International legal context

Adherence to all treaties

Disarmament Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1996 CCW Amended Protocol II on mines	State Party
1980 CCW Protocol III on incendiary weapons	State Party
1995 CCW Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons	State Party	South Africa applies the prohibition at all times, including peacetime.
2001 Firearms Protocol	State Party	Not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

International Humanitarian Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1949 Geneva Conventions	State Party
Additional Protocol I of 1977	State Party
Additional Protocol II of 1977	State Party

International Criminal Law Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	State Party	South Africa decided to withdraw in 2016, but revoked its notice in 2017 before it became effective.
Amendments to the Statute on the crime of aggression	Not Party
Amendment to the Statute on blinding laser weapons	Not Party
Amendment to the Statute on the intentional starvation of civilians in NIAC	Not Party

International Human Rights Treaties

Instrument	Status	Comment
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	State Party
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR	State Party
1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	State Party
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights	State Party

Membership to International Organisations

Organisation	Status	Comment
United Nations	Member State
International Court of Justice	Member State	In December 2023, South Africa brought a case against Israel before the ICJ under the 1948 Genocide Convention. The case was ongoing at the time of writing.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Member State	Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol in place with the IAEA. South Africa formerly had a nuclear weapons programme, which was dismantled before the end of the apartheid regime.

Domestic Legal context

South Africa has a national arms exports and imports regime covering a broad range of conventional weapons. South Africa is one of Africa’s very few significant arms exporters. Most other African States are major importers of weaponry, mainly from Europe, China, Russia, and the United States.

South Africa generated US$550 million from defence exports in 2025, selling weapons and ammunition to 42 States, including France, Germany, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Zimbabwe. The largest export share went to Europe, with munitions making up the bulk of the sales. Germany was the top buyer, ordering around $180 million worth of shells. Armoured vehicles and aircraft were exported widely within Africa, with Ghana, Kenya, and Malawi among the major vehicle buyers, while combat aircraft were sold to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) and Mozambique. Combat aircraft were also sold to Iraq and the UAE.

In terms of imports (in Appendix C of the Report), light weapons were procured from Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2025. A total of 113,000 rounds of ammunition (unspecified) were procured from China.

Domestic legislation relevant to the Arms Trade Treaty

The National Conventional Arms Control Act of 2002 (as amended in 2008) is the regulatory basis of South Africa’s arms control regime. The Act also establishes the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) as the decision-making body. Section 15 of the NCAC Act sets out a list of criteria that the NCACC must use when making decisions on whether to grant arms export permits. These include under Section 15 of the Act:

(c) Avoid contributing to internal repression, including the systemic violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(d) Avoid transfers of controlled items to governments that systematically violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(e) Avoid transfers of controlled items that are likely to contribute to the escalation of regional military conflicts, endanger peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into a region or otherwise contribute to regional instability;

(f) Adhere to international law, norms and practices and the international obligations and commitments of the Republic, including the United Nations Security Council Arms embargoes;

(g) Take account of calls for reduced military expenditure in the interests of development and human security;

(h) Avoid contributing to terrorism and crime.

Section 14(3) of the Act obligates the NCACC to cancel, amend, or suspend an export permit if certain criteria are met. The Act uses the wording “must” in this context, leaving no room for discretion. The text of the provision is as follows:

“(3) The Committee must, by notice in writing to the person who has been issued a permit …

(a) cancel or suspend the permit if any condition of the permit has not been or is not being complied with;
(b) cancel the permit if the person who has been issued the permit is convicted of an offence in terms of this Act;
(c) cancel, amend or suspend the permit if it is in the interest of the protection of the security of the Republic; or
(d) cancel, amend or suspend the permit if it is in the interest of maintaining and promoting international peace or avoiding repression and terrorism.”

The National Conventional Arms Control Committee

In the last quarter of 2025, 144 export permits for munitions were granted by the NCACC. Import permits increased to 111 (from 90 the previous quarter), although their value declined to R8.7 million. Dual-use exports rose to 40 permits worth R242 million. As in the previous quarter, no applications were denied.

The NCACC has been widely criticized, albeit for different reasons. In February 2026, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence of the South African Parliament raised serious concerns about the effectiveness of the NCACC and the functionality of the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control (DCAC) in ‘facilitating a conducive regulatory environment’ for the armaments trade industry. The result, the Committee said, was lost business for South African companies. On the call to review the framework, the Committee said that while such a review may be considered, it must remain aligned with international arms control standards and the spirit and provisions of the National Conventional Arms Control Act.

In contrast, a report issued in October 2025 by the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) entitled The Great Hypocrisy of South Africa’s Arms Exports said that the nation continued to export arms to repressive regimes and nations accused of war crimes, identifying sales of South African-made weapons to States under military rule such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Myanmar, and Mali. Dr Atilla Kisla, International Justice Cluster Lead at SALC, told the media that the findings reveal a ‘serious contradiction’ between South Africa’s legal obligations and its actions. ‘Arms exports are not neutral acts’, he said. It was also claimed that ‘In the 30 years since the committee’s establishment, export permits have routinely been granted to countries alleged to have committed war crimes.’

Writing in The Witness in April 2026, Ntokozo Dladla, a lawyer at Open Secrets, noted that in 2021, Open Secrets along with the SALC applied for an order to review and set aside the Committee’s decision to authorize the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. The organization Bellingcat found that a 2018 attack on Hodeidah’s fishing harbour that then targeted survivors and first responders was likely caused by bombs produced by South African company Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM). This was corroborated by the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen in its 2019 report (at para 556).

Another criticism of South Africa’s arms exports is ‘transparency. While the NCACC is mandated to report to parliament regularly, these reports often lack detail and can be characterised by inaccuracies. One example being the 2023 erroneous listing of arms exports to Australia worth R33 million as R33 billion’. In 2020, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Ms Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, told Parliament that the only time where Africa conducted an on-site inspection of its arms exports was with respect to Pakistan. This raises concerns about how end use and end users are monitored.

In July 2024, the Gauteng Division of the High Court in Pretoria ordered the NCACC to suspend arms exports to Myanmar. The Court declared that the NCACC is obligated under Section 14(3)(d) of the NCAC Act to suspend any existing contract or export permit for the transfer of arms if the importing country has either experienced an unconstitutional change of government (e.g. a military coup); or is reasonably suspected, by a special rapporteur, independent expert, or other person working under a UN mandate, of having committed any crime against humanity, war crime, or act of genocide.

key weaponry in the armed forces

South Africa has an air force, a navy, and an army – the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF). Under the 1996 Constitution of South Africa (§200(2)), the SANDF has as its primary object ‘to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force’.

The South African Space Command Section (SASCS) is a space command of the South African Air Force. The establishment of the SASCS, which became operational in 2024, was announced in September 2022. The SANDF does not have a cyber division but the SANDF employs ‘robust cyber measures’ as part of its warfare according to a statement by Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga at the end of 2025. It has long had a cyber strategy in place.

The SANDF had a total of about 71,235 active personnel and 29,350 reserve personnel as of August 2025.

The SANDF may not lawfully produce or procure anti-personnel mines or cluster munitions as a result of their disarmament treaty obligations.

The South African Army

The South African Army, which has around 40,000 active personnel and more than 12,000 reservists, has a wide range of weaponry. Combat infantry are generally equipped with the Vektor R4, a 5.56 x  45 mm assault rifle.

The South African Air Force

The Air Force has three Aérospatiale SA 330H Pumas still in service. The Puma is a French medium-transport and utility helicopter. There are also four AgustaWestland Super Lynx 300s, a highly capable, multi-role military helicopter. In contrast, none of the C-130BZ Hercules transport aircraft is airworthy, severely limiting airlift and combat capabilities.

According to Good Governance Africa, the deaths of the South African soldiers in DR Congo in late January 2025 ‘occurred largely as a result of insufficient air cover for ground troops, and exposed the poor state of the SANDF’s tactical intelligence, particularly in operations where counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare strategies are required’.

The South African Navy

compliance with IHL by the armed forces

South Africa was a party to the Second Congo War in the DR Congo that ended in 2002. A 2015 United Nations report identified SANDF soldiers as among the worst offenders for misconduct in UN peacekeeping operations with nine substantiated allegations in 2010–13. But more recent reports from battles in Saki and Goma in DR Congo are said to suggest that South African forces ‘have demonstrated bravery and commitment to their mandate’.

The SANDF has also performed law enforcement functions in which excessive force has been used. See below the Khosa case for one example.

Compliance with IHL by South African Peacekeeping Forces

As of end February 2026, South Africa was contributing 382 soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions.

In 2023, SANDF soldiers on the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission to DR Congo were alleged to have committed acts of sexual abuse against Congolese civilians. The eight implicated soldiers were recalled to South Africa as the investigations were taking place.

Sonke Gender Justice noted in October 2023 that this was not the first time that the SANDF has been flagged for sexual abuse cases. The defence force’s soldiers deployed around the continent have been implicated in sexual exploitation and abuse cases ranging from rape, to taking advantage of women over the years, with about nine cases reported against South African peacekeepers in 2017 and four in 2018 respectively.

In 2025, South Africa was contributing to two regional peace operations – of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – one in DR Congo and the other in Mozambique. In the latter case, there were allegations of serious violations of IHL levelled against SANDF personnel.

DR Congo

In 2025, South Africa withdrew from the SADC peace operation in the DR Congo. The SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) was a military force tasked to support the DRC government’s struggle against M23. SAMIDRC deployment began in mid-December 2023 with troops from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania. In January 2025, M23 rebels, which were being militarily support by Rwanda, captured several towns in the Kivu region, including Goma. During the offensive, 14 SANDF soldiers were killed in clashes and ambushes, marking the largest military death toll for the country in the post-apartheid era. In March, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the end of SAMIDRC and a phased withdrawal of troops. The pullout began in late April.

Mozambique

South African troops were also part of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), a force comprising troops also from Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SAMIM was assisting the Mozambican authorities in its non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with Islamic State Mozambique. After SAMIM’s withdrawal in July 2024, the SANDF remained in Mozambique until December 2024 when it too left the country.

In January 2023, a video appeared on social media showing SANDF soldiers throwing a corpse over a pile of burning rubble apparently containing other bodies. As Human Rights Watch recalled, IHL prohibits the mistreatment of the dead. SADC leaders were quick to condemn the acts in the video and announced an investigation. But eight months later, the regional organization had still to publish its findings.

Key Weaponry in Law Enforcement Agencies

The South Africa Police Service (SAPS) has been frequently criticized for excessive use of force. South Africa needs to revise its legislation to restrict SAPS use of firearms in line with international law. International law restricts such use to a situation where it is necessary to confront an imminent threat of death or serious injury or a grave and proximate threat to life.

According to the 1995 Police Services Act, where force has to be used, this must be only ‘the minimum force which is reasonable in the circumstances’. (S. 13(3)(b), Police Services Act, No. 68 of 1995 (as amended).)The most important national legal provision governing use of force during arrest by the police is Section 49(2) of the 1977 Criminal Procedure Act (as amended). This states as follows:

If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing, but, in addition to the requirement that the force must be reasonably necessary and proportional in the circumstances, the arrestor may use deadly force only if:

(a) the suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or any other person; or

(b) the suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means of effecting the arrest, whether at that time or later.

This provision does not comply with international law governing use of firearms for law enforcement, which may only occur where either there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury or a proximate and grave threat to life.

In 2025, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) published analysis demonstrating that the SAPS disciplinary system is unlikely to sanction police brutality. The ISS said that the ‘acquittal of VIP Unit officers who assaulted victims on camera highlights the police’s failure to define and enforce standards of conduct’. In July 2023, officers were filmed dragging a driver and two passengers out of a vehicle, repeatedly kicking them as they lay on the ground, then rapidly leaving the scene. Although the eight police members face criminal charges for the assaults, SAPS ‘is unable or unwilling to convict any of them despite the video recording of the incident’.

At the trial in March 2026, at Randburg Magistrates’ Court, a VIP protection officer said he acted to protect Deputy President Paul Mashatile during the 2023 N1 incident, while another officer admitted the actions seen on video were wrong and against the law. The eight defendants face charges that include pointing a firearm, malicious damage to property, reckless and negligent driving, and assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm. A verdict had not been reached in the case at the time of writing.

SANDF law enforcement operations

In its domestic operations, the SANDF has been tasked with securing South Africa’s borders, particularly the border with Zimbabwe with a view to curbing illegal cross-border activities such as smuggling and human trafficking. Since December 2023, about 3,300 SANDF soldiers have also been used to combat illegal mining carried out by informal miners known as zama zamas. SANDF troops have also been deployed to protect Eskom infrastructure from sabotage and criminal activity since 2023.

Khosa v. Minister of Defence (2020)

This case, before the High Court in Pretoria, concerned the assault on Mr Collins Khosa on 10 April 2020 and other applicants by members of the SANDF during enforcement of the COVID-19 lockdown regulations. Mr Khosa died of his injuries, which included blunt force trauma to the head. Judge Fabricius stated in his judgment that:

 The public is … entitled to be treated with dignity and respect whether rich or poor. Section 7 of the Bill of Rights [in the Constitution] makes this abundantly clear and there is no doubt about that. They are also entitled to human dignity and this right needs to be respected and protected as again made abundantly clear by section 10 of the Bill of Rights. Similarly the public is entitled to the right to life by way of section 11, and everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person according to the provisions of section 12 which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources, not to be tortured in any way, and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. Section 12(2) provides that everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes the right to security in and control over their body.

Compliance with the Law of Law Enforcement and Human Rights by the Police

Some SAPS officers have used excessive force in the course of their work. Indeed, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) claims that use of excessive force ‘is not a problem of a few “bad apples”, but a routine part of everyday policing in many places across South Africa.’

The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) is tasked with conducting ‘independent, impartial and quality investigations’ of crimes allegedly committed by members of SAPS. IPID’s 2023/2024 Annual Report identified more than 5,000 cases that had been reported over the preceding twelve months. These included 460 deaths due to police action (a 17% increase from the previous year); 212 deaths in police custody; 273 cases of torture (a 20% rise in reported incidents); and a 75% increase in cases of rape within police custody. Moreover, as of June 2025, the parliamentary committee charged with its oversight – the Portfolio Committee on Police – expressed its concern about the backlog of 14,469 cases and called for ‘urgent strategies to remedy the concern’.

These and other issues discussed below raise red flags in relation to any decision to export firearms and less-lethal weapons for use by SAPS.

Sometimes there may have been a discriminatory element to abuse by SAPS officers. Thus, for example, in 2013, in Daveyton, east of Johannesburg, a Mozambican taxi driver, Mido Macia, was seized by SAPS officers for parking his vehicle in a way that blocked traffic. Video footage recorded by a bystander showed uniformed policemen handcuffing him and tying him to the back of a van, dragging him helplessly for about 500 metres along as they drove away. He was later found dead in a pool of blood in a police holding-cell with injuries sustained during a brutal beating after being held in formal custody. An initial post-mortem found that Mr Macia had died of head injuries and internal bleeding. Two years later, eight SAPS officers were convicted of murder.

Just two weeks after the fatal attack on Mr Macia, another SAPS officer was charged with attempted murder after dragging a man alongside his car for about 100 metres in Setlopo village in Mafikeng in North West province. The victim had witnessed him engage in unlawful conduct. The man suffered injuries to his feet and was taken to hospital by a neighbour.

Most shockingly, past abuses include the mass killing and wounding of striking miners at Marikana in 2012, which led to the establishment of a national commission of inquiry. The 2015 Report by the Commission was highly critical of the actions of SAPS in relation to the events at the Lonmin Plc platinum mine. In particular, the Commission confirmed that the ‘decisive cause’ of the shooting to death of thirty-four striking mineworkers and the wounding of another seventy-four on 16 August 2012 was the decision taken by senior SAPS officials the previous night to disperse the strikers, using force if necessary. Despite being warned of the risks of bloodshed, they ‘nevertheless proceeded with that plan at a time when there was no reason to do so’.

Seventeen of the protestors died in a wave of semi-automatic rifle fire at one place. The Commission attributed the outcome to reckless planning and a reliance on tactical units armed with assault rifles, which the Commission said was ‘effectively operating as a firing squad’. Shortly after, at a second location to which some of the strikers had fled, some 500 metres away, police shot 295 rounds of live ammunition, killing a further seventeen strikers. The massacre was the gravest use of lethal force by the police in post-apartheid South Africa.

More recently, Amnesty International reports that in July 2025, the KwaZulu-Natal province police commissioner denounced political interference and corruption in the criminal justice system, which included collusion by law enforcement officials with criminal syndicates; and government interference in police investigations. The commissioner further alleged abuse of power by the Minister of Police, Senzo Mchunu, in connection with his disbanding of the Political Killings Task Team without consultation or explanation.

President Ramaphosa responded by announcing the appointment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the allegations, and the minister of police’s immediate ‘leave of absence’. Appearing before a parliamentary committee in October 2025, the suspended minister acknowledged that the Task Team had achieved successes in reducing political killings in KwaZulu-Natal but argued that it was limited in scope, under-resourced nationally, and unsustainable as a standalone entity. As of May 2026, Mr Mchunu remained on a leave of absence.

Risk of Diversion of Imported Weapons

There has been no confirmed diversion of weapons that were legally imported into South Africa in recent years.