Navy has no current dedicated operational deployment beyond its standing maritime security and surveillance missions.

Compliance with IHL by the Armed Forces

Compliance by Senegal Peacekeeping Forces

The SAF has generally been regarded as a disciplined peacekeeping contributor. The 2015 OIOS Evaluation Report on SEA in Peacekeeping Operations recorded one substantiated allegation against Senegalese uniformed personnel during the period 2010–13. The UN Secretary-General’s annual SEA reports record 21 allegations involving Senegalese personnel between 2015 and 2023: 18 of sexual exploitation (adult victims) and 3 of sexual abuse (rape), including one substantiated case involving a child victim in UNOCI in 2016, which resulted in 45 days’ imprisonment. Of the 21 allegations, 12 were substantiated, 3 unsubstantiated, and 6 pending. Repatriation was consistently applied in substantiated cases; one case – a 2020 MONUSCO rape – was referred for criminal prosecution. These figures should be read against Senegal’s exceptional deployment scale as the world’s second-largest police contributor to UN missions. At the January 2024 Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) session, a Committee expert asked Senegal about measures to prevent and respond to sexual abuse and exploitation of children perpetrated by Senegalese peacekeeping forces and to recognise and compensate victims; the delegation said that for several years there had been no cases of abuse by Senegalese peacekeeping forces.

Casamance — Conduct of the Armed Forces

The Senegalese army and MFDC fighters have reportedly committed atrocities against both their enemies and against civilians in the conflict. The international community has, however, paid little attention to the conflict in Casamance. Amnesty International has documented widespread detention without trial of civilians suspected of MFDC sympathies, alongside serious allegations of torture, extrajudicial executions, and disappearances carried out by Senegalese security forces, noting that ‘in every case, the authorities have been extremely reluctant to initiate impartial investigations’.

A 1998 Amnesty International report documented military sources confirming under anonymity that it was ‘regular practice for the Senegalese army to torture and execute people in Casamance, and then bury the victims’ bodies close to army camps and checkpoints’. The report further commented that these human rights violations could not be considered isolated incidents or operational mistakes. It highlights that, given the Senegalese army’s reputation as a disciplined and professional force with extensive peacekeeping experience, such abuses suggest possible responsibility of the highest authorities.

Approximately 180 disappearances between 1992 and 2001 were attributed to both sides – around 100 to the army and around 80 to the MFDC – while documenting ongoing impunity. These abuses were concentrated in the bloodiest period of the conflict (1992–2001). In its 2002 annual report Amnesty International noted a marked reduction in reports of extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and torture following the change of government in 2000. Although the government made a commitment that past human rights violations by the military would be investigated, no inquiry was set up. The MFDC was also responsible for attacks on civilians, including the bombing of Ziguinchor from April 1999.

The conflict resulted in an estimated 5,000 deaths, including hundreds caused by landmines, and displaced approximately 60,000 people.

Children, Armed Conflict and Protection Issues

Under the Optional Protocol on children in armed conflict (OPAC), the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted Senegal’s prohibition of child recruitment and its cooperation with international mechanisms, while calling for stronger identification, rehabilitation, and reintegration measures for children affected by the Casamance conflict. No finding of systematic recruitment or use of children by the SAF was made.

Compliance in Domestic Enforcement — Gendarmerie and Army

Concerns regarding the use of force have also involved the National Gendarmerie and the deployment of military personnel alongside the National Police during periods of civil unrest. During the protest crackdowns of 2021–24, the security forces faced allegations of excessive force during crowd-control operations (see details below).

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

Law enforcement in Senegal is primary carried out by two forces operating under separate ministerial authorities: the National Police and National Gendarmerie. The National Police, under the Ministry of the Interior, is responsible for civilian law enforcement, public order maintenance, criminal investigation, and border control. It is governed by Law No. 2009-18 of 9 March 2009 on the Status of National Police Personnel ), implemented by Decree No. 2009-490 of 28 May 2009 .

Both the Police and Gendarmerie exercise judicial police powers under the Criminal Procedure Code, including powers of arrest, search, and detention. However, the Criminal Procedure Code does not establish a detailed operational framework regulating the circumstances under which law enforcement officials may use force or firearms. The Penal Code (Law No. 65-60 of 21 July 1965, as amended) provides a framework for criminal liability for unlawful violence committed by public officials but does not function as a comprehensive operational use-of-force framework for police or gendarmerie operations.

The 2001 constitutional framework provides general protections relevant to law enforcement conduct. Article 7 of the Constitution guarantees the inviolability of the human person and protects the rights to life, liberty, security, and physical integrity. Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly. However, the Constitution does not contain specific provisions governing the use of force by security forces.

Senegal stated, in its 2018 report to the Human Rights Committee that ‘it is prohibited for the security forces, in the performance of their law-enforcement tasks, to use force except when it is necessary and in moderation, in accordance with operational requirements’. However, the legal basis for this principle is not clearly established in a specific statutory instrument.

The absence of a dedicated statutory framework on the use of force and firearms has been highlighted by regional and international monitoring mechanisms. In 2019, regretting the lack of information concerning investigations into allegation of abuse, the Human Rights Committee reminded Senegal of the need to ensure that its laws complied with international standards. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2023 study on the use of force by law enforcement in Africa identified Senegal among the States whose legal provisions governing the use of force lack sufficient precision, particularly regarding firearms.  noted Senegal as being one of the States with insufficient legal precision concerning use of force and permissive rules specifically concerning the use of firearms.

Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights by the Police

International Standards and Treaty Body Findings

Senegal’s law enforcement agencies have faced sustained concerns from international human rights bodies regarding compliance with international standards on the use of force, particularly in the context of public demonstrations. The main forces involved in public order management are the National Police and the National Gendarmerie, although the Armed Forces have also been deployed in limited circumstances for domestic security operations.

The UN Human Rights Committee, in its 2019 Concluding Observations on Senegal, called on Senegal to guarantee and respect the right of assembly and demonstration of the general public, politicians, and civil society organizations, and to ensure that national legislation governing police use of force complies with the ICCPR and international standards. The Committee noted with concern allegations of excessive use of force at political rallies and demonstrations, including deaths, and expressed regret at the lack of information on investigations, prosecutions, sanctions, and reparations granted to victims or their families.

Similarly, the UN Committee against Torture  in its 2019 Concluding Observations expressed concern regarding ‘consistent reports of the use of excessive and disproportionate force by the security forces, including the use of live ammunition and tear gas, to repress political rallies and demonstrations.’ The Committee noted with concern that deaths had resulted from the disproportionate use of force and regretted that the authorities had not responded to requests for information on whether investigations had been or would be conducted. The CAT called on Senegal to train all law enforcement officials on the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Firearms, especially in the context of controlling demonstrations.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights , in Resolution 208 of 2012 on the Human Rights Situation in Senegal, expressed concern at ‘the use of force by law enforcement officers who are firing live bullets at peaceful demonstrators resulting in the loss of lives’, and strongly condemned ‘the persistent and serious human rights violations which are tarnishing the electoral campaign, and the use of force against peaceful demonstrators’.

Following her official visit to Senegal from 3 to 14 February 2025, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, examined law enforcement by the police and gendarmerie, including investigation practices and the use of force during protests since 2021. In her end-of-visit statement on 13 February 2025, she urged Senegal ‘to repeal the Amnesty Law providing an immunity from prosecution to those allegedly implicated in using excessive force and other human rights violations that occurred during the protests between March 2021 and February 2024’. ‘The Government’, she said, ‘has an obligation to establish the truth in relation to these events and to provide justice and reparations to victims in a timely manner’. Her full report was presented to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2026.

Use of Force During Political Protests (2021–24)

The most significant documented instance of excessive force by Senegalese law enforcement concerns the policing of political demonstrations between March 2021 and February 2024. The political crisis was linked initially to the arrest and judicial investigation of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko in March 2021, and escalated through his June 2023 conviction and the subsequent postponement of the February 2024 presidential election.

Following Mr Sonko’s arrest on 3 March 2021, security forces fired tear gas and live bullets to disperse protests, arrested approximately 100 people, and left hundreds injured. Amnesty International documented 14 deaths, including three children – 12 shot by the security forces – without opening an investigation. In June 2023, following Mr Sonko’s conviction and the dissolution of his party PASTEF, the security forces responded to demonstrations on 1 and 2 June 2023, resulting in at least 23 deaths including three children, as well as 390 injured and approximately 500 arrests. The Armed Forces were deployed in parts of Dakar on 2 June, representing direct military involvement in domestic crowd control.

In February 2024, demonstrations against the postponement of the presidential election resulted in further deaths and injuries. Human rights organisations reported that a 16-year-old boy was among those killed during security force responses in Saint-Louis, Dakar, and Ziguinchor. Across the full 2021–24 period, Amnesty International and civil society organisations documented at least 65 deaths (most by gunshot wounds) and more than 1,000 wounded, as well as some 2,000 arrests.

Accountability and Oversight

The 2024 Amnesty Law, adopted on 6 March 2024, initially generated significant concerns among human rights organizations that it would limit accountability for violations committed during politically related unrest between February 2021 and February 2024. Amnesty International called for its repeal. In April 2025, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law would not impede prosecution for the most serious crimes, including killings, torture, and enforced disappearance. The National Assembly subsequently voted 126 to 20 to amend the law to exclude murder, torture, and forced disappearance from its protection, allowing judicial proceedings concerning serious violations to be initiated. The judiciary began investigating deaths and violent incidents relating to protests that occurred between 2021 and 2024, with several persons of interest interviewed in October 2025 according to Amnesty International.

During the crisis, Ousmane Sonko filed applications before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice alleging eleven human rights violations by Senegal. The Court dismissed all allegations in November 2023, finding no breach of Mr Sonko’s rights and awarding costs against the applicant (ECOWAS CCJ, ECW/CCJ/JUD/42/23, 17 November 2023: africanlii.org). This regional judicial finding did not prevent the subsequent political resolution of the crisis following the election of President Faye in March 2024.

Accountability mechanisms remain structurally limited. Senegal has no fully independent police oversight body with investigative and sanctioning powers. The Office of the Ombudsman may receive complaints concerning abuses by public authorities but has no authority to conduct criminal investigations or impose sanctions.

Discriminatory Use of Force

LGBT persons and activists: Human Rights Watch has documented arrests under Senegal’s criminalization of same-sex conduct and reported allegations of physical abuse, extortion, and mistreatment in police custody in connection with such arrests.

Risk of Diversion of Imported Weapons

Senegal participates in international and regional arms-control mechanisms, including the ATT framework and ECOWAS small arms-control mechanisms. Its arms-transfer controls operate within recognized standards, although assessments identify remaining needs in weapons and ammunition management, stockpile security and implementation capacity. A April 2025 WAM baseline assessment by UNIDIR, ECOWAS and ComNat-ALPC sought to address these gaps.

Senegal’s main diversion vulnerability derives from its position within the West Africa–Sahel trafficking environment. The 2019 Small Arms Survey identifies routes linking coastal West Africa to Mali, including flows through Mauritania, with some weapons originating from coastal areas including Senegal. Field research identifies Bakel, on the Senegal River, as a trafficking and smuggling hub through which arms may move towards Mauritania and Mali. This indicates exposure as a regional transit environment, rather than evidence of systematic diversion from Senegalese state stockpiles.

The Mali conflict reflects wider regional arms-circulation patterns involving battlefield capture, trafficking networks and weapons from previous conflicts. Public reporting does not identify Senegalese state stockpiles as a significant source of weapons used by armed groups in Mali. The legacy of the Casamance conflict also offers a residual weapons-management concern. Decades of conflict involving Senegalese forces and MFDC factions contributed to small-arms circulation, with weapons reportedly obtained through local capture, acquisition and regional circulation. Current risks relate mainly to residual weapons, ammunition management, landmine contamination and local circulation rather than documented diversion of Senegalese state weapons to armed groups.

Senegal’s arms-diversion risk level is assessed as moderate. Available assessments do not identify Senegal as a major hub for arms trafficking or as a significant source of weapons or support to non-State armed groups. Evidence supports a distinction between Senegal as a transit-risk environment and Senegal as a source of diverted weapons: regional trafficking exposure is documented, while significant diversion of Senegalese state weapons to armed groups is not. Key vulnerabilities remain border monitoring, stockpile management and residual weapons linked to historical conflicts.